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Activity of public institutions
1.1. Calm waters
Spirits have calmed down in the legislature with political debates ending and deputies shifting their attention to less important legal acts.
1.2. Legal acts
Law on Investments in Entrepreneurship provides legal, social, and economic principles of investment activity, investor's rights and responsibilities, mandate of pubic authorities in the field, guarantees provided by the state to domestic and foreign investors, and procedures for joint ventures operation.
Opposition parties criticised the chapter on state guarantees to compensate damages incurred by investors, on the grounds those were just words not backed up by adequate policies with investors being persecuted (Union Fenosa, Farmaco, Megadat, expropriation of "Dacia" hotel).
Generally speaking, the law did not add any new guarantees or methods of fostering investors. The latter shall be included in the fiscal, customs, and property law. It only establishes the general framework of the state policy on investments. The latter will be developed and enforced by the Government, in particular through the Ministry of Economy.
Law on cancelling penalties and fines to rayonal thermo-enterprises annulled the penalties and fines incurred by rayonal thermo-enterprises as of January 1, 2004. Their debt is estimated at 22.5 million Lei. Another 22.5 represent the fines and penalties. The enterprises have no chance whatsoever to pay the debts incurred, whereas by annulling them the state hopes to boost the sector.
Another legal act passed by the Parliament, Law on modification of the law on taking in and out of the country goods by natural entities is:
Law on completing Code on Administrative Offences introduces a new article - Breaching the law on state representation in economic enterprises. This article provides sanctions ranging 3,600 and 54,000 Lei for: violation of rights and legal interests of the state during the establishment, operation, reorganisation and liquidation of societies, thereby the state shall be ascribed the role of participant having unlimited rights or its participation quota in registered capital shall be decreased, in cases prohibited by law; concealing the conditions in which a state representative holds or has got a patrimonial interest in the economic enterprise and failed to notify authorised bodies; concealing data on economic or financial activity or any other information that state authorities is entitled to request, etc.
Law on the modification of legal acts regulating operative activity, holding guns and licensing of certain types of activity brings a number of legal acts in accordance with the provisions of the new Code on Penal Procedures and Law on Private Detectives and Security.
In addition legislative body ratified a number of international treaties:
(For further details on Parliament activity see http://www.e-democracy.md/en/comments/legislative/)
2.1. Reshuffles
Constantin Mihailescu and Igor Semenovscher were designated to head the newly emerged structures after the restructuring of Ministry of Environment, Construction and Territory Planning, namely Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources and Department of Constructions and Territory Planning respectively.
Other reshuffles brought Svetlana Dohotaru to the position of Senior Director of the aforesaid Department, Olga Goncearova to the Head of Interethnic Department thus replacing Tatiana Mlecico, Ion Dron would head Legislative Centre replacing Parascovia Copacinschi. Aurelian Danila was ousted from the position of Dean of Academy of Arts, Theatre and Movie, whereas Iurie Moraru from the position of Head of the Government Press Service. Other reshuffles envisaged Adrian Fetescu being appointed as Deputy Director of the Licensing Chamber and Andrei Neguta, Republic of Moldova Ambassador to France being designated to cover Spain as well.
2.2. Decisions
2.3. Fighting corruption
Commission entrusted to work out the National Strategy on Fighting Corruption convened on a work session on March 19 and approved draft strategy and Action Plan with certain amendments. The latter refer to including new chapters "that will provide the necessary conditions for mass media to conduct journalistic investigations as well as on liability of control bodies upon incurring damages to businesses". Within five days Commission Secretariat shall operate the amendments and then submit it to Parliament.
3.1. Decree
As a follow up to President Voronin's call to build an informational society in the Republic of Moldova, a decree to this effect was passed on March 19. Under the decree, building informational society in the Republic of Moldova is set as a top national priority. It also defines the four tasks Government would have to undertake in this respect, two of them are establishing the National Commission for Building Informational Society in Moldova and working out by the end of the year a Strategy and an Action Plan in this respect.
Indeed President's initiative is a worthy one. It remains to be seen whether it wouldn't be compromised as it happened with the Strategy of European Integration which wasn't developed yet, although it should have been ready by March 14, 2003.
3.2. Tasks for the Academy of Science
On the eve of general assembly of the Moldovan Academy of Science, on March 17 President Voronin paid a visit and met employees of the Institute of Economic Research, Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, Political Science and Law; Institute of Interethnic Research and Genetics Institute. President talked consolidating collaboration between the Academy of Science' institutions and public institutions so as to make full use of scientific research in developing public policies.
A catastrophe, that's how President viewed Moldovan science. He called on a structural reform and outlined the main targets in this respect, namely "establish a favourable environment to boost innovations, /�/ developing the legal framework allowing the sale of scientific research results; /�/ establishing the legal framework that would allow the transition from flawed state funding in research to state investments in science and innovation /�/ establishing conditions for it (science) to interact with education". In this respect President outlined ruling party's intentions in the field of science: concentrate state allocations for scientific research so that they could be accessed only through the Academy of Science; have all scientific institutions under the subordination of the Academy of Science; accrediting Academy institutions; changing Academy structure so that Supreme Council for Science would become a collective executive body of the Academy; raising salaries to scientific researchers; concluding an agreement between Academy and Government that would outline each other's responsibilities.
3.3. Session of the Ministry of Energetics' College
In his speech at the Ministry of Energetics' College, President Voronin criticised its activity. He dubbed it a "central controller" and pointed that it would become "the centre" of the industry only after reorganisation. For that to happened President believed the Ministry should: modernise distribution networks, cut production costs, reduce wasted energy, enforce in the next 3 years the Strategy of developing the capacity to generate electricity so as to contribute to energetic sustainability of the country; and decentralise heating system, etc.
1. Monetary and credit policy
On March 26, 2004 National Bank Council of Administration decided to keep interest levels at the level set back in December 2003. National Bank officials claim the decision took into account the evolution of macroeconomic indicators, inflation rate, and monetary indicators.
Also, the basic annualised interest rate was set at 14% and is to be applied for refinancing of commercial banks via REPO operations of buying state securities and T-bills for a two month period. Interest rate on lombard facility, overnight credits and commercial bank's deposits attracted by National Banks were kept steady at 16%, 17% and 3% respectively. Interest rate on long-term credits (over five years) reached 11.5 %.
2. Banking sector
In 2004 acquisition of foreign currency in cash from the population has exceeded by far the amount of sale. In January commercial banks bought 24.7 million USD more in cash than in December 2003. In February the difference reached 30.3 million USD. Also in January financial and banking institutions bought 9.3 million Euro, whereas in February only 6.6 million Euro. Throughout 2003 banks gained 302 million USD and 103 million Euro as a result of difference in buying and selling rates and there is evidence that the gains would further grow. National Bank seeking to fill its foreign currency reserves, accounts for about ? of foreign currency buying operations. At the beginning of the year net foreign currency reserves amounted 159.83 million USD, whereas at the end of February they reached 176.69 million USD. Gross foreign currency reserves are estimated at 310.91 million USD and cover for 2.2-2.3 month import. Such a surge in National Bank's assets has led to a considerable increase in M0 money supply. Based on the evolution of the main monetary indicators one may assume that by the end of first quarter National Bank's foreign currency reserves would reach 320 million USD.
3. Trade policies
In 2003 amount of goods manufactured in free economic zones rose 1.5 over last year. Moreover, 75% of it was exported. Last year residents of free economic zones transferred 64.9 million Lei to the state budget. Free Economic Zones proved to be an efficient mechanism of the investment policies pursued by the state. Decision-makers at the Ministry of Economy say those zones play an important role in the economy of the regions. For instance "Valcanes" transferred 5.6 million Lei to the state budget, i.e. 48% of the rayon budget revenues. A similar situation is in Taraclia with "Tvardita" being one of the main sources of revenues. Net investments placed in that region last year reached 51.3 million USD.
4. Privatisation
Government announced a new tender for its 99.97% share in "Nis-Struguras" enterprise. In the previous round, last year, only one company had bidden, i.e. Russian "Parom" from Moscow. Therefore privatisation was adjourned. Privatisation followed after investor failed to comply with assumed obligations as provided for in the privatisation contract. Government sources say the contract was annulled as "Tarom" failed to pay in due time the 1.5 million USD it had pledged to invest in line with the contract signed by both parties and laws in enforce.
1. The official Chisinau urges the resumption of talks in the five-sided format
During a press conference held on 16 March in Chisinau, the Moldovan Minister of Reintegration Vasile Sova called upon the mediators to determine an exact date for the resumption of talks in the pentagonal format. According to Minister Sova, the prospects for resuming the talks are real; however, additional efforts need to be made. He urged the mediators on behalf of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE to initial the necessary consultations in order to summon a five-sided meeting by the end of March, according to the agreements reached in Belgrade.
Vasile Sova reiterated Chisinau's concerns with regard to the unilateral actions of the Transnistrian administration, which are intended to destabilise the situation and tension the relations with Chisinau, referring to the incidents around the Moldovan police commissariat in Tighina (Bender) and the situation of Romanian language schools in Transnistria. Thus, Sova was quoted by Basa-press as saying that: "one can sense the symptoms of a crisis situation, which could be prevented by resuming negotiations in the widest format. /.../ However, if our efforts prove without result, we will probably have to call for a special meeting of the Permanent Council of the OSCE in Vienna ".
On the other hand, William Hill, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, told the press on 16 March that the Transnistrian authorities are tergiversating purposefully the resumption of talks in the five-sided format. According to Hill, the Transnistrian authorities have declined repeatedly the OSCE requests to name an exact date when they would be available to attend a five-sided meeting along with the Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian and OSCE representatives.
2. The Russian elections and the priorities of the Transnistrian "foreign policy"
"The foreign policy of Transnistria has remained unchanged and is historically oriented towards priority links with Russia and Ukraine. The maintenance and consolidation of these links represent our strategic priorities", the Transnistria leader Igor Smirnov was quoted as saying by Transnistrian official news outlets during a pres conference on 22 March in Tiraspol, which was gathered to make an assessment of the political year 2003 and set the foreign policy priorities for 2004. Smirnov thanked the two states for successfully conducting the peace operations in the region and for their contribution to the conflict settlement process. Furthermore, he expressed hope that the two states will continue to play a prominent role both in the settlement process and in the post-settlement reconstruction efforts.
The assertive tone of Smirnov's statements can be easily attributed to the results of the presidential elections in Russia. On the eve of the election, Smirnov met in Moscow with the Russian President Vladimir Putin, with whom he discussed the Transnistrian issue. On the day of the voting Smirnov called upon Russia to increase its role of the power that ensures the "peace and security" in Transnistria and urged Russia to set permanent military bases in Transnistria and to speed up the process of acquisition of Russian citizenship by the inhabitants of Transnistria. Thus, one can easily understand the context within which the Transnistrians have been calling lately for a final and just settlement of relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, and for the legal consolidation of the Transnistrian statehood on the international arena.
3. The evacuation of Russian weapons from Transnistria
A trainload of approximately 100 tons of Russian weapons was evacuated from Transnistria on the night from 24 to 25 March. This has been the first trainload of Russian weapons to be evacuated from the region this year, after a three-month pause. The spokesperson of the OSCE Mission to Moldova Claus Neukirch confirmed the fact that the load was evacuated, but specified that the OSCE Mission military experts were not allowed to witness the loading, but were let in only at the end of the operation. According to Neukirch, the Transnistrian authorities have not given a date for the transportation of the next load of weapons.
4. The Kozak Plan in the attention of the international community
Ambassador Stephen Pifer, Deputy Assistant of the US State Secretary, expressed in Moscow confidence that in the result of the visit to Washington of the Russia Deputy Foreign Minister Veaceslav Trubnikov this April, the Russian settlement plan, also known as the "Kozak Plan", will be "injected new energy". According to Russian news agencies, quoted by Basa-press, the American diplomat said that Russia should assume a part of the blame for the failure of the Kozak Plan, because the plan provided for the participation of a 2000 troops strong Russian peacekeeping contingent instead of the maximum 500 that Russia had announced within previous consultations with European officials.
Referring to the same Kozak Plan, the electronic issue of the Moscow daily "Nezavisimaia Gazeta" published on 25 March a comment by the German political analyst Aleksander Rahr. The comment argues that the plan elaborated by one of the most promising men from the Putin team, Dmitri Kozak, was intended as a model for recovering the former Soviet republics. Thus, writes Rahr, the confederation model drafted for Moldova, in the event of success, would have been proposed to Georgia, then to Armenia and Azerbaijan. The transformation of the former Soviet republics into confederal states would have gradually led to the transformation of the CIS into a quasi-confederal entity. Rahr argues that Russia will oppose any proposals for international peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet area, and as long as the West keeps the door to the European Union and NATO closed for the Georgians, the Moldovans and the Ukrainians, Russia's influence will only be rising. Thus, concludes Rahr, "the fate of the partnership between Russia and the West during Putin's second mandate will be decided not in the diplomatic saloons of Brussels, Washington, London, Rome or Berlin, but in such hot spots as Batumi, Suhumi or Tiraspol".
1. European integration
According to a press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the last round (the 3rd one) of negotiations on the Action Plan Republic of Moldova - EU should have been held in mid-March. However, it was adjourned, fact that raised eyebrows among media outlets. They now speculate that negotiation process was stalled. Later on, British Embassy, after a meeting of a number of European diplomats with Moldovan Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued a press release saying "negotiations were not stalled /�/ At this stage, EU member countries and new members review negotiation outcomes with all neighbourhood countries involved in Enlarged Europe program so as to determine future actions. The main goal is to obtain clear and positive outcome in discussions on action plans, including for the Republic of Moldova".
The gist of this explanation has been confirmed by sources in Ministry of Foreign Affairs who expect negotiations to resume end of March or early next month. Afterwards, authorities would have to complete the action plan so as to submit it to Brussels by May.
2. GUUAM
National Co-ordinators of GUAM countries flew to Azerbaijan capital Baku for a meeting. Moldova was represented by Sergiu Stati, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to RIA "Novosti" cited by "BASA-press", topping the agenda were streamlining GUUAM internal structure, enforcing agreements previously signed and regional co-operation.
Fire on headquarters!
Igor Botan
Although oppositions' efforts in establishing a single electoral coalition do not inspire much confidence, this did not stop ruling party from engaging in a large-scale campaign aimed at denigrating and breaking it apart. And this because, weak and shattered as it is, opposition claims it seeks to seize the power amidst worsening social and economic conditions, largely due to sharp price hike on energy and food. What makes things even worse is that public funds are wasted to keep a soaring bureaucratic apparatus brought by the incumbent governance led administrative-territorial revision.
Also, ruling party's economic policies tarnish the image the country is projecting abroad, as well as its investment climate. As if to underline this point, 10 Ambassadors including USA, EU together with heads of international monetary institutions and Council of Europe had publicly expressed their lingering concerns with regard to authorities' attempts to strangle businesses in Moldova. Moreover, diplomats' act followed shortly after Presidency's attacks on OSCE Head of Mission in Moldova.
Relations with major foreign partners, including Russia, worsened as well. Recently Vladimir Putin chose to talk ways of settling Transdnistrian conflict with separatist leader Igor Smirnov rather than President Voronin.
All of the aforesaid emerged after last year local elections that showed a slight decrease in Communists' rating and that amidst better economic and political climate than today. If things go on like this, Communists run the risk of falling short of votes so as to control the entire state machine. Under those circumstance there are two things that could secure Communists a landslide victory: resorting to administrative levers and keeping opposition shattered and frustrated.
Accordingly, those were the goals that Communists set for themselves. President Voronin made them public during one of the Communist Party plenary sessions last summer. Back then, referring to Moldova Noastra Alliance (Our Moldova) President said: "It would be inexcusable for us to sit and wait until our political foes start fighting. Only naives in politics may underestimate their ability to unite together upon crisis; though political naiveness has been always liable". Recently President Voronin was more explicit when saying that Christian Democratic Peoples' Party "is to be neutralised".
Those words were in fact calls for action. In this sense, Moldovan situation is very much reminiscent to that of China when on the eve of Communist plenary in 1996 Great Helmsman Mao called for "Fire on headquarters!" Afterwards the so-called squads of "hunveibins" armed with Mao's quotations proceeded to settling scores with his political foes. As a result only in the Communist Party Central Committee 90 out of the total 170 members were "neutralised".
2. Techniques
Propagandists of Moldovan state-run media or that affiliated to ruling party acts like "hunveibins", thereby triggering backlashes, especially as the state-run media supposedly should not engage in the information war between power and opposition. On the contrary, one may find that state-run media attacks on opposition are methodist and well co-ordinated so as to secure a maximal impact in ridiculing, denigrating and disorienting it.
For instance after Communist majority faction withdrew the parliamentary immunity and started the criminal investigation on the Christian-Democrat leaders, state-run media has systematically set upon them featuring them as an extremist group just because they protest against Russia's failure to comply with its obligation to withdraw munitions and troops from the soil of Transdnistria, which is separate from Moldova and is controlled by citizens of Russia. What is striking is the discrepancy between Russia's supportive attitude towards its citizens, leaders of the breakaway Transdnestrian regime, who usurped the power on a portion of Republic of Moldova territory, and Moldovan authorities' attitude towards its citizens who protest against such a state of affairs. As a result Christian-Democrats accused of extremism have a tighter berth for manoeuvres in coalition building.
As for Moldova Noastra Alliance (MNA), the goal is to disunite its leaders by having a differentiate approach to each of them. Thus, Co-Chair Veceaslav Untila is mocked by the very same state-run media for issuing irrelevant declarations, or for serving previously in road police. Other Co-chair, Dumitru Braghis, albeit ridiculed for statements made four years ago, has been made a generous offer to share his social-democratic aspirations in the state-run media, in the hope that it would reveal lack of cohesiveness in Moldova Noastra leaders' ideas. Preferential treatment Braghis has enjoyed lately and the declaration made by one of the MN's moguls to the effect that social-democratic wing headed by Braghis might leave the Alliance, have generated rumours that Braghis was made a proposition to replace Vasile Tarlev as a Prime Minister. Such rumours greatly undermine MN capacity to become a stable unifying centre for an eventual electoral bloc. The buzz is backed up by Braghis' previous intention to keep Prime Minister seat expressed on numerous occasions after Communists' victory in 2001 elections.
And yet the third MNA Co-chair, Serafim Urechean, is also permanently under fire. Those systematic and well co-ordinated attacks started two years ago. Back then, once early local elections were announced (later on cancelled by a Constitutional Court ruling) state-run media featured a denigrating article on Mayor Urechean accusing him of corruption and many other murky affairs. In parallel, state TV reported on street kids and again accused the mayor of ignoring their problems, in contrast to Russian President Putin (?!), who at that time engaged in solving their problems in his own country. On top of that, Urechean was presented as rather conservative, not even appreciating such a popular band as "Zdop si Zdup", whom President Voronin himself awarded state orders.
That was the first sign for Serafim Urechean that ruling party was not on his side and in fact sought to step him down, albeit until that very moment he had been spoiled by state-run media and in fact surreptitiously employed it throughout his 1999 campaign. And that despite Urechean's openness to collaborate with the ruling party at the very beginning. One year later Urechean claimed that back then President offered him an Ambassador position in exchange for not running for Chisinau Mayoralty.
Henceforth, Chisinau Mayor has been a target of political flak, with state-run media insistently working towards discrediting Urechean's image and his managerial skills. Most recently it was announced that several criminal investigations against Mayor Urechean are almost completed. Moreover, based on preliminary investigation of a special commission, governmental press alleged that "Wheat Mafia" seeking to undermine the incumbent ruling by increasing the price on breadstuffs, which was uncovered by President Voronin himself during a recent Supreme Security Council session, was after all headed by Serafim Urechean.
On top of that, Urechean regularly faces all kinds of administrative barriers. The recent announcement by the Communist faction in the Municipal Council that it would be in intransigent opposition to the Mayor would only further the ongoing backfire between ruling party and MNA leader.
3. Possible outcomes
Having in mind authorities' actions in the previous electoral campaign when several candidates running for mayoralty had been arrested and released immediately after elections, similar actions are to be expected in the upcoming elections. For example if opposition managed to build a coalition that would pose a threat to ruling party, criminal investigations against Christian-Democrats and Serafim Urechean would be resumed so as to, let's say, convict them and suspend the sentence on probation. This way, opposition would be decapitated right on the eve of elections by prohibiting their names to be included in the candidate lists.
When under fire opposition leaders are tensed and suspicious of each other. Moreover, amidst those growing concerns, they would hardly engage in party building or effective dialogue with smaller parties, i.e. potential partners, in view of forming electoral coalitions.
Leaving aside harassment by governors, the actions of MNA leaders raised a few eyebrows. To establish the much-publicised coalition under the auspices of MNA it was simply enough to launch a dialogue on one simple condition, parties at the negotiation table should not make any public statements until the end of negotiations or until they decide to leave the negotiation table for good. Normally, basic principles and algorithm for building the coalition were to be worked out in the course of negotiations. However, MNA set some conditions right from the beginning as to what algorithm should be used in drawing the candidate lists, including such criteria as number of parties that merged before. Thereby, they have drawn authorities' attention to the way MNA itself was established. In fact it was discovered that the merger wasn't completed yet, although almost one year passed. After this incident, would-be coalition partners may want to give another thought as to MNA' organisational potential.
Nor do the actions undertaken by MNA' potential allies inspire much optimism. They rant about the conditions set by MNA at press conferences, saying that a coalition would not be possible. And this per se is a visible evidence to the efficiency of the "fire on headquarters" strategy. Moreover, opposition runs the risk of engaging itself in a "backlash", an illustration to this effect are the media outlets affiliated to Christian Democrats and to MNA. This backlash serves the best interests of the ruling party.
The concluding point to be made is that it remains to be seen yet what regroupings are likely to happen. For now, opposition runs out of time in managing to regroup, build a coalition and go public as an organised and competitive force.
Crisis aftermath
Iurie Gotisan
Even back in October it was quite clear that prices would be propelled further upwards, and this because of surging production costs. If there are to be any bread manufacturers at all, then they should be entitled to a profit margin, at least a minimal one. Moreover, given the rising cost of wheat and the gaping lack of grain on the internal market one may well expect that the previous price hike would not be the last one. Though, governmental officials are well aware of that. Therefore, one may rightly wonder should people be warned beforehand about any price hike?
On the one hand, if announced beforehand, the market and stores would be a mess. Government should have announced early during the harvesting period that given the circumstances a price hike was inevitable, for the citizens to have time to find alternative sources. Franzeluta's increase of prices back in November 2003 beset a social upheaval. Prices surged by 30-60% depending on breadstuff. Though, the bread whose price Franzeluta claimed kept steady was nowhere to be found.
Recent tensions between bread manufacturers and governmental structures, which certainly are politically motivated, stand out as testimony to the fact that the famous promise to keep bread prices down made by Communists in elections, was compromised by economic realities. It is known for a fact that governmental officials pledged to keep the prices down or at least steady for another couple of months, regardless of market outlook. It is also true that the state did try to keep prices under control, move that besides running counter to the very principles of market economy where prices are shaped by offer and demand. It is all-too-clear now that market forces impinge on the political will of the ruling party. Currently grain reserve of the Republic of Moldova reached 30 thousand tones, amount enough to take it until April 15. Moldova's wheat harvest in 2003 was ten times less than in 2002 amounting to only 102 tones. Amidst those negative developments in the agricultural sector, it's hard to predict as to how Moldova would cope without foreign aid.
On top of that, sharp price hike on bread sets a favourable economic and psychological climate for a hike in prices on other food products. As if to underline this point a big dairy manufacturer has already announced it would revise its prices. Unless bread prices drop to the previous average, one might well expect other prices to be propelled further upwards in the next couple of months, so as to balance the level of relative prices on food products.
Besides the likelihood of other prices being adjusted to surged breadstuffs price, there is also the risk of triggering an inflationary spiral. Trade unions would demand labour contracts to be renegotiated, whereas social rallies and strikes would be inevitable. To diminish the domestic debt Government might have to give up timely payment of foreign debt so as to be able to raise pensions and nominal subsidies without even having funds to cover for them. And such a move would definitely upsurge foreign debt.
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