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Activity of public institutions
1.1. Tensions build
Parliament convened for only two sessions during the past two weeks, which were as tensed as the previous ones. Again Christian-Democrats blocked the central tribune, thereby demanding data on the controls conducted by the Court of Accounts on public funds spending by central public administration to be made public and calling on Parliament Chair resignation.
As usual, at the beginning of the session Parliament Chair called on Christian-Democrats to observe the Parliament Regulation, however they refused to do so. Last week thought, majority faction proceeded to amend the Parliament Regulation that would allow sanctioning deputies who obstruct plenary sessions.
1.2. Legal acts
Law on establishing diplomatic duty free shops provides for opening a duty free shop in Chisinau to serve diplomatic corps where goods shall be sold based on identity cards issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in amounts enough for personal or family use, which shall not be subject of resale. Foreign missions would be allowed to purchase goods in larger amounts with the previous authorisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Government is to decide on the establishment, operation and sale of goods in the diplomatic duty free shops.
The law does not stipulate whether duty free shops would be state-owned, joint venture or private; no does it specify whether a tender is to be held to select the successful bidder. The Government would have to decide on those issues in the Regulation it is to develop. And only then, would we see whose interests are at stake.
Via Law on converting the debts of the "Tracom" tractor plant into shares Parliament decided to convert the 12.5 million Lei debt into shares to be owned by the state. Thereby state would hold 93% of the registered capital, fact that reportedly would boost production of agricultural machinery and tractors in the country.
Law on settling historic debts to the state budget of "Mezon" joint venture under insolvency procedures authorises Ministry of Finance and Creditors Council to settle Mezon's debts worth 1.7 m Lei by transferring its patrimony into the property of Basarabeasca rayon. The patrimony shall be transferred via alienation. Noteworthy, the plant was part of the industrial military complex. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union its production shrank and in 2000 it undergone insolvency procedures under a resolution of the Economic Court at the request of the Ministry of Finance.
Law on the modification of the Law on Local Public Administration provides that privatisation and other auxiliary activities shall fall within the competence of rayon public administration. Given that territorial agencies of the Privatization Department were shut down, their functions have been delegated to rayon (municipal) local public administration. Therefore, selling plots, real estate in state property shall be the prerogative of local authorities.
Via the Law on ratifying the Protocol on free railway tickets for veterans Parliament ratified the Protocol on enforcing the Resolution of the Council of the CIS Chief of States that entitled WWII veterans to a free railway ride once per year. The Protocol also enables veterans to choose a 50% discount on maritime or airfare.
Also, Parliament passed the Law on modification of the Law on Budgetary System and Process. Under the law funds administrators shall be responsible for executing writs of execution issued by courts, namely in the case of local and central authorities - their heads, whereas in case of debts to the central budget - Ministry of Finance via State Treasury.
Law on the modification of legal acts on social protection of citizens affected by the Cernobil accident increases monthly allocations to 100 Lei for the following: spouses incapable to work of those who took part in liquidating accident consequences and died; children up to 18 of deceased participants in liquidation; one of the parents unable to work of the deceased participants in liquidation; I degree disabled unable to work as a result of the accident, etc.
Law on modification of legal acts on declaring and control of the incomes of public officers distinguishes on the status of various categories of public officers and state officials. Also the law obliges officials to declare their income and estate, the failure to do so being sanctioned. The law extends the list of persons obliged to declare their income and estate to include elected bodies, heads of various central or local control bodies and law enforcement bodies. The minimal amount of goods to be declared is set at 50 thousand Lei. The law also perfected the mechanism of checking the declarations.
Law on the modification of legal acts on the free economic zones, provides for:
(For further details on Parliament activity see http://www.e-democracy.md/en/comments/legislative/)
2.1. Reshuffles
On April 28, Valentin Mejinschi was appointed as Director of the Centre for Fighting Economic Crime and Corruption. Noteworthy, until February 28 the position was held by Alexei Roibu, who was ousted by the Supreme Security Council as a result of the grain scandal.
Another reshuffle had Boris Cojuhari replacing Valeriu Starenco as Republic of Moldova plenipotentiary representative to the Commission on economic issues of the CIS Economic Council.
2.2. Decisions
According to Finance Minister, Zinaida Grecianii, throughout 2005-2007 income tax shall be reduced to 15% and shall be applied commencing 2006 for legal entities and 2007 for natural entities. Furthermore, commencing 2007, minimal taxation quotas shall be reduced for natural entities to 7% - first level and 10% - second level.
It is also intended to gradually increase throughout 2005-2007 exemptions to the income tax for the natural entities. In 2005 those exemptions would reach 4,500 Lei, in 2006 - 5,400 Lei, whereas in 2007 - 6,000 Lei. Exemptions for supported persons shall be increased from 240 Lei to 1,200 Lei in 2005, 1,440 Lei in 2006 and 1,680 Lei in 2007.
Note worthy, the lowest income tax in Central and Eastern Europe is to be found in Hungary, boasting 17%. In Bulgaria companies have to pay a 18% income tax, plus 8% to regional budget. In Poland, income tax amounts to 20%, whereas in Slovenia and Bulgaria exemptions from income tax are granted to companies for 3-5 years, provided they invest in national economy and open up new jobs.
3.1. Press liberalisation
On the eve of International Day of the Freedom of Press, President Voronin addressed Parliament, Government and other state institutions with "a message encouraging press liberalisation from legal and economic point of view". A press release issued by the Presidency reads "the message includes suggestions and propositions on ways of supporting domestic press". One of the propositions refers to examining possibilities "of making amendments to the Fiscal Code so as to lower local taxes on advertising, as well as VAT on advertising for informative publications". In addition, President recommended a project to be developed by the Academy of Public Administration that would bolster regional media and would urge local public administration to support media.
President also referred to the onerous state of mass media in his inauguration speech at the National Conference of the League of Professional Journalists held on May 3. While pointing to the numerous deficiencies of the domestic press President advised the journalists to hold "the mirror of the press always clean so that the shortcomings of the power be well reflected in it" thus insinuating that the reflection should not tarnish Republic of Moldova's image. It is worth mentioning yet another memorable phrase of the President "a good press should be the watchdog of the society, it should be smart and loyal to its citizens, rather than a cur easy to deceive with a piece of "mamaliga" thrown by a political mogul from the country or abroad".
3.2. International conference "BIT +"
As a follow-up to his decree of March 19 on building an information society in the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin attended International Conference "BIT +" and briefed the participants on his legal initiatives in the field, among others: law on electronic and digital signature; law on e-commerce; amendments to the legal acts exempting IT companies from income tax. Another promise was that a draft law on amending Article 49 of the Fiscal Code on favourable taxation to small business would be submitted for the examination of the Parliament.
President believed it was more important to establish "innovation climate in the country" that was to be fostered via: establishing favourable conditions for better interaction between education, science and entrepreneurship; establishing a preferential innovation climate; determining science intensive activities that bring an added value so as to exempt them from the income tax on a long term; introducing new type of management via uniting the four social ministries into a single human development ministry that would develop a well-coordinated single policy on social, educational and cultural standards.
What is striking is that during the recent restructuring of the Ministry of Environment and Territory Planning into two separate structures a totally different logical was cited, from that for uniting "social ministries".
1. Banking sector
Last week over 100 depositors of the "Guinea", "Bankosind", Banca Turco-Romana banks, "InterCapital" financial consortium, and other financial institutions that went bankrupt in the 90s staged a protest rally in front of the Parliament. "Give us the money back!", "Talmaci give us the money back" were some of their slogans.
Those people were brought into streets by desire to recover the money deposited in banks and financial institutions that went bankrupt for various reasons, either incapacity or because their leadership frittered money away. Some of the banks were doing murky bargains involving high risk, an illustration in this respect being "Guinea" bank (after spending its own capital it incurred huge debts and finally went bankrupt).
Chair of the Association of Cheated Depositors, Nestor Samofalov calls on Parliament to amend the laws on National Bank and National Securities Commission as well as the Law on Investment Funds so as to insure transparency of the banks and investment funds' activity.
Great many protestors are striving to recover their money for five years now, however not very successfully. Depositors of the bankrupt institutions believe they were deceived by the banks' administration, whereas National Bank, law enforcement forces and state authorities did nothing to help them. Previously, officials at the National Bank stated that the nine banks undergoing liquidation procedures have returned 32 m Lei, i.e. 55.7% to their depositors. Banks still owe another 27 m Lei. Neither of the banks under liquidation managed to return all the money to the depositors.
In 2003, a special commission of the Parliament entrusted to investigate the causes that had led to the bankruptcy of the said institutions found that "great many" citizens that made deposits at the said banks throughout 1996-2001 wouldn't manage to recover their money. Bank deposits would not be returned as the said banks "haven't taken necessary measures in due time" so as to ensure sound management of the funds.
2. Foreign currency policy
National currency has constantly appreciated against USD and reached its highest in the last five years being traded over 11,5 Lei per USD. According to the National Bank experts and economy-watchers the fluctuations are largely due to strong supply of foreign currency, mainly money sent home by Moldovans working abroad.
National Bank issued a press release last week reading that the supply of foreign currency from the natural entities reached in the first quarter of the 2004 119 m USD, i.e. a 76.5% increase over last year. As a result throughout January 1 - May 7, 2004 the official exchange rate has appreciated in nominal terms by 11.2% against USD and 15% against Euro.
To diminish the negative effects of the excessive supply of foreign currency on the domestic market, National Bank intervened and bought throughout January - April foreign currency amounting to 34 m USD. At the same time central bank sterilized monetary base via open-market operations worth 453 m Lei, including via REPO operations with HVS worth 163 m Lei, and deposit auctioning worth 217 m Lei.
At the same time, to meet the excessive demand for national currency without affecting foreign currency reserves, throughout the aforesaid period National Bank used reversible instruments of the foreign exchange policy, such as swap, amounting to 14.8 m USD.
Many financial analysts point that from a commercial point of view the exports are the ones being heavily affected by the weak dollar, given the nominal appreciation of the Lei in the first quarter of the year. A drop in exports would swell the trade balance deficit, whereas current account would be considerably affected. On the top of that, energy imports mainly in USD would greatly affect the latter.
Investors who underestimated foreign exchange hedging operations would be affected, if they have to make payments in Euro, whereas cash-in Euros. If Euro/USD parity would drop below 1:1, their would be a certain pressure on the banking sector from those who borrowed in Euro. National Bank of the Republic of Moldova is the "lucky one" benefiting from the current evolution of the USD, on the other hand a higher appreciated Leu would propel inflation further upwards.
National Bank claims that excessive supply of foreign currency on the domestic market might be diminished by a raft of measures, strategies and programs aimed at establishing a favourable investment climate that would encourage Republic of Moldova's citizens to invest not only in consumption, but also in the real economy sector. In this respect National Bank experts believe a raft of measures should be undertaken at the state level so as to ensure a favourable legal framework, financial incentives.
1. Transnistria Political Settlement: the five-sided talks resumed on 27 April
The five-sided political talks on the Transnistrian issue were resumed on 27 April after a five-month pause. The talks joined representatives of the Moldovan and Transnistrian sides and those of the three mediators - the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine. The Transnistrian side, which had announced earlier that it would present to the meeting its proposals on the settlement plan drafted by the mediators under the OSCE aegis last year, proposed to the Moldovan side to sign a joint statement "On the approval by the peoples of the Republic of Moldova and of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic of the creation of the federal state between the Republic of Moldova and the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic". The statement provides for the organisation of separate referendums in Moldova and Transnistria, by the model of the Cyprus referendum, whereby the "peoples of Moldova and Transnistria", according to principles of self-determination, would either approve or disapprove of creating a common, federal state. Should the vote be positive, then a Constitutional Assembly would be created to draft a Constitution. The future federal state will consist of two equal federal subjects, free to leave the federation at any time, with federal bodies made up of representatives of the two subjects on a proportional basis, and with all rights of ownership being recognised and protected.
William Hill, Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova commented on the results of the meeting by saying that the two sides remain on divergent positions, but expressed hope that these might be reconciled. Given that this was the first round of talks this year, the participants did not adopt any decision, save for an agreement to meet on a monthly basis henceforth. The next meeting was provisionally scheduled for the w/c 24 May.
The Moldovan authorities have not made any official comments yet on the contents of the Transnistrian proposal, but only said that it goes beyond the current framework of talks and hence needs to be considered separately.
The Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, on the other hand, told the Transnistrian TV on 28 April that the Transnistrian proposal should be regarded as a step forward in the negotiations process and a way of salvaging the negations from the deadlock to which these had been brought by the Moldovan side after its failure to sign the Kozak Memorandum last November.
At the same time, during a media-briefing on 5 May in Tiraspol, the Transnistrian "foreign affairs minister" Valerii Litskai told the press that despite the resumption of talks, it is very unlikely that the two sides will reach any significant agreements in the near future. He announced that the "Supreme Soviet" of Transnistria has yet to consider, within currently ongoing debates on Transnistria's foreign policy concept, whether to continue the reunification efforts or insist on a "civilised divorce" with the rest of Moldova.
These developments mark an important, although not unexpected turn of events in the process of the Transnistrian conflict resolution. Transnistria's proposal looks even more unacceptable to the Moldovan side than the Kozak Memorandum and there is little, if any, chance the parties can reach a compromise on it. Transnistria is receiving ever greater support from Russia, which, it seems, is determined to promote the Kozak Memorandum as the basic document for talks on the structure of the future federal state. While the Presidents of Russia and Moldova have not talked to each other for more than five months, the Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov is a regular guest in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, where he has received lately a number of civic and religious awards. Russia's support to and involvement in Transnistria is growing beyond these symbolic ties to expanding financial control of the region with reportedly about 60% of privatised assets in Transnistria being owned by Russian firms.
This asymmetry in the Moldovan-Transnistrian relations may only be balanced by a timely and adequate support to the Moldovan side by the European powers, in particular the European Union. Last week the Moldovan Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan told the press that the currently being drafted Moldova-EU Individual Action Plan would include a special compartment on Transnistria, including provisions on the deployment of international peacekeepers to the region. At the same time, the German Bundestag has adopted a Motion on Moldova which calls for the enforcement of German and European efforts at solving the Transnistrian conflict and reintegrating the country. The question that remains is whether this time the Moldovan leadership will find the will and vision to pursue a genuinely European course in its reintegration policy, as in all its policies.
1. Republic of Moldova - EU Action Plan
Last week after a two months break in the negations of the Republic of Moldova - EU Action Plan, Moldovan Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Stratan announced that the third round would resume on June 4. On June 15 the document should be examined by the EU Council for General Affairs, said Stratan. Moreover, Stratan also announced that as a result of EU enlargement of May 1, one of the new EU member states, either Poland, Slovenia or Hungary would be designated to "oversee Republic of Moldova's efforts on the path of EU integration".
In this respect, Minister Stratan hoped that once the Action Plan is enforced (within two years), Moldova would have all the grounds and would stand real chances of getting the status of associated member.
It's clear than nothing is clear
Igor Botan
Three years passed since the presidential decree no. 46-III of 15.05.2001 on resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict was issued. Under the decree "settling Transdnistrian conflict by observing the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty is a key task for the public authorities of the Republic of Moldova". Three priorities were singled out: a) developing and adopting a special legal status of the localities to the left of Dniester; b) restoring joint economic, social, legal and defence space as well as a single border; c) undertaking measures to build mutual trust". To enforce the decree a raft of Parliamentary and Governmental commissions and other structures were to be established so as to "speed up resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict".
As a result, Parliament established via its resolution no. 178-XV of 18.05.2001 a parliamentary Commission on Transdnistrian problem that was to "meet with representatives of Transdnistrian side on a bi-weekly basis". On December 6, 2002 Parliament passed the Law no. 1520-XV on modification and completion of the Law no. 64-XII on Government providing that "Government shall also include a Ministry of Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova", which "shall promote and ensure the enforcement of the Government policy on country reintegration".
President established via his decree no. 812-III of 01.08.2002 a State Commission for the Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova entrusted to "work out propositions on modification of the legal framework so as to bolster country reintegration process". Via Decree no. 1012-III of 12.12.2002 Vasile Sova was appointed as the Minister of Reintegration, who was entrusted via another decree no.1101-III of 31.01.2003 to "negotiate on settling Transdnistrian conflict and country reintegration�" In its turn, Government established via resolution no. 385 of 31.08.2003 an Interdepartmental Commission for the Country Reintegration entrusted to "implement unified policy of country reintegration�" Ministry of Reintegration headed by Vasile Sova was designated to oversee its activity.
In line with presidential decree no. 46-III "bodies taking part in negotiations on behalf of the Republic of Moldova are to actively cooperate with State Commissions on political resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as well as OSCE Mission and other international organisations". In this respect, Parliament ratified via Law no.760-XV of 27.12.2002 the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between Republic of Moldova and Russian Federation of 19.11.2001. Under the Treaty, contracting parties "pledged their commitment to political resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict, whereto Russian Federation is one of the mediators and guarantors..."
In fact the Treaty was signed with many legal aspects such as support of secessionism, or Russian military presence on the soil of the Republic of Moldova being inadequately tackled. As there were no clear-cut solutions as to how to settle the conflict, Article 4 of the Treaty provided that in cases when "security of any of the parties is under threat, it shall address the other Party to immediately hold consultations and examine the situation". Article 5 of the Treaty provided that "Each of the Contracting Parties shall refrain from any actions that would infringe on the other party's sovereignty, independence and its territorial integrity. The Parties condemn separatism under all its forms and pledge not to support separatist movements".
Therefore, albeit many of the aforesaid actions were actually carried out, their effects have been contrary to the outcomes Decree no. 46-III sought to achieve and even fell short of Moldovan authorities' expectations. A raft of events in the last couple of months might prove to have negative or even dangerous repercussions: total halting of the economic ties between Chisinau and Tiraspol; provocations and other actions seeking to throw Moldovan police out of Bender; threats to shut down Moldovan schools in Transdnistria; privatisation of Transdnistrian enterprises despite measures undertaken by Chisinau to halt the process; no telephone connection between the two regions for almost six months, etc.
2. Efforts to work out the legal status of Transdnistria
Noteworthy, there are evidences pointing to the numerous deviations in enforcing presidential decree no. 46-III. Thus, one year after it was signed the idea of "developing and adopting a special legal status of localities to the left of Dniester" was abandoned in favour of modifying Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, so as to transform the country into a federative one. That was provided for in the OSCE draft made public on July 3, 2002 in Kiev.
Later on, in February 2003 President Voronin gave up the idea of modifying Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and proposed to draft the Constitution anew. That was to be done by a Constitutional Commission to equally represent Moldova and Transdnistria. Parliament adopted via its resolution no. 160-XV of 04.04.2003 the Protocol on the mechanism of developing and approving the Constitution of the Federal State (that was never made public), whereas via its resolution no. 180-XV of 17.04.2003 designated three people to the said Commission. It was to be assisted by experts from OSCE and Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.
Yet the third correction in handling Transdnistrian conflict was by all means a secret one. Without notifying citizens of the country, or OSCE for that matter, which at the time was working on a new draft agreement between Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria, Vladimir Voronin asked Russian President to designate experts that were to draft constitutional principles of the "joint state" due to be formed by the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria. The resulting document - "Kozak Plan" named after Russian expert and diplomat who oversaw its elaboration, was released half a year ago and was to provide a quick solution to the Transdnistrian conflict. According to president Voronin it should have had the impact of the "Berlin wall" fall. The document was to be signed by the Moldovan President and the chief of Transdnistrian administration in the presence of Vladimir Putin on November 25, 2003. However, shortly before President Putin's arrival to Chisinau, his Moldovan counterpart changed his mind and decided to "adjourn" the document signing on the grounds "the document was developed behind Europe's back, which we intend to join".
International reactions to not consulting OSCE, EU, NATO etc while developing the "Kozak Plan" albeit diplomatic, were quite negative. Domestically, public opinion had different opinions. For instance state owned media referred to aforesaid events as a "brave initiative" of President Voronin. Opposition had its own takes on the subject and responded with protest rallies and accusations of "high treason". Constitutional experts referred to the morph from "developing and adopting a special legal status for localities to the left of Dniester" into developing a new Constitution by Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria based on parity principles, as well as to ways and procedures for reaching that goal as juridical nihilism.
3. Negotiation status
Since the "Kozak plan" signing has been "adjourned" almost half a year ago, negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol have reached a deadlock. President Voronin confirmed this in his address to the Parliament at the closing winter session: "Currently, the prospects of Transdnistrian conflict settlement seem quite gloomy". Tiraspol administration blames President Voronin for that "gloominess" in the negotiation process, also for undermining "final" solutions of settling the conflict, and what's more important for "total lack of credibility". Given the aforesaid, Tiraspol position in negotiations has become more intransigent while it insisted on extra-guarantees for the negotiations to resume.
The deadlock in negotiations for some months now has made overcoming "gloominess" a must for everyone, i.e. conflicting parties and mediators alike. And this is the more so, as some are keen to preserve the status quo, which to some opens opportunities in pursuing their goals, whereas to others to justify their mediation efforts. In this respect, to resume negotiations in January Bulgarian Chairmanship of OSCE gathered mediators (Russia, Ukraine and OSCE) for a meeting in Sofia. Parties agreed that negotiation format should not be changed. Two weeks later on February 13, OSCE Mission in Chisinau released a new plan entitled "Propositions and recommendations of the mediators, i.e. OSCE, Russian Federation and Ukraine on Transdnistrian conflict settlement". Moreover, they called on Chisinau and Tiraspol to come up with propositions on amending the plan, which were to be discussed in late February at Belgrade mediators' reunion.
Chisinau did submit its recommendations; however it failed to present them to its own people. Only mediators, Tiraspol administration and some international institutions have had a chance to take a good look at the document. Well, the only thing Moldovans did really learn was that the new draft Moldovan authorities came up with was nothing but an amended version of the "Kozak Plan"; info disclosed by foreign political analysts, in particular American analyst Vladimir Socor. The latter also revealed that Moldovan authorities intend to hold a referendum on the modification of the Republic of Moldova Constitution simultaneously with parliamentary elections, in the hope that the move would resolve the conflict. Those suppositions are very much in line with President Voronin's claims that Transdnistrian conflict would be settled by April 2005.
Transdnistrian authorities did not come up with any propositions at the Belgrade meeting as they were quite happy with the "Kozak Plan" as it was. OSCE Mission in Chisinau was quite critical of their position as well as of their thwarting pentagonal negotiations. Nevertheless negotiations resumed on April 27. Still the situation is quite uncertain. On top of that, resumed negotiations were a good opportunity for Tiraspol to release the draft "Declaration on endorsement by the people of the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic of the federative state establishment".
It is all-to-clear that the draft Declaration issued by the Transdnistrian authorities was part of its plan to make its position more intransigent. Indeed, last year on August 8 Tiraspol released its own draft Constitution for the "joint state" that is to be founded by the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria. That draft was in fact copied from the confederation model to be found in Serbia and Montenegro Constitution (see political comment "Transdnistrian project"). It provided for the subject's rights to secession. This time however, Transdnistrian leaders propose the Declaration itself to be subject to a separate referendum to be held in Moldova and Transdnistria, making possible to legalise secessionism prior to the establishment of a "joint state", in case that people on either sides would give up on establishing a "joint state" at the would-be referendum.
4. Tiraspol's dexterity or Chisinau' inconsistency
Regardless of the attitude one might have towards Tiraspol separatist regime, undoubtedly it is very efficient in pursuing its goals. For instance in 1994 it secured the documents synchronising the evacuation of Russian troops with working out its legal status to be signed; in 1996 it earned the right to foreign trade based on the customs seals provided by Republic of Moldova; in 1997 the famous Memorandum granted it the status of equal party in building the "joint state" together with the Republic of Moldova; in 2002 it pushed Moldovan authorities in accepting the "joint state" to be a federation; in 2003 via "Kozak Plan" it was on the verge of its statehood being recognized, having the right to veto in the would-be Federation Senate with only ? of the votes, while holding 1/3 of seats - all of that in a "demilitarised" territory with great many guarantees provided by Russian Federation, including those in line with the Treaty signed with the Republic of Moldova. Indeed, such a performance is a huge incentive for Transdnistrian leaders to keep striving for their ultimate goal, i.e. recognition of their independence. For this to happen, even Transdnistrian Constitution was amended so as to allow Igor Smirnov to stay in power until the ultimate goal is fully achieved. Smirnov even issued a statement in this respect claiming that he would leave the position only when the country becomes independent.
In the eyes of many Transdnistrian achievements are largely due to the Moldovan governments' inconsistency, rather than dexterity of separatist leaders. If Republic of Moldova had accepted federalisation and thus made its last concession, then 2002 OSCE plan wouldn't seem like the worst scenario. At least OSCE Plan provided for a classical federalisation model and laid the grounds for a sovereign state. It acknowledged peoples' sovereignty on the entire soil of the Republic of Moldova; it provided for a single economic, monetary and customs space; it distinguished quite clearly between the prerogatives of the federal centre and its subjects, with the former exercising the most important ones; it left the issue of federation subjects open, thereby not clarifying on the representation method in the upper chamber of the Parliament; and the law enforcement forces were similar to classic federation model.
Having said that, it is not clear why the President went for "Kozak Plan", which: did not clarify to whom "joint state" sovereignty belongs to; left in the competence of the federal centre only citizenship of the "joint state" and meteorology issues, while transferring the main prerogatives either in the joint competence of the centre and subjects or in the exclusive competence of the subjects; legalised the right to secession; provided for demilitarisation of the "joint state"; granted Russian Federation exclusive right to guarantee "Kozak Plan" enforcement, albeit it was involved in the conflict right from the beginning and was openly supporting Tiraspol leaders, who by the way are Russian citizens, etc. Moldovan authorities realized what a trap had been set only on November 23, 2003 when Russian Defence Minister, Serghei Ivanov, made public Russia's plans to deploy a 2,000 peacekeeping squad in Transdnistria until 2020. Ivanov went as far as saying that he had given the relevant orders in this respect once Transdnistrian leaders conditioned accepted of the "Kozak Plan", by Russia's deployment of its military on the soil of Moldova for thirty years.
Ironically, the last OSCE draft agreement issued on February 13, 2004 and developed while "Kozak Plan" had been worked out "behind Europe's back" is favourable to the establishment of a classic federation, especially as it had the deficiencies of the 2002 draft eliminated. Still, the last draft OSCE came up with, should have taken into account the "achievements of the Kozak Plan" in as far as subject's right to secession and demilitarisation of the Republic of Moldova is concerned.
5. Conclusions
Moldovan authorities' teetering in choosing the right solution has resulted in Transdnistrian leaders proposing Chisinau to choose between "Kozak Plan" and their draft Declaration. The move is solely intended to thwart negotiations. Meanwhile, Tiraspol leaders keep talking of the impossibility to reach an agreement with incumbent Moldovan authorities that "lost their credibility" and are guilty of all the worlds' ills. Therefore, on the eve of the parliamentary elections Tiraspol is showing Chisinau the other side of the actions it undertook against Transdnistrian leader when he was running for re-election in 2001. Back then Tiraspol administration was accused of corruption, weapons, drugs and human trafficking, etc in an attempt to sack Smirnov. "Grom" (Thunderstorm) show launched at the National Television was intended specifically to serve as "purifier after a storm" from the "Smirnov criminal regime". In fact, though, "Grom" had the contrary effect to what the presidential decree no. 64-III referred to as "measures aimed at building mutual trust". That is why official media in Transdnistria alleging that there is no alternative to independence, announced it would closely watched on upcoming parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova. And that probably in order to denigrate Moldovan authorities and support a pro-transdnistrian political force.
Mediators both from OSCE Mission and Russian Federation, William Hill and Valerii Nesteruskin respectively, also voiced their scepticism regarding breakthrough in settling Transdnistrian conflict prior to spring 2005 parliamentary elections.
Still experience shows that on the eve of elections opposition and ruling parties standing real chances of victory make promises and considerable concessions. Therefore, it may well happen that the state of negotiations would radically change until the elections, this is the more so considering President Voronin's plans to settle the conflict by April 2005. On the other hand, experience also shows that short-sighted electoral stunts have never contributed to the consolidation of Republic of Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity. That is exactly why, at least for now, the prospects of Transdnistrian conflict settlement remain quite unclear.
Domestic foreign exchange market: on-going volatility
Iurie Gotisan
At the same time, recent evolutions on the domestic foreign exchange market, in particular price hike (implicitly inflation rate that has reached 3% in the first quarter of 2004) amidst considerable appreciation of the Lei, signals major pitfalls for National Bank. Apparently, appreciation in real terms of the exchange rate is an outcome of the National Bank's monetary policy focusing on strict control of the monetary base (M0), i.e. cash in circulation and money banks hold on the Central Bank account.
Of course, foreign exchange market, as are other markets, is regulated by economic rules, respectively, exchange rate is shaped demand and supply on the market. It is known for a fact that foreign exchange markets are heavily influenced by two factors: trade deficit that needs to be financed and capital flows invested in economy. Then, what's the impact of exchange rate on the economic realities in the Republic of Moldova from the perspective of those two factors?
For a start, foreign exchange policy announced and employed by the National Bank of the Republic of Moldova allowed for a real appreciation of the Leu, which affected the trade balance. That this policy does not help keeping inflation under control is yet another story. Another major pitfall, for Moldova, which is facing a huge external pressure, is the appreciation of the real exchange rate. That is, currency appreciation discourages exports and boosts imports, which as a result propels trade deficit further upwards. According to the latest press releases issued by the National Bank, trade balance deficit has reached 107 million USD in the first quarter of the year.
To diminish strong fluctuations of the exchange rate Moldovan economists recommend establishing Foreign Exchange Council, that is an exchange rate of the national currency against a single reference foreign currency (in contrast to a Central Bank that may issue money at any time, Monetary Council issues national currency only in exchange for assets in reserve, that is, foreign currency reserves of the central bank). A fixed exchange rate would protect domestic foreign exchange market from negative evolutions on the international financial markets. In a small and open economy as Moldovan is, heavily reliant on foreign markets (Moldova's dependence on foreign trade exceeds 70% of the GDP), fluctuating exchange rate wields heavy inflationist pressure that may at any time lead to disastrous effects in economy. Bulgaria established a Foreign Exchange Council in 1997 as a cornerstone of an ambitious program of stabilizing inflation, which dropped by 580% in 1997 accounting for less that 1% in 1998.
Ongoing negative balance of the current account stems from the persisting swelling trade balance deficits of the Republic of Moldova amounting to 408 m USD in 2002 and 666 m in 2003. If we are to consider private transfers made by Moldovan citizens working abroad that according to Minister of Economy Marian Lupu reached 1 billion USD throughout 2002-2003, they practically covered for trade balance for the last two years. However, albeit constantly swelling, foreign currency transfers that are so much praised by media outlets as being very important and able to cover for the amount of trade deficit, they are still an unreliable source of funding. In their turn, foreign direct investments are easily reversed, not to speak of the instability of the "hot money", i.e. speculative flows on the foreign exchange market. Having said that, at the first glance financing trade balance via autonomous flows seems less certain.
Secondly, in the structure of the current account transfers from abroad, especially from citizens working abroad are far from diminishing trade balance deficit. To put it differently, albeit these are still considerable they loose grounds due to growing imports over to exports. In this respect, negative trade balance in the first quarter of the year rose to 34% or 28 m USD over similar period last year. Finally, one may not speak of a foreign direct investments flow into Moldova able to automatically finance the swelling trade deficit. Therefore, foreign direct investments placed in Moldova throughout 2003 amounted only to around 70 m USD.
Finally, amidst nominal appreciation of the Lei against USD, commercial banks would not be willing to make placements in foreign currency and as a result would have to diminish the amount of credits granted to the real economy sector, thereby propelling interest rates further upwards. Being affected by high interest rates, economy would attract only short-term capital that might lead to a sharp appreciation of Lei in real terms, thereby dropping export revenues and swelling trade balance deficit.
One may argue that swelling interest rates would lure foreign capital that would automatically increase the supply of foreign currency and would reduce the monetary base to its initial state. Unfortunately, though, realities of Moldovan economy make us consider the opposite scenario, especially given state's deficient investment policy. The type of capital that might be lured by the swelling interest rates would most certainly be a speculative one, ready to exit the country at the first sign of risk. Therefore, it may well happen that we would end up in a vicious circle that might as well lead to massive capital outflows.
It is not certain how long would National Bank be able to support the financial pyramid that is on the verge of collapse. Nevertheless, let us hope that autumn 1998 was the greatest ill we had to experience.
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