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e-journal, II year, no. 31, 2 June 2004

Activity of public institutions

Economic polies

Transdnistrian Conflict

Foreign affairs

Studies, analyses, comments

I. Activity of public institutions

1. Parliament

1.1. Official visits

On May 11-12 Parliament Speaker, Eugenia Ostapciuc, headed an official Moldovan delegation to Italy. During her visit Eugenia Ostapciuc met the Presidents of both Italian Parliament Chambers, Minister of Labour and Social Security, other high rank officials as well as a group of Moldovan citizens working in Italy.

One week later, representatives of Moldovan legislature to PACE attended its reunion. On this occasion they met with PACE President Pieter Schieder, Council of Europe Secretary-General Walter Schwimmer, Chairman of the German Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse etc. Eugenia Ostapciuc, also in Strasbourg, attended the European Conference of Speakers of Parliament.

1.2. Legal acts

Law on Amending the Law on Judicial Organisation has increased the number of judges in the Botanica District Court, Chisinau Municipality as it investigates more cases than other district courts.

Law on the Exemption of Monument Construction Works from the VAT provides for the exemption from the value added tax (VAT) of works of technical expertise, planning, design, construction and restoration financed from donations by physical and legal entities. The list of eligible objects is to be approved by the Parliament.

Law on Additions to the Law on State Security added to threats to state security the cases of organised crime and corruption, which are likely to undermine state security. According to these provisions, the following represents major challenges to state security:

Law on the Amendment of the Law on Preparing Citizens for Defence of the Motherland added provisions that allow students at private higher and secondary education institutions to defer their service in the army. Current law allows this only to state and accredited higher education institutions.

The Law on the Amendment and Completion of the Penal Code was adopted in the final reading. It provides for the amendment of provisions related to:

Via the Law on the Amendment the Law on State Awards and the Decision on Instituting the Anniversary Award "60 Years of the Liberation of Moldova from the Fascist Occupation" Parliament endorsed the President's proposition to institute the medal "60 Years of the Liberation of Moldova from the Fascist Occupation" to mark on 24 August 2004, 60 years of the liberation of Moldova from the fascist occupation and to thank those who participated in the liberation operations.

Law on the Amendment of the Law of Joint Stock Ventures provides for the obligation of joint stock ventures to pay as dividends at least 30% of the net profit that they make after they fulfil other obligations according to current laws. This draft was criticised by representatives of joint stock ventures as one limiting the autonomy of enterprise administration and freedom of economic activity. On the other hand, the authors of the draft said the draft was aimed at supporting minority shareholders, whose number is considerable, but who often are treated in an unfair manner by not receiving their yearly dividends or receiving them in small amounts.

Via the Law on the Amendment of the Law on Declaring "Cricova" as National Cultural Heritage Parliament excluded a number of its units from the list of heritage that would enable the company to use them for its technological development and get credits, etc.

Law on the Amendment of Legal Acts Regulating Oil Products extends the prerogatives of the National Agency for Regulation in Energetics, thereby entrusting it to regulate the prices and tariffs on oil. The law includes a number of provisions aimed at increasing the responsibility of the licence holders; their compliance with the technical norms, standards and licence terms, consumer rights, price estimation methodology, etc.

Law no. 461-XV on Oil Products Market was passed on July 30 2001 and was hailed by the governing as the major breakthrough in fighting oil smuggling and a mechanism able to ensure energetic safety. Since its adoption the law attracted a storm of criticism and even protest rallies by importers and retailers that led to its amendment several times already. Nevertheless, oil prices are on the rise, while the quality remains quite power. As for the revenues to the state budget, they still fall short of expectations.

(For further details on Parliament activity see http://www.e-democracy.md/en/comments/legislative/)


2. Government

2.1. Reshuffles

On May 26, Lilia Dumitras was appointed as Councillor to Senior Deputy Prime-Minister Vasile Iovv, whereas Ion Moraru was appointed as Deputy Director of the Migration Department. Also, Government ousted Gheorghe Caraivanov from his position as administrator of "Tvardita" Free Economic Zone and appointed Ion Borov as interim.

2.2. Decisions


3. Presidency

3.1. Decree on establishing Supreme Security Council

President Vladimir Voronin signed the Decree on establishing Supreme Security Council (SSC), no. 1824-III of 24.05.2004. After the number of SSC dropped from 12 to 10 in 1997, via a similar decree no. 237-III of 19.09.2001 the Council was enlarged by including more public officers. The evolution of the SSC structures may be seen in the following table.

Decree on establishing SSC, no. 162 of 20.08.91Decree on establishing SSC, no. 332-II of 08.10.97Decree on establishing SSC, no.237-III of 19.09.2001Decree on establishing SSC, no.1824-III of 24.05.2004
SSC Members (members/positions):SSC Members (members/positions):SSC Members (members/positions):SSC Members (members/positions):
1. President of RM - Chairperson of SSC1. President of RM, Commander in Chief - Chairperson of SSC1. President of RM, Commander in Chief - Chairperson of SSC1. President of RM, Commander in Chief - Chairperson of SSC
2. Presidential Councillor - SSC Secretary2. SSC Chief of Service of the Presidential Apparatus - SSC Secretary2. SSC Chief of Service of the Presidential Apparatus - SSC Secretary
2. Parliament Chairperson(excluded)3. Parliament Chairperson
3. Prime Minister3. Prime Minister3. Prime Minister4. Prime Minister
4. Minister of Foreign Affairs4. Minister of Foreign Affairs4. Minister of Foreign Affairs5. Minister of Foreign Affairs
5. Minister of Internal Affairs5. Minister of Internal Affairs5. Minister of Internal Affairs6. Minister of Internal Affairs
6. Defence Minister6. Defence Minister6. Defence Minister7. Defence Minister
7. Chairperson of the Committee for State Security(excluded)
8. Chair of the Parliament Committee for State Security and Military(excluded)7. Chair of the Parliament Commission for National Security8. Chair of the Parliament Commission for National Security
9. Chair of Parliament Commission for Legal Issues(excluded)8. Chair of the Parliament Juridical Commission for Appointments and Immunities(excluded)
10. Chair of Parliament Commission for Human Rights and National Relations(excluded)
11. Chair of the Parliament Commission for fighting crime(excluded)
12. Chair of the Parliament Commission for Local Administration and Economy(excluded)
7. Minister of Finance9. Minister of Finance9. Minister of Finance
8. Director Information and Security Service10. Director Information and Security Service10. Director Information and Security Service
9. Director Department for Civil Protection and State of Emergency11. Chief of State of Emergency Department11. Chief of State of Emergency Department
10. Chief of staff, Senior Deputy Defence Minister12. Chief of staff, Senior Deputy Defence Minister(excluded)
12. Minister of Economy
13. Chair Moldovan Academy of Science
14. National Bank Governor
15. Director Centre for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption
16. Prosecutor General
17. Gagauz-Yeri Governor

Besides SSC enlargement, the Decree no. 1824-III of 24.05.2004 adds a new article on the procedure of filling vacancies. The Decree also establishes a new Commission on antiterrorism that would work along Commission for internal policy, Commission for foreign policy, Commission on economy and financial policy, Commission for social security and environment and Analysis and Information Centre.


II. Economic polies

1. Moldovan energetic dependence

As of 1 June 2004, Republic of Moldovan debt for natural gas supplied by "Gazprom" amounted to 1.2 billion USD, including fines. According to "Moldova-Gaz" press service, Moldova's debt on expired payments together with fines on them amounted to 305.2 million USD, whereas that of Transdnistria - 961.2 million. Electro-energetic companies, such as CET-1, CET-2, "Termocom" continue to be the major debtors.

Gazprom Deputy Chair Aleksandr Reazanov stated during the annual shareholders meeting of "Moldova-Gaz" that "Moldova-Gaz strategic objective in 2004 should be developing a scheme for restructuring previously incurred debts to Gazprom". Reazanov said such a scheme should provide for restructuring the debt for 5-10 years, thereby paying back the debts in money or transferring into Gazprom property Moldovan industrial assets.

"Moldova-Gaz" President indicated that the fines for expired payments exceed 2.5 times Moldova's debt for gas supplied in 2003. Independent domestic observers point that Moldovan authorities are well aware of the fact that imports from Russia are more than "imports" and that those relations may not be explained by simple maximization of profit since Russian part is more insistently demanding the majority stake in a domestic company in exchange for its debt. Therefore, political considerations seem to dominate the economic ones.


III. Transdnistrian Conflict

1. New round of talks held on 25-26 May

A new round of talks on the Transnistria issue in the five-sided format including representatives of Moldova, Transnistria and the mediators took place in Tiraspol and Chisinau on 25-16 May. The two parties circulated at the meeting their written opinions on each other's proposals on the political plan drafted by the mediators under the OSCE aegis last autumn. Assisted by the mediators, the parties discussed the structure and institutions of the future federation.

William Hill, Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, summed up the results of the talks at a press-conference on 26 May. According to Basa-press, he stated that the parties still remain on divergent positions with regard to the structure of the future federation. Although the meeting produced no written documents, it helped parties reach agreement on some important issues, Hill added, although he did not name any such issues. Asked to comment on views expressed in Moldova, Transnistria and elsewhere that no significant progress is to be expected prior to the parliamentary elections in Moldova in March 2005, Hill said those views were "exaggerated", and that any time is a good time to seek compromise and try to reach agreement. The next round of talks was provisionally scheduled for w/c 21 June.

In a TV talk show broadcast on Moldovan National Television immediately after the negotiations and joining Moldovan Minister of Reintegration and Head of Moldovan delegation at the talks Vasile Sova, the Transnistrian "foreign minister" Valeri Litkai and the OSCE Head of Mission William Hill, the parties reiterated their embedded divergences, but showed committed to continue the talks. Notably, this has been the first ever TV show to feature a TV debate on the Transnistrian issue by top Moldovan and Transnistrian leaders.

2. Public Opinion Barometer, May 2004

The public opinion barometer commissioned in April-May 2004 by the Chisinau based Institute of Public Policies on a national representative sample, excluding the Transnistrian region, found that the territorial reintegration of the country is thought to be Moldova's primary task by only 2.9% of respondents (up by only 0.3% since November 2003), after the consolidation of the state and order (30.6%), economic development and upgrading of living standards (30.3%), ensuring peace and accord among people (15.3%), fighting corruption (8.3%) and improving the education, science and cultural spheres (4.1%). At the same time, asked whether they find acceptable the proposal to turn Moldova into a federal state, 17.1% of those questioned said yes (21.20% in November 2003), 32.6% said they would not accept it in any case (37.80% in November 2003), 14.3% said this question did not concern them (13.10% in November 2003), and 32.7% did not know how to answer this question (25.50 in November 2003). Notably, the data for the November 2003 barometer was collected in early November, i.e. prior to the Kozak Memorandum events. The comparison of November 2003 and current results shows no significant differences, which makes one believe that the Kozak Memorandum events have left no lasting impression on the Moldovan public opinion and the popular attention to the Kozak Memorandum events last November was small-scale and short-lived.

3. Small arms and light weapons in Moldova

The South Eastern Europe Small Arms and Light Weapons Monitor, funded by the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons and prepared by the UK based NGO Safeworld, was published at a round table organized at the UNDP office on 17 May in Chisinau (the full report may be found at: http://www.seesac.org/target/salw_monitor.htm). According to the monitor, "Moldova's small arms problems, including illicit production and sale of SALW, large stockpiles of surplus weaponry and the lack of controls over a wide segment of the country's external border, are inextricably linked to the political and security challenges emanating from the 'frozen' conflict in the breakaway region of Transnistria". The Monitor takes on allegations made elsewhere that Transnistria is a haven of organized crime and a virtual arms' dump containing within its boundaries large quantities of mines, ammunition and small arms, as well as that the Transnistrian regime has the capability to manufacture and export different models of SALW, and argues that the SALW issue is further complicated by the lack of actual border and customs control along the Moldovan-Transnistrian and the Transnistrian-Ukrainian borders, which facilitates smuggling, arms transfer and other illegal activities. In conclusion, the report acknowledges that the problem if SALW cannot be fully mitigated unless the Transnistrian problem is solved, referring to the findings of the IGC "No Quick Fix" whereby one cannot develop effective collaborative actions to improve legislation, law enforcement training and awareness-raising campaigns related to trafficking issues when a country is not recognized internationally.


IV. Foreign affairs

1. Visit to Bulgaria

On May 19-21 President Voronin paid an official visit to Bulgaria. During his visit Vladimir Voronin met Bulgarian President Gheorghi Pirvanov; Bulgarian Prime-Minister Simeon de Saxa Coburg-Gotha; Chair of the Bulgarian Peoples' Assembly Ognian Gerdjikov; Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and OSCE Chairman-in-Office Solomon Passy etc.

A raft of important documents were signed during the visit, among others: Free Trade Agreement; Cooperation Agreement in postal communication, telecommunication and information technology; Cooperative Agreement on fighting organized crime, traffic of drugs and psychotropic substances, terrorism and other types of offences; Memorandum on cooperation in the field of social security and labour market, Cooperative Agreement in the field of youth and sports, etc.

Noteworthy, Free Trade Agreement signed with Bulgaria is the last one Moldova signed with the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe member states that would gradually lead to the liberalization of foreign trade with those countries by 2007.

2. XI Summit of the Central European heads of state

On May 27-28, Romanian resort of Mamaia hosted the Summit of the Central European heads of state, with Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin in attendance. According to the Presidency press service, topping Summit's agenda were: effects of the first EU accession round; EU expansion, regional co-operation and stability in the Balkans; investment climate in Central and South-eastern Europe.

Of special interest to the Moldovan public opinion was the meeting of Moldovan and Romanian Presidents, especially given the ever worsening relations between the two countries. The Two considered the current status of bilateral relations with Vladimir Voronin "pointing to the need of continuing political dialogue at all levels and concluding some agreements equal to the status of international law mutual engagements" he also opted for "resuming consultations between expert groups working on the Basic Treaty and package of documents on the frontier regime". Moreover President Voronin proposed a mechanism of scholarship exchange in education to be established between Moldova and Romania and called on his Romanian counterpart to issue a declaration supporting Moldovans in their efforts to build an independent state and referring to the "Moldovan language" as an element of their national identity. In the eyes of many the mere fact that Romanian President invited his Moldovan counterpart to the commemoration of Stefan the Great at Putna on July 2, 2004 was a clear sign that he would issue such a declaration.

3. Moldova - Romania Neighbourhood Program

The third session of the Joint Committee on Moldovan-Romanian Cooperation was held in Chisinau on May 11. Committee looked at projects that are to be implemented as part of the Moldova - Romania Neighbourhood Program launched within EU "new neighbours" policies. According to governmental sources, Memorandum on funding the projects for years 2004-2006 is due to be signed in September 2004. It is expected that Moldova would get 5 million Euro in aid as part of this program that would go for implementing projects in the field of cross-border cooperation, environment, healthcare, preventing and fighting organized crime, border security, encouraging interpersonal cooperation, etc.


V. Studies, analyses, comments

Pre-election configuration
Igor Botan

The configuration of the main electoral contestants in the upcoming elections has become quite clear in May. The main parties represented in Parliament, namely Communist Party and Christian-Democratic People's Party already held plenary assembly (the former) and the congress (the second).

At the same time, two political blocs have been established: Citizens' Union "Patria - Rodina" (CUPR) founded by two socialist parties and several informal political organisations declaring themselves in opposition to the Party of Communists; and secondly Democratic Moldova Bloc (DMB) founded by Moldova Noastra Alliance, Democratic Party and Social Liberal Party setting themselves as a centrist force also in opposition to the ruling party.

Social Democratic Party that declined the offer to join DMB has also made public the key points of its political program entitled "Towards a democratic and strong state". Apparently, those five players would set the rules for the 2005 electoral race. The other 12 political parties registered with the Ministry of Justice apparently having a minor weight stand no chances whatsoever in upcoming elections. Therefore, let's consider the five players from the right to the left.

a) Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party

On May 16 the VIIIth party congress was held outdoors on the Great National Assembly square in Chisinau. The unusual location enabled the party to grab public attention as well as to put the blame on the authorities for not allowing a more suitable location for about 2,000 delegates.

Besides changes in the bylaws and election of the party governing bodies of special interest were the congress resolutions and the Proclamation on the party's electoral strategy swearing allegiance to: fighting corruption, economic recovery, restoring country's territorial integrity, ending Republic of Moldova's membership in CIS, and accession to EU and NATO. For each of the aforesaid tasks concrete solutions and recommendations were provided.

Christian-Democrats believe those tasks might be only achieved if Communists were ousted from power in the upcoming elections. The Congress resolution also blames Communist leaders for corruption, undermining state democratic institutions, poor economy and poor welfare system. Noteworthy, the Congress was held amidst Christian-Democrats on-going blocking of the legislature sessions on the grounds they were denied access to Court of Accounts findings on the public funds spending, as well as amidst agile campaign aimed at drawing public attention to murky bargains struck by Communist moguls and their families.

Still, Christian-Democrats believe the next parliamentary ruling coalition would be a transition one, which would have to dispose of Communist ruling aftermath, i.e. "de-communising" that would lay the grounds for full-fledged democratization and economic recovery in the Republic of Moldova.

Moreover, Christian-Democrats made public their intention to "fiercely criticise" DMB, whose founding parties had refused to establish a single opposition anti-communist electoral bloc. BMD leaders are also suspected of surreptitious ties with Tiraspol separatist regime and even of seeking Russian Federation's support in defeating Communists in elections. In addition, Christian-Democrats viewed BMD's refusal to establish a single anti-communist electoral bloc as a clear sign of its intention to rather form a post-election alliance with Communists than with them.

b) Democratic Moldova Bloc (DMB)

Meanwhile on May 18 leaders of Moldova Noastra Alliance, Democratic Party and Social-Liberal Party reconfirmed during a press conference that the bloc announced on May 8 was really established. Its founding declaration reads that DMB's goal is to "put an end to the tendencies pushing the country to the brink of collapse". In this respect DMB set the following tasks: poverty eradication by boosting a functioning market economy; ending moral degradation of the society; building a rule of law state underpinned by consensus and cooperation with civil society; bringing Moldovan legislation in line with European standards; ensuring citizens' access to education and medical services guaranteed by the state; peaceful reintegration of the country by means of democratization, demilitarization and decriminalization of the Transdnistrian region; getting Moldova closer to reaching its strategic objective, i.e. accession to EU; restoring good ties with Romania and Ukraine; establishing mutually beneficial relations with EU, US, and Russia.

From the beginning DMB was quite optimistic with regard to its chances in election and of securing a majority in legislature that would enable it to form the Government. That optimism runs counter to the scepticism among political analysts, who cite long and onerous negotiations on establishing the bloc. In the eyes of many, DMB's main weakness remains to be the heterogeneousness of its constituent parts that results in inconsistent messages on the major problems Moldova is facing and most importantly, distrust among its leaders. This specifically refers to the Democratic Party's refusal to end its post-electoral alliance (after 2003 local elections) with the Communist party in a number of rayon council; different visions on settling Transdnistrian conflict shared by founding parties, as well as on ways of achieving key foreign policy objectives. If things go on like this, many of the bloc's would-be voters would be scared away.

Another DMB's major weakness refers to its positioning on the political spectrum. It represents, so to say a bumper between Christian-Democrats and Communists, two antagonist and irreconcilable parties. At this stage already, DMB is buffeted by criticism both from the right and left, which only fuels the scepticism of many with regard to the capacity of this amorphous and fragile alliance to withstand such a pressure. If it indeed manages to withstand and runs in elections as a united electoral bloc, than its chances would increase significantly. However, in that case also, there are high chances that the bloc would break apart after elections, even into different formations than the founding ones.

To increase its chances in elections, bloc leaders would have to reach a consensus on certain things. For a start, their minimal goal should be preventing Communist Party from wining a majority in legislature, which opinion polls indicate they could still secure. That would set DMB in a quite advantageous position as neither of the contestants would be able to secure a majority without their participation. That is why, DMB's electoral program should resemble a centre left one and be targeted at the great bulk of electorate sharing moderate views, but who for one reason or another had voted for Communists in the past elections. In fact, this very same thing was suggested to DMB by Christian Democrats. And the way the basic principles were laid down indicates that DMB has been perfectly aware of this.

Finally, to defy criticism from either left or right, DMB may want to sent a clear message that it would accept to form a post-electoral coalition with the party that was the least aggressive towards it during the electoral campaign. Christian-Democrats were jolted into realising it as its leaders after making clear that they would harshly criticize BMD, went back to calls for co-operation and refraining from forming a post-election alliance with Communists. On the other hand, state-run media affiliated to the Communist Party continue the "flak" against BMD, arguing that the recent opinion polls point to Communists' landslide victory in upcoming elections. In fact, official propaganda would find it quite difficult to restructure its aggressive stance towards BMD once it happily revealed that prosecution recently completed a raft of investigations against BMD leaders.

c) Social Democratic Party (SDP)

During a press conference on May 18 SDP announced its National Council's decision to launch three initiatives: on society consolidation; state organization; and conception of the new social-economic policy. SDP intends to initiate public debates on those initiatives that would become official party documents at the IX party congress due in November. Out of the three initiatives only the one, on state organization, was made public. It envisages a wide scale modification of the Constitution so as to ensure society control over state power. The gist of the initiative is to introduce new eligible positions in the local public administration and judiciary, change the electoral system and procedure of electing the President, ensure transparency of public spending, etc. As usual, SDP initiatives are quite interesting, however it remains to be seen in how far voters would understand and endorse them by casting their ballot.

Since the first parliamentary elections in 1994 SDP has had about 3% in all the elections. In the last two parliamentary elections SDP preferred to run on its own, which is likely to be the case in next parliamentary elections. If the Social Democrats manage to assess electorate's feedback to their initiatives, then it is not excluded they may want to join one of the parties standing real chances of being represented in the legislature. This refers specifically to DMB. Undoubtedly, both parties would benefit of such a move, the gains being directly proportional to the formations' rating.

d) Party of Communists

So far, Communists stand high chances of a landslide victory in the forthcoming elections. An illustration to this are the recent opinion polls. Strong Communists' rating stems from two factors: President Voronin's charisma and the party name, which is still associated by great many with social-oriented polices targeted at vulnerable strata of the society.

Moreover, being in power Communists have a wide range of administrative resources to choose from in order to keep their positions. This refers specifically to access to funds directly, or disguised as charitable initiatives supported by businessmen that "do not want troubles with state bodies". That is why more and more often state-run media features Communist moguls together with businessmen on charity missions, etc. Total control over state-run written and electronic media having a nation-wide or partial coverage, which most of the time praises Communists and denigrates its political foes, has so far proved to be decisive in propelling Communists' high rating. The experience of partial local elections and regional ones in Gagauz-Yeri showed far too well how "power vertical" jolts state institutions and local public administration into serving the interests of the Party of Communists. Moreover, the latter secured control over much of the trade unions and the so-called GONG (NGOs inspired and controlled by the government) by means of which they may efficiently shape electorate's preferences.

Still there are several factors pointing to the effect that Communists' victory should not be taken for granted. First of all, opinion polls signal a constant decrease in confidence to the President Voronin from 45% in March 2002, to 29% in May 2004. Secondly, Communists' rating and that of the opposition parties in May 2004 are practically identical to those of May 2003 on the eve of the local elections. This alone enables us to identify a certain "correction factor" so as to assess the real rating of the electoral contestants. In this respect, it is still questionable whether Communists would secure a landslide victory in the forthcoming elections, given that in the past local elections they scored below 50%. Thirdly, Communists' abuses in employing "administrative resources" during regional elections in Gagauz-Yeri as well as during last year local elections have drawn international organizations' attention to the electoral process in Moldova, which in its turn emboldened opposition parties to start fighting against those administrative resources right now. In this respect, Christian-Democrats came up with a raft of amendments aimed at decreasing state control over media outlets, and judiciary, etc. If Communist moguls objected level playing field for all electoral contestants, then most definitely they would face increasing pressure both at home and from abroad. For now, it's not clear what would be the likely outcome of such a pressure, but most certainly it wouldn't be favourable to the Party of Communists. Having said that, in the eyes of some opposition members Party of Communists reached its heyday and the only thing left is for it to roll back where it started! This alone should be a quite encouraging thing for opposition.

Within the party, the situation does not look too ideal as well and this because of teetering policies promoted by the President, going against the party program and bylaws. On May 15 the Party of Communists convened on a plenary sessions and decided to hold its V-th Congress on December 11 this year. The party bylaws and its program are to be revised during the congress. Interestingly, the Congress was scheduled on the eve of winter holidays, when the political life is standstill for almost one month and a half. Most likely, end of winter holidays would coincide with launching of the electoral campaign. Therefore, adjourning the congress for December may be only explained by Communist leaders' wish to soften somehow the effects of party documents' amendment. The thing is that orthodox Communists unhappy with the would-be amendment of the party program and bylaws would be confronted with the fait accompli, without actually having time to regroup for an electoral counteroffensive.

Evidence to the fact that those suppositions are really grounded is the stance of some Communist moguls towards eclectic post-modern policies promoted by President Voronin, which are said to be inspired by his advisor Mark Tkaciuc. Thus, one of the orthodox ideologists of the Communist Party Ivan Grec published a number of articles in official press on the one hand praising the President and showing off his loyalty; and on the other pointing to the fact that the economic and foreign policies promoted by the President were faulty. On top of that, Communist ideologist started justifying the party's failures, which per se is indicative of the congress' likely leitmotif. Another illustration is the stance of the leader of the Communist faction in the Chisinau Municipal Council, Valerii Garev, who recently stated that any amendment to the party program or bylaws should not impair the party's ultimate goal - building Communism. All of this reveals Party of Communists' ideological disorientation, which is exactly what any party striving to keep "Communist party" label should avoid. The internal cocktail of opinions has enough explosive ingredients to have serious repercussions on each of the electoral contestants.

e) Citizens' Union "Patria - Rodina" (Motherland) (CUPR)

Once launched CUPR positioned itself in left opposition to the Party of Communists, which was blamed for betraying left wing Communist ideals. The Steering Committee of the party issued a declaration on May 21 "clarifying its position", namely: CUPR is a left wing party, but not of social-democratic orientation (which only disguises a purely capitalist gist); univocally and radically anti-Western; of pro-Eastern (Russian) orientation. At the same time CUPR leaders did not exclude any post-election cooperation with centrist parties, but only with those that anti-Communist.

For now, CUPR's chances are quiet slim, however it is believed it might steal several percentages from Communists' electorate. CUPR's weaknesses are quite obvious: amorphous structure made up of two socialist parties each having less than 1% rating and several informal radical left groups; lack of credible and well-known leader; lack of financial resources and access to nation-wide media. CUPR leaders are well aware of those shortcomings, still they hope to address them prior to elections.

For a start, to gain grounds CUPR capitalizes on the promises made by the Party of Communists but never achieved, such as: getting on good terms with Transdnistria and settling the conflict by establishing a federative "joint state"; Republic of Moldova's integration in the Eurasian area, more specifically in the Single Economic Area set by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Secondly, to address the lack of a strong leader, Komersant Plus newspaper came up with Grigore Maracuta candidacy, who is the Speaker of the self-proclaimed, secessionist Moldovan Dniestrian Republic's Parliament. If so, then Maracuta would follow the example of the former separatist leader of Ajara, Aslan Abashidze, who topped the candidate lists of the Revival Party and helped it gain seats in Parliament, but never attended any of its sessions.

This scenario should not be taken seriously, especially knowing how Abashidze ended. Still, Kommersant Plus suggestion coincided with Maracuta's quite strange initiatives, namely to raise the status of "Moldovan language" in Transdnistria, which dispels the myth of linguistic harmony in the region. Further, a raft of articles followed in the Transdnistrian official press claiming that the regions' elite had a special interest in the forthcoming polls in Moldovan legislature. Moreover, recently the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the secessionist region indicated they had clear signs that nobody would ever recognize Transdnistria's independence and therefore building a "joint state" with Republic of Moldova was the only possible solution. The latter was probably meant to justify Transdnistrian interest to interfere in the upcoming parliamentary electoral race in the Republic of Moldova.

Indeed, if Transdnistrian leaders choose to seriously influence election results in the Republic of Moldova, they would do so by means of CUPR, which in turn would stand greater chances in elections. This could be done by means of financial and informational support, opening up polling stations in Transdnistria, etc. If so, then support from certain political forces in Russian Federation is also to be expected. However, past experience shows that these scenarios are very unlikely and are more of a source for speculations against the ruling party.


Despite the constant economic growth, people think they are poorer
Iurie Gotisan

1. Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth Strategy (PRSP) approved

On May 19 Government approved PRSP, a document including social economic policies to be implemented over 2004-2006 to ensure sustainable economic growth and reduce poverty. In the eyes of many Republic of Moldova is the poorest country in Europe. Strategy indicates that despite the overall 21.6% GDP growth over the last three years, average monthly salary rose by 70.1% and average monthly pension by 93%, poverty still remains to be a major issue. Moreover, it is estimated that around 40% of the population live below subsistence level, whereas 35-40% of the working population has left the country in search for a decent earning.

On May 25, the final PRSP version was submitted for the evaluation and final approval of the World Bank. Authorities expect WB to approve the document by July so that it becomes operational. Noteworthy, PRSP has been developed for four years. In 2000 WB Governing Board approved the preliminary PRSP developed by Braghis Government. After Braghis Government was ousted in spring 2001, the document was revised and later approved in 2002. However, after civil society and international organisations voiced their lingering concerns with regard to the quality of the document, the period of working out on the document was extended for another year.

Furthermore, PRSP would be also submitted to USAID, UNDP, CIDA, other partner agencies that would bring their technical assistance priorities in line with the strategy. Chisinau is now considering how the Parliament would approve PRSP, as a law or as a resolution. Experts believe the document should not have the status of the law.

Being a guideline for future technical assistance programs PRSP would secure the most needed and advantageous foreign aid. A special attention shall be given to the feasibility and clarity of the priority actions developed by the Government, as well as to the monitoring mechanism that would allow for on-going improvement of the document.

Noteworthy, the current PRSP version is of a higher quality than the previous drafts and is among the best similar documents developed in Moldova since independence. However, experts point to certain shortcomings, some of which would be addressed upon public debates over the document. According to IMF and WB standards the Governments itself should identify and acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of Poverty Reduction Strategies as well as risk factors.

2. Poverty is becoming a major problem for more and more people

Implementing PRSP is paramount. Great many Moldovan citizens, around 90% consider themselves poor according to the findings of an opinion poll commissioned by Institute for Public Policies and conducted by CIVIS in April-May 2004 at the order of. Interviewees had to assess their welfare on a scale of 1 to 10, "poor" and "rich" respectively. Almost 10% rated their welfare at 1 point thus considering themselves "poor", 13.3% rated it at 2 points, 21.9% at 3 points, 21.3% at 4 points, and 24.6% at 5. Only 9.2% rated their welfare from 6 to 8 points. What is striking is that none of the interviewees rated his/her welfare at 9 or 10 points.

At the same time, 42.8% of the interviewed claim current income of their family is not sufficient even "for the essentials of life", while 40% - "only for essentials of life". Moreover, 86.8% of the interviewed say they are not satisfied with their wage and only 8.8% are "quite happy" or "very happy" with it. As compared to 2003 there was registered a significant increase in people's fear of price hike 50% (a 23% increase over last year), of poverty 64% (11% increase over last year), and future of the children 52% (8% increase).

35.8% believe life in Moldova would get better or slightly better in one year, 25.5% believe nothing would change in one year. Still 43.2% of the interviewed say this year economic situation is "better" or "slightly better", whereas 34.7% believe it is the same, with only 8.4% being satisfied with the current state of affairs, while 47.6% are not quite satisfied or not satisfied at all. Persons interviewed said that to improve the socio-economic situation in the country it is necessary to improve law enforcement, increase the role of the state in administering economy, attract more foreign investments, boost industrial output and fight corruption.

Noteworthy, many people live from subsistence farming. People judge economy by the money in their pockets. Last opinion poll registered a significant increase in the unhappy or unsatisfied ones. Almost 40% believe economic situation worsened after the incumbent Government had come to power. The following factors that worsened the situation are cited: drop of income, price hike and no job.

Opinion poll also indicates that the great majority of Moldovans wish for a more homogenous society without any huge inequalities in income. It is very important how people perceive social injustice, as any increase in inequality brings about a decrease in solidarity and trust among members of the society. The poll also shows that 80% view Moldovan society as highly unjust, with great many poor and a handful of extremely rich.


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