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Activity of public institutions
1.1. Legal acts
At the initiative of majority faction the Law on Modification of the Law on the Election of the President of the Republic of Moldova was adopted. Under the law "Parliament of the same legislature gets to elect the President only once, except for cases of the vacancy of the position (upon resignation, ousting, decease or impossibility to exercise the responsibilities)". The provision was not included in the amendments operated to Constitution in 2000 and the existing legal framework allowed the Parliament to elect the President at most 45 days prior to the expiration of the mandate of the President in office.
Previously, Christian-Democrats came up with a similar initiative thereby the elections of the President were to be held within two months of the expiration of the mandate of the President in office and that election results be confirmed via an organic law. The draft was rejected on the grounds that it would have allowed the extension of the Presidential mandate, and therefore might lead to conflict situations or political deadlock, in cases when the President being in conflict with the Parliament might refuse to promulgate the organic law confirming the election of the new President. Noteworthy, as long as appropriate amendments are not made to the Constitution, the law may be still abrogated.
Parliament also approved the Law on Ratification of International Legal Acts on Free Trade, namely between the Republic of Moldova and Macedonia, and Moldova and Serbia and Montenegro. The Agreements provide for trade liberalization, in particular: abolishing technical barriers, guaranteeing free transit; introducing and enforcing antidumping, safeguarding and compensation measures, applying WTO mechanisms for litigation.
One week later Parliament ratified a similar Free Trade Agreement with Albania.
Noteworthy, quite recently Republic of Moldova concluded the procedure of signing Free Trade Agreements with all the countries members to the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina (December 23, 2002); Albania (November 13, 2003); Serbia and Montenegro (November 13, 2003); Macedonia (January 28, 2004); Croatia (February 22, 2004); Bulgaria (May 20, 2004). Free Trade Agreement with Romania was signed back in 1994 (February 15) and entered into force the same year. So far, Moldovan Parliament did not ratify the agreements with Bulgaria and Croatia.
Parliament passed the Law on the Modification of the Law on State Budget for 2004. Under the law, National Bank of Moldova shall provide a loan worth 50 million USD to service the foreign debt. The Government has used the money to buy back the debt on securities issued for Russian Gazprom, estimated at 115 million USD.
Via Resolution on designating a new member of the Observer Council of the Teleradio-Moldova public broadcaster Victor Osipov, Director of Electronic Press Association was appointed as a new member at the recommendation of opposition factions. He would replace Vasile Botnaru who resigned earlier on.
Last week Parliament passed the Law on the State of Emergency, Siege and War. The law outlines: terms, ways and conditions for declaring state of emergency, siege or war; competencies of the authorities declaring such a state; measures to be applied during such states; as well as the rights and responsibilities of legal and natural entities. During the state of emergency, war, or siege it shall be prohibited to amend the Constitution, adopt, modify or abrogate organic laws or electoral law, as well as conduct elections of the local or central government. Once the state of emergency, siege or war ends all the acts adopted during that time shall be abrogated without any previous notification.
Under the Law on Modification of the Law on Licensing more than 45 types of activities in various fields shall be subject to licensing. The law also stipulates that Licensing Chamber together with specialised local government bodies shall verify the compliance with the law no often than once a year. The law also outlines the grounds for withdrawing the license.
Also last week Parliament ratified the Protocol on the privileges and immunity of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. Under the document representatives of the member-states Parliaments shall enjoy certain privileges and immunity while exercising their mandate and travelling to the place of work, such as immunity from arrest or detention, immunity from any kind of trial based on the words spoken or written in their capacity as representatives of member-states, right to immigrate together with their family members to the member-states of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, which they visit or travel to while exercising their functions, etc.
(For further details on Parliament activity see http://www.e-democracy.md/en/comments/legislative/)
2.1. Reshuffles
The last two weeks were rich in reshuffles as Government was very much displeased with the activity of certain government officials. Felix Virlan was ousted from the position of Deputy Minister of Energetics, while Valeriu Munteanu from the position of Director of the Migration Department. Several others government officials were sanctioned: Feodosia Furculita, Deputy Minister of Finance; Sergiu Sainciuc, Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Security; Anatol Dubrovschi, Deputy Minister of Education. The first two were blamed for delaying the draft Government resolution on salary supplements to the people of culture and sports; whereas the latter for the failure to enforce in due time Government motion on transferring sport schools into the property of the Department of Youth and Sports, as well as for "unreasonably lowering the amount allotted for the activity of the Olympia Sports Club".
2.2. Decisions
In fact this regulation might scare away some potential investors interested to buy large amounts of shares, at the same time some small investors would have a chance to bid due to the lower transaction price as a result of the smaller amount of shares available for sale. Another thing is that Government lowered the indicators of electricity generating capacity from 500MW to 200MW and it gave up the requirement for the potential investors to have experience in electricity distribution.
3.1. Code on science and innovation
On June 15 during a session of the majority faction President Voronin presented the Code on Science and Innovation. In fact it was known back in March that such a draft is being developed when the President outlined the main objectives of the government regarding science reform during a meeting with institutions part of the Academy of Science of Moldova. In his presentation to the majority faction Vladimir Voronin reviewed the current state of science and innovation in the country and from there he talked about the tasks lying ahead:
The Code is structured under 5 chapters and includes 166 articles. According to President Voronin it would be necessary to make appropriate changes to other codes, as it provides that all science and innovation institutions will be exempted from VAT, customs duties on the imported equipment necessary for conducting research. In addition, the draft provides for the accreditation of organizations working in the field of science and innovation, with private and non-governmental organizations being eligible as well. This would enable them to become associated members of the Academy of Science and apply under co-funding terms for the tender on public funds.
Another important provision is the establishment of the Agency for Protecting Intellectual Property by merging the Agency for Protecting Industrial Property and Copyright Agency.
The Code would acknowledge and strengthen the role of the Academy of Science, which shall become "the only public institution of national importance working in the field of science and innovation". In addition, all the scientific projects shall be exclusively funded via the Academy, for which purpose it would conclude a four-year Partnership Agreement with the Government.
3.2. Session with the Government
On June19, President Vladimir Voronin convened on a session Government members where he insisted on improving its activity. According to a press release issued by the Presidency, the President recommended Government members to pay more attention to: improving the quality of adopted decisions, better control their enforcement, eliminate personal and departmental interests when spending public money, improve cooperation between Government structures.
1. High OSCE dignitaries visit Moldova
In June Chisinau hosted a series of visits by high OSCE officials. Thus, following the study visit on 9-12 June by 26 ambassadors accredited at the OSCE, Chisinau hosted on 17-18 June a delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and on 21-22 June Chisinau was visited by the OSCE Chairman in Office, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy.
The visit of Solomon Passy had the objective "to support efforts towards the Transnistrian conflict resolution and encourage democratisation and the reform process in the entire country". Passy had a number of visits with high Moldovan officials, including the Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and the Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Stratan, as well as with representatives of civil society organisations and political parties. Passy also visited Tiraspol, where he had a meeting with the break away leader Igor Smirnov. During meetings with both sides, Passy presented them a package of draft agreements on a balanced reduction of military forces as well as confidence-building and transparency measures, worked earlier in June by the OSCE Mission to Moldova.
At the end of his visit, Passy held a press conference, during which he called upon the Moldovan and the Transnistrian authorities to speed up negotiations on the Transnistrian settlement. Referring to the current negotiations format, Passy said that "it is not a dogma" and may be changed, but he did not believe it rational to make "changes for the sake of changes".
Asked to comment on his meting with the Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, Passy said that Smirnov seemed ready to engage in dialogue. "We presented him our proposals, and he engaged to examine them ", said Passy. In his general assessment of a viable solution of the Transnistria conflict, he said that it is essential that such a solution is accepted by all sides.
2. The negotiations round on 23-24 June
One day after the end of the visit of Solomon Passy to Moldova, in Chisinau and Tiraspol a new round of negotiations took place. During the round, Chisinau officially joined the political plan drafted under the OSCE aegis and which included some of the Moldovan proposals on the Transnistrian settlement.
At a press conference held at the end of the round, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Chisinau, William Hill, said that Moldova's move was a positive result of the talks and an important step towards a political settlement. At the same time, Hill regretted that the Transnistrian delegation did not attend the talks, after the mediators had not accepted Transnistrians' proposal to postpone the round for 30 June to allow them enough time to examine the demilitarisation proposals presented to them by Solomon Passy. Thus, in the absence of the Transnistrian delegation, Hill said the round was rather one of "consultations" and reminded the Transnistrian side that their verbal commitment to attend negotiation rounds should be proved by acts.
During the same press conference, Hill referred briefly to the demilitarisation proposals presented by Solomon Passy and explained that both sides accepted to examine them. Hill specified that Moldova's demilitarisation had nothing to do with the withdrawal of Russian weapons and troops from Transnistria, which falls under the commitments assumed by Russia at the OSCE Summits in Istanbul and Porto.
The next round of talks with the participation of the Russian, Ukrainian and OSCE mediators has been scheduled for 21 and 22 July.
3. New ICG Report on Moldova
The International Crisis Group (ICG), an independent think tank working through field based analysis and high level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflicts, published on 17 June 2004 a new report on Moldova, "Moldova: Regional tensions Over Transnistria". The report asserts that "resolving the Transnistrian secessionist dispute in Moldova is vital to remove a potential source of chaos on the periphery of the expanding European Union, to implement an important part of the post-Cold War settlement, and to make Moldova itself a more viable state," and advocates for "greater U.S. and EU engagement with the stalled peace process" as essential to bringing a settlement of the dispute.
The report analyses the motivations governing Russian and Ukrainian policy towards Moldova and Transnistria, and outlines the attempts by the Transnistrian officials to enhance their influence in those two countries. The report refutes the orthodox view held by the opposition forces in Chisinau that that external support to Transnistria stems solely from Russia, and argues that the break away leadership has constantly tried to diversify its external support and secure greater backing from Ukraine. Over the years, Transnistria has developed into "a self aware political entity with own interests that it is able to advance through lobbying, economic opportunism, political posturing and creative negotiating".
Referring to Russia's role in the Transnistrian conflict settlement, the report devotes particular attention to Russia's unilateral effort to push through a settlement in 2003 (the "Kozak Memorandum" affair). The report discloses a wealth of detail about the background of the document and the diplomacy surrounding it, most of which have been unknown to the Moldovan public opinion. The report argues that the failure of the plan has been an indication of the limits of Russian influence, which has proved unable to push through a settlement without the support of Moldova and of the international community. At the same time the affair has also showed that the latter needs Russia and its considerable influence over the Transnistrian leadership if it is to mediate a political settlement.
The report concludes that "Russia's heavy handed role in the negotiations has produced the opposite effect, as illustrated by the fact that a communist government in Chisinau has made European integration its highest foreign policy goal". Finally, the report advocates for greater Western support, especially in tackling the illegal business activity and the external support that sustains the break away regime in Transnistria.
The full text of the report may be found at www.icg.org. This is the second report in a series of IGC reports of Moldova. The first report "Moldova: No Quick Fix" was published last August and included an analysis of the background of the conflict and of the past and current conflict resolution efforts.
1. Republic of Moldova - EU Action Plan
Although only three negotiations rounds on the Republic of Moldova - EU Action Plan were initially scheduled, on June 15 the fourth round of bilateral consultations was held in Brussels. Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release reads that during the round "parties reached an understanding on the content of this bilateral political document", that outlines the framework of cooperation between Republic of Moldova and EU in the next three years. The press release is rather vague when it comes to the date of signing the Plan "once both parties complete the internal procedures". During a press upon his arrival in the country, Minister of Foreign Affairs Stratan stated that the Plan was to be signed by both parties by the end of July, so that it would be enforced commencing September. Initially it was expected that the Action Plan would be signed in mid-May, however due to delays it was to be signed by the mid of the next month.
The press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reads "Moldova is invited to establish closer political, security, economic and cultural ties with EU and boost cross-border cooperation as well as share the responsibility for preventing and settling conflicts", as well as "one of the main objectives of the Plan would be continuing supporting a viable resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, EU being ready to continue its involvement in the process by all the instruments at hand".
As for economic benefits awaiting Moldova once it signs the document, one should mention the opportunity to advance towards "significant degree of integration, including via access to EU internal market", a first step being EU allowing for asymmetric trade, which could be viewed as a tremendous success of Moldovan diplomacy.
It is worth mentioning that the Action Plan provides for EU assistance to Moldova in view of adjusting its legislation to European standards, in particular by means of TAIEX office and strengthening institutional capacity, as well as cooperation with Europol and Eurojust.
Action Plan also provides for the possibility to consider other contractual agreements between the contracting parties depending on how the measures outlined in the Plan are being implemented as well as on the relations between Moldova and EU. In this respect the head of Moldovan diplomacy, Andrei Stratan stated that "once Moldova fulfils the tasks outlined in the document, it would acquire a more advanced status in relations with EU, and Chisinau aspiration to become an associated member might become quite realistic".
Challenges faced by the National Bank
Iurie Gotisan
Undoubtedly, one may find Moldova's macroeconomic achievements (given the economic growth registered in the last three years) acceptable, as banking sector managed to steer away from a system crisis despite the difficulties it faced. Still, the country is not able to secure sustainable economic growth, reduce unemployment and keep inflation down. There are great many factors both at the macroeconomic level, i.e. structural deficiencies of Moldovan foreign sector of economy (exports, servicing foreign debt), as well as the microeconomic level, i.e. slow progress of enterprise restructuring, privatization, and institutional development in general; that account for such a state of affairs.
National Bank pursued a restrictive monetary policy throughout those years aimed at keeping prices stable, however that policy proved to be unfeasible, inconsistent and unable to keep inflation under control (National Bank has made its goal quite clear - to keep inflation under control, however 2003 it failed in its pursuit). Being under pressure, National Bank systematically provided credits to the "vulnerable" sectors as well as to commercial banks facing problems. Those were only some of the shortcomings of the NBM activity throughout those years. At times it directly funded public deficits albeit the move ran counter to its efforts to keep prices stable. It frequently has made wide-scale interventions on the foreign currency market (especially buying USD and Euro), which is yet another policy set to soar the monetary base and also boost inflation. For instance, 15.7% inflation rate registered in 2003 undercut NBM's great policy and has led some to the conclusion that Moldovan economy is ill fated.
At the end of May 2004 annualized inflation rate was estimated at 12% and some experts believe it is still set to soar. An eventual price hike in 2005 might be brought about by a tax cut both for legal and natural entities as scheduled by the Government for early 2005.
Usually, Governments are tempted to swell their ratings on the eve of elections by tax cuts and increase in the social sphere spending. However, such actions might boost the internal consumption, which in its turn might set the domestic debt and budget deficit to soar, onerous dilemma for the NBM. To enlarge and accrue funds to state budget revenues, at the recommendation of NBM, Government would probably raise customs taxes and tariffs for export-import operations (which account for 70% of the budget revenues). The move would probably serve a strong stimulus for importers and exporters alike to raise production price, respectively sale price, which in turn would affect inflation rate.
Therefore, NBM faces a double challenge in its monetary policy attempting to reduce inflation. Firstly, this policy mix should include a revenue policy and small budget deficits based on rigorous controls coupled with rationalization of public spending and financial discipline imposed at the company level. Huge deficits lead to high interest rates and require a more flexible monetary policy for counterbalance, however such a policy poses a number of difficulties for an open economy like Republic of Moldova is. Secondly, liquidity should be under control and strong inflationist expectations after years of "programmed inflation" should be ended. As long as there are no major changes in the monetary policy, either because of the lack of political will or lack of relevant institutions or infrastructure, it would be quite difficult to bring about a turnaround in the expectations.
2. Impact of NBM's policy on economy
Albeit a relative stability of the prices and exchange rates, there was no breakthrough in the financial or banking sector, which has led to a even higher financial dependence over foreign donors. NBM policy has had a contrary effect, i.e. holding back economic and investment activity. Because of still high interest rates, bank credits have become inaccessible for investment projects funding, while great many jobs were cut. On a short-term such a policy is acceptable, as the first risk any economy should address is that of inflation out of control. However, on the long-term, once a macroeconomic stabilization is achieved and once populations' inflationist expectations are hold back, keeping inflation down should no longer be a top goal in the macroeconomic policy, which should instead focus on economic growth and fighting unemployment.
NBM together with the Government are the key players responsible for establishing an attractive investment climate in Moldova. For instance, throughout 2003 investments in Moldova reached 58 million USD, two times less than in 2002. It represents only 13 USD per capita, not accounting for Transdnistria, whereas in Romania it amounted to 7 billion USD in 2003 that is almost 320 USD per capita. It is all-too-clear that via its policies National Bank stimulated capital outflow from Moldova. This specifically refers to the norms banning and limiting free exchange of Leu into other currencies. Secondly, interdictions were set on foreign currency in the companies' pay office and bank deposits. Thirdly, monitoring over foreign currency transactions was increased, namely foreign currency may not be hold on a current account for more than three days. And finally, a new procedure of notifying specialized bodies, prosecution in particular, on the amounts hold in the bank account.
Undoubtedly, Moldova's economy and legal framework, including the investment climate are not the most luring ones, still the aforesaid NBM's actions are greatly accountable for the capital outflow. Why is the capital outflow such a critical factor? It is because when capital outflows it brings about such phenomena as: soaring unemployment, shut down of enterprises unable to stand fierce competition due to their obsolete technologies, lack of well paid jobs, devaluation of assets on financial and monetary market, state's inability to keep up its social promises and accrue revenues to the state budget, and most importantly country morphing into an economic cemetery. The future seems quite gloomy for the young generation, i.e. no jobs, leaving the country being the only solution left. And things seem to get worse and worse as there is no quick fix at hand.
In case the aforesaid issues were to be address efficiently, then all the aspects of economic policy would have to be synchronized, coupled with a fine-tuning of the agencies responsible for its enforcement. Until now the waters have been calm with the Government refraining from any spectacular moves and National Bank having a quiet usual performance. Handing those economic deficiencies would test Government and National Bank's ability to struck mutually beneficial agreements.
When would elections be held?
Igor Botan
Recently amendments to the Law on the Procedure of Electing the President of the Republic of Moldova were operated, under which "The Parliament of the same legislature gets to elect the President only once, except for cases of vacancy of the position". In fact it was opposition who came up with the idea of having the amendments, however the Communist Party preferred to vote its own amendments claiming that these would "calm down the opposition".
The problem stemmed from the fact that future Parliament was to be elected between 26 February - 26 May, while the President between 22 February - 7 April, 2005. Once the amendments were operated and entered into force, and actually will be respected together with the constitutional provisions, Parliament elections would as usual be held on a Sunday in the time period between February 27 and March 13, 2005 the latest. And this because sufficient time should be left for the tabulation of election results and their validation by the Constitutional Court, which might take up to 2 weeks, especially given numerous appeals that are to be settled prior to the validation of the mandates of the newly elected deputies. Later, in compliance with Article 63(2) of the Constitution, the President convenes the Parliament of the new legislature that is to elect its own governing bodies and only after that the special Commission for the election of the President is formed. All of these should be completed by the deadline set for electing the President, i.e. no latter than April 7, 2005.
To ensure the compliance with the terms provided by the law for hosting elections, the Parliament should announce the day of parliamentary elections no latter than December this year, before the closing of the autumn-winter sessions, as under the electoral law election date is to be set at least 60 days prior to the election day, while the next session of the Parliament (in line with Constitution) starts only in February. It may well happen that a special session of the Parliament would be called after winter holidays only to set the election day, as provided by the Article 76 of the Electoral Code.
2. The impact of the consecutive parliamentary and presidential elections
Consecutiveness of parliamentary and presidential elections might have a decisive role in the elections outcomes. Thus, if Presidential elections were to be held before parliamentary ones, then re-election of the President in office for another term would raise some eyebrows, people would rightly wonder whether it is appropriate for the President after being re-elected to run also in parliamentary elections by heading the party list in order to help it to win. It seems to be obvious that if President Voronin would not participate in the parliamentary elections it might in the end have a negative effect on the total number of votes cast in favour of the Communist Party.
That is why amendment of the Law on the Procedure of Electing the President does not run counter to the Communist Party interests. On the other hand, the same problems exist even if parliamentary elections are held before the presidential ones, as it is not clear if the chief of the state may run for another position, especially MP, without having to resign from the position he is holding. It is this misunderstanding that triggered debates in the opposition press alleging that the Chief of state might resign on the eve of the parliamentary elections so as to get re-elected by the incumbent legislature (without even violating the legal framework) or in order to head the Communist party's list and then be re-elected as a President.
Noteworthy, the amendments drafted by the Communist faction and voted by the Parliament, although are very much welcomed, leave wide berth for manoeuvres both in terms of setting the day of presidential elections as well as in consecutiveness of conducting parliamentary and presidential elections. On the other hand opposition draft proposing to validate Presidential elections via an organic law would exclude any such opportunity. The thing is that if the majority Communist faction really wants it may argue at any time that constitutional provisions on conducting parliamentary elections within 3 months of the expiration of the legislative body's mandate prevail over the limitations imposed by the Law on the Election of the President.
3. Suggestions for Constitutional Court
Government affiliated media claimed recently that Chisinau mayor, Serafim Urechean, singled out as the main political foe of President Voronin, lied the citizens when he ran for the Chisinau mayoralty knowing that he would later on run for the Parliament as a leader of an opposition party. The problem is that the situation is very much similar in the case of President Voronin. On the one hand he represents the state, and on the other hand he is the leader of Communist Party whose candidates' list he would probably want to head in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Having said that it would be rather interesting to have a closer look at the incompatibility issue. For instance Chisinau office of the State Chancellery recently appealed in the Court of Appeal the legality of one of the decisions of the Chisinau Municipal Council on appointing pretors designated by Mayor Urechean, on the grounds some of the councillors were holding at the time the decision was passed, positions incompatible with that of the councillors, namely they were pretors and actually voted for their own re-election. Court of Appeal rightly ruled in favour of the State Chancellery viewing as illegal the election of pretors, with Supreme Court of Justice also confirming the ruling.
The decision of the Supreme Court is of special interest especially if viewed from the perspective of the constitutional principle on the uniformly applying the law, meaning that President Voronin's eventual participation in parliamentary elections on the top of his party list might raise some problems. Article 81 of the Constitution states: "position of the President of the Republic of Moldova is incompatible with exercising any other paid work". MP position is a paid job. If Vladimir Voronin ran on the Communist Party list and kept the Presidential seat, then once elected in Parliament he would no longer be able to exercise his constitutional prerogative of the chief of state and thus wouldn't be able to convene the new legislature of the Parliament as the Constitution requests. If President Voronin would renounce to his MP mandate in order to be able to convene the new legislature the risk is however that the Communist Party would not win enough seats in Parliament to elect the President, thus Voronin might end up with no parliament nor presidential seat.
If President Voronin would choose to resign before the parliamentary elections than this plan would have to envisage "sacrificing" the eventual mandates of Parliament Speaker or Prime-Minister, which according to the constitutional provisions are interims of the President. In fact, mass media's scenario that the President would resign on the eve of elections so as to head Communist Party list is very unlikely. From a political point of view, the move might impair the Communist Party image.
Thus the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Justice may serve at least as a suggestion for deputies to address the Constitutional Court in order to clarify whether the chief of the state may run for another position while he is exercising his mandate. At the beginning of Vladimir Voronin's presidential mandate the Constitutional Court refused on various grounds to provide a clear answer to the question raised by the opposition on whether a President may also be a party member. If President Voronin would indeed head the Communist Party list, then Constitutional Court would find it quite difficult to avoid responding to the question if it is asked.
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