![]() | Association for Participatory Democracy | Print version. Published on www.e-democracy.md Original: /en/e-journal/20050420/index.shtml |
Activity of Public Institutions
1.1. Parliamentary administration
As we had presumed in the precedent issue of the e-journal "Democracy and Governing in Moldova", the candidacy of the leader of a parliamentary party which was more cooperating at presidential election was proposed and accepted for the post of second deputy speaker. The second deputy speaker is Iurie Rosca, leader of the Christian Democratic People's Party (PPCD), who was voted by 77 parliamentarians representing the Party of Moldova Communists (PCRM), Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), Social Liberal Party (PSL), and evidently, the Christian Democratic faction.
Iurie Rosca said in a speech on this occasion that his election as deputy speaker allows him to plenarily participate in the legislative process, to promote and fulfil the key tasks of the ten proposals that the Christian Democrats had submitted to the chief of state.
Asked to comment on election of Iurie Rosca as deputy speaker, Serafim Urechean, leader of the Our Moldova Alliance (AMN), said that the AMN faction should normally hold this post because it is the largest opposition faction in the Parliament, and this confirms one more time the existence of a governing coalition between Democrats, Christian Democrats, Social Liberals and the Communist parliamentary majority, since the AMN did not get this office.
1.2. Legislative documents
Lawmakers adopted the law on amendment of the law on government, after President Voronin had unveiled the executive reformation concept in the Parliament . Under the new amendments, the new cabinet will comprise 15 ministries and 13 institutions. The law adopted by Parliament does not establish the hierarchy of these structures, but available reports say that it would correspond to the following scheme: ministry - national bureau (centre/ chamber) - service - agency. The list of ministries and other governmental institutions is published in the next paragraph.
The law on live broadcast of plenary sittings of the parliament by television is another important document adopted by legislature. The main argues in favour of this law are based on experience of European countries and need to ensure the information of wide public. It was highlighted that "the price is not important" for accomplishment of these goals, no matter how high it is.
It is worth to underline that parliamentarians did not indicate any financial sources to cover these amendments, nor they established any date for implementation of these amendments. As a result, if the law is published, its accurate implementation could be demanded immediately after its appearance in Monitorul Oficial.
The Parliament had urgently ratified several international documents in connection with the April 21-22 GUUAM summit in Chisinau:
The initiative to create this association of states was launched in the mid-1990s. Later, the GUUAM leaders signed three political declarations - on October 10, 1997 in Strasbourg, on April 24, 1999 in Washington, and on September 6, 2000 in New York, so that GUUAM became a regional initiative aimed to promote the cooperation on European and regional security matters, in particular, within the OSCE.
Moldova joined this initiative to implement concrete projects on facilitation of trade and development of Euro-Asian transportation networks, as well as border security, struggle against terrorism, organised crime, and illegal trafficking in drugs and human beings. The United States and European Union provide political and financial assistance for cooperation within GUUAM.
According to the GUUAM Chart, this organisation has an open nature, being created in compliance with universally recognised international law norms and principles and key cooperation sectors: economy, science, technologies and environment, infrastructure of transports, energy, telecommunications, investments and finances, humanitarian sector, culture, education, mass media, tourism, and youth exchange.
The annual meeting of chiefs of state is the supreme body of GUUAM, while the member states hold the rotating chairmanship in this organisation in alphabetic order. The meetings of chiefs of state pass decisions on creation of specialized bodies of GUUAM; coordination of stances regarding current issues of common interest of international life.
The session of foreign ministers which takes place, as a rule, twice a year is the executive body of GUUAM. The sessions of foreign ministers examine problems related to implementation of agreements within GUUAM and draft proposals on development and continued deepening of GUUAM cooperation for examination at meetings of chiefs of state.
The Committee of National Coordinators (CNC), which comprises national coordinators named by foreign ministers and by one on behalf of every member state, is the task force of GUUAM. CNC coordinates the activity between GUUAM-member states, prepares the meetings of chiefs of state and sessions of foreign ministers. CNC holds sittings every quarter, while the member states host them in consecutive order.
The spending estimate for the GUUAM Information Office in 2004 was established in the amount of 90,610 dollars. Thus, every member pays 18,122 dollars (of which 8,240 dollars is the initial sum paid once in three years, and 9,882 dollars is the permanent amount paid every year).
Creation and adequate functioning of the Information Office would allow a deeper cooperation between member states for accomplishment and implementation of the GUUAM trade and transportation facilitation project.
2.1. Appointment of candidacy of prime minister
President Vladimir Voronin notified the parliament on April 8 over his decree on appointment of Vasile Tarlev as prime minister of Moldova. Under the decree, the prime minister was instructed to introduce the members of the new cabinet of ministers and to present the governing programme to the parliament for approval within 15 days. Appointment of Vasile Tarlev to the prime minister post for the second time, which surprised many observers after the chief of state had earlier highlighted the need to give new valences to Moldova's European integration process through promotion of new persons to state high ranking offices, outlines the stake of President Voronin on insurance of a continuity, no matter if slow, of a number of activities started by the Tarlev cabinet in 2001-2005.
In idiomatic terms, President Voronin thought that "a bird in hand is worth two in the bush", more than that the precedent Tarlev cabinet had ensured a minimum macroeconomic stability in country and improved some economic indicators, and the premier did not raise any problems regarding implementation of different projects, including "palace" scenarios staged by presidential team. President Voronin did not accidentally hint during a TV programme that the repeated appointment of Vasile Tarlev as prime minister is due to the fact that the latter is an obedient executor.
2.2. Structure of Government
The new cabinet of ministers will comprise 15 ministries, in line with amendments to the law on executive:
Also, the cabinet will comprise another 13 bodies:
Comparing this structure of executive with the one indicated by Moldovan president to lawmakers on April 8, we can observe some differences since the chief of state proposed maximum 17 ministries instead of the 16 ministries and 14 departments in the Tarlev-I cabinet. It was presumed that departments would disappear as central administrative institutions and ministries would take over their tasks.
In the context, it is worth to outline that President Voronin had proposed at the end of his mandate, with a couple of days before the 2005 parliamentary elections, to create the ministry of local public administration, and it was expected that the new cabinet of ministers comprise this ministry.
The public opinion does not know so far why this idea was not accomplished. Also, the solution to the three key problems identified by chief of state, which should be solved through creation of the ministry of local public administration is unknown: integration of efforts of central and local power bodies into a "single centre for coordination of planned transformations," aimed at general modernisation of the country; implementation of the ample project "Moldovan Village" and elimination of the "full lack of coordination" in activity of local public authorities which fulfil the same tasks as the governmental administration, Justice Ministry and Parliament, and many other structures, and this provokes confusions."
The fate of the domestic security service SIS is also unknown, since it is not part of any category of named governmental institutions. The state authorities had unlikely given up the services of this institutions.
3.1. Investment of Moldovan president in office
Vladimir Voronin was invested as president of Moldova after the Constitutional Court had validated the results of presidential elections.
"The events the past days represent a kind of prologue of an absolutely new stage in history of our country. The election of the chief of state served for the first time as s sort of unique occasion for union and consolidation of different political forces," President Voronin said. He noted that this is a result of mobilization of political forces for accomplishment of the European integration objective of Moldova.
"Three tasks" were named among priorities of his new mandate:
Also, President Voronin highlighted the need to reintegrate the state, expressing conviction that this goal will be fulfilled with the support of foreign partners of Moldova.
3.2. Reformation of Government. 7/7 tasks
The chief of state expressed his vision regarding the reformation of executive at the April 8 parliamentary sitting. Vladimir Voronin established seven strategic tasks for activity of the cabinet of ministers in 2005-2009:
In addition, Vladimir Voronin indicated seven permanent tasks:
It is hard to say whether the same number of strategic and permanent tasks for the new executive is an accident. However, it is sure that figure "7" will be a reference point of "luck or bad luck" of the Tarlev-II cabinet after four years.
It is worth to mention that the implementation of the 2004-2008 national human rights plan, national strategy on prevention and combat of corruption, and action plan on its accomplishment, documents approved by the precedent legislature has a distinct place in any of these categories of tasks. The E.U. Action Plan for Moldova highlights the need to implement these two documents, and the plan was named in the list of strategic tasks, and this could be an explanation why they are not part of the list of tasks of the Tarlev-II cabinet. However, distinct, strategic or permanent tasks should be drafted in connection with these plans, since the two documents envisage complex sectors and serious deficiencies in these sectors.
Making a short commentary of the chief of state's vision on government reformation, it is worth to mention that the president wants this process be held in two stages. According to the president, maximum 17 ministries must replace the 16 ministries and 14 departments within the first stage, while the staffs of the future executive will lose 70 percent of bureaucracy by November 14. Reduction of staffs must be followed by a rise of salaries of public functionaries up to 400-1,500 dollars, Voronin said, and strict selection of qualified specialists for new personnel units on basis of a contest.
1. Prices
The cost of importation rose from 502 to 545 dollars for one ton, in the case of petrol, and from 516 to 563 dollars for one ton of Diesel oil.
A crude oil price at the world's major commodities markets rose very rapidly, especially since the Goldman Sachs Bank had predicted a price over 100 dollars.
On the other hand, many analysts estimated that the forecast of Goldman Sachs is overestimated. In New York NYMEX price closed at a new record, 57.28 dollars, and in London the "black gold" price rose by two dollars in just one day, till 56.50 dollars.
On March 21, the petrol price in Moldova rose by about 7 percent and the Diesel oil price by 14 percent as response to introduction of higher prices of crude oil at international exchanges. Last year fuel prices in the ex-Soviet state rose by more than 30 percent.
Some estimates show that the gas tariff could grow by 25-30 percent and even more, if the world prices of energy resources remain at a high level. "The economic relations between Moldova and Russia cannot remain out of the influence of Chisinau's policy on Transnistria."
Even more, he underlined that the announcement of Gazprom about eventual introduction of higher tariffs fits the recent statement of the Russian government that the Russia-Moldova economic relations will depend on Chisinau's policy.
On the other hand, Moldova-Gaz manager Ghennadi Abaskin estimated that there are no economic reasons to increase the natural gas tariffs. "Moldova is not a subject of the European energy market and therefore no European tariffs can be introduced," said Abaskin, adding that Moldova pays for the entire current consumption of natural gas.
At present, Moldova imports natural gas from the Russian concern Gazprom in exchange for 80 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres, as well as from the daughter company of the Russian concern, Gazexport, which establishes the gas tariff every quarter. Thus, Gazexport exported gas to Moldova for 69 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres but the tariff rose up to 71 dollars on April 1, 2005. Moldova-Gaz signed contracts on acquisition of 3,150 billion cubic metres of gases from Russian companies Gazexport and Gazprom in 2005, by about half from each of them.
2. Banks and insurance
Operations worth 2,874,064,000 lei (231.82 million dollars) were carried out in Moldova via cards of Moldovan banks last year. The most of operations were related to cash withdrawals - 2,857,035,000 lei or 95.4 percent of the total, while the others were cash-free payments.
Overall, 340,275 cards were in circulation in late 2004, including 327,917 of international payment systems (VISA, EuroPay, MasterCard etc.). Banks issues 134,998 cards in 2004, including 3,315 local cards and 131,683 international cards. Twelve commercial banks issue cards in Moldova at present, including 11 cards of the system MasterCard International, six of the Visa International system, two of the local system MoldCardSystem, and one of Unicard system.
According to preliminary data of the State Inspectorate for Supervision of Insurance and Non-State Funds of Pensions (ISSAFNP), the following companies paid the highest damages: QBE Asito SA 43.18 million lei, Afes-M 8.93 million lei, Moldova-Astrovaz SRL 7.52 million lei, Moldcargo SRL 7.37 million lei, Carat 6.17 million lei, Artas 4.11 million lei, Donaris-Group SA 4.03 million lei, and Moldasig 3.72 million lei.
Most of money - 123.7 million lei - was raised from civil responsibility insurance of owners of motor transport and Green Card policies. Another 112.8 million lei was raised from optional insurance of goods, while 102.4 million lei was paid for insurance of estate of enterprises.
The total statutory capital of insurance societies rose by 50.8 million lei in 2004 up to 168.5 million lei, while reserves and insurance funds grew by 20 million lei up to 146.6 million lei.
Forty-five companies function on the insurance market in Moldova, of which only 33 hold a social capital in the amount of two million stipulated by legislation.
3. Trade
According to members of the Ukrainian executive, the new agreement will allow the creation of a free trade zone between Ukraine and Moldova under the existing requirements of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The agreement calls for a "no-exception" regime of trade between the two ex-Soviet countries, under the WTO rules and practices. Under the document, the sides committed themselves to protect their markets, compensate losses and apply anti-dumping and safeguard measures in line with WTO rules. The agreement would take effect at the time Ukraine became a WTO member.
The first free trade agreement between Moldova and Ukraine was signed on August 29, 1995. Official statistics show that Ukraine is the second largest trade partner of Moldova. Last year's trade turnover between them rose to more than half a billion dollars. On the other hand, Ukrainian exports created in Moldova the largest trade deficit last year compared with another 80 countries - 371.7 million dollars. Moldova exported goods and services worth 64.7 million dollars to Ukraine, while imports absorbed 436.4 million dollars.
Farmers contracted credits and benefited from unreimbursable financing in the amount of 120 million lei last year, compared with 84 million lei in 2003. Also, the 17 agricultural enterprises affiliated to associations sold products worth 42.2 million lei and invested 640 million lei.
Uniagroprotect was founded in 2001 as a nongovernmental and non-profit nongovernmental organisation to assist private agricultural producers. At present, the union includes 15 associations of agricultural producers, who brings together 2,240 members and administrate 50 percent of agricultural fields in Moldova.
4. Moldova and the world
David Johnson, coordinator of the Food Security Programme, said that this is the first project drafted on basis of the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (EGPRSP) and the E.U. Action Plan for Moldova. The financial assistance will be distributed for promotion of concrete reforms in three key directions: public finances, social protection and agriculture.
According to forecasts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding the development of global economy, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Moldova, will register an economic growth in 2005-2006 below the levels reached in the past two years. Azerbaijan will be the only exception, as it will post a 21.6 percent growth in 2005 and 38.3 percent in 2006, the IMF forecasts.
Forecasts show that Moldova will post a five-percent growth in 2005 and four percent in 2006. Armenia will register 9.5 percent and 14.2 percent, Tajikistan 8.0 percent and 7.0 percent, Georgia 6.0 percent and 5.0 percent, Kazakhstan 8.0 percent and 7.7 percent, Ukraine 7.0 percent and 4.0 percent, the Russian Federation 6.0 percent and 5.5 percent. A "relatively favourable" situation will be recorded in this region, the IMF report said.
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a subdivision of the London-based The Economist forecasts a five-percent growth for Moldova in 2005 and 2006, and an inflation rate of 12.5 percent this year and 10 percent in 2006. EIU experts warn that the narrow economic base, trade deficit and financial insufficiency are risky, but the significant growth of remittances of Moldovans who work abroad will partly reduce this risk. According to the EIU analysis, the payment of debts will be a problem in continuation.
The European Union does not have a concrete Transnistrian settlement plan, but is ready to make proposals that might be useful, the EU Special Representative for the Republic of Moldova Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged told a press conference at the end of his visit to Moldova on 11-12 April. According to him, the EU will support any plan that will propose an efficient and working distribution of powers between the centre and the periphery, whatever the settlement principle, be it a federation, a common state, etc.
"This visit has given me the impression that there is a great will to solve the Transnistrian conflict. And we are ready to contribute. I will not stay here permanently, but will visit often. In addition, I will consult Moscow, Kiev, Bucharest, Washington, the OSCE and other EU countries.," Jacobovits said, quoted by the Infotag news agency.
The EU Special Representative noted the �crucial change' in the EU attitude towards Moldova. "The EU Neighbourhood Policy has been approved, so has the EU-Moldova Action Plan. This is an important progress. The European Commission will open an office in Chisinau," added Jacobovits, announcing his next visit to Moldova for 26 April 2005.
The EU Special Representative for Moldova was appointed by the Council of the European Union on 23 March 2005. His mandate is principally focused on the coordination of the EU contribution to the Transnistrian conflict resolution.
In the meantime, on 12 April President Voronin told a TV show on "Pro TV" that the official Chisinau is working on a draft law on the special status of the Transnistrian region within the Republic of Moldova. According to Voronin, the document will provide for extensive rights of the future autonomy - local parliament, administration, own budget, flag, anthem and other attributes. The banking system, army, customs and foreign policy will remain unique. Speaking of the announced Ukrainian settlement plan, Voronin said he was not aware of its contents, but that Moldova would accept an eventual proposal from Ukraine to solve the Transnistrian issue by the example of Crimea. Voronin denied the roomers that Moldova will withdraw from the CIS and declared that GUUAM is a �purely economic' initiative and is not directed against the CIS.
On the other hand, on the eve of the GUUAM Summit that will take place in Chisinau on 22 April, the Chisinau and Kiev press have published a series of articles regarding to settlement plan that the Ukrainian president is to propose at the Summit, but also on the future role that Ukraine will play in the settlement process. Thus, many Ukrainian political commentators have called upon the Ukrainian authorities to publish the plan ahead of the Summit and discuss it with independent experts both in Ukraine, and in Moldova, Romania, US, EU and OSCE States. Such an approach would be in line with the European style policy of regional leader that Kiev has assumed on the trilateral Kiev-Chisinau-Tbilisi, and would prevent a Kozak Memorandum like failure of the plan.
At the same time, Ukrainian commentators have deplored the �generous' reopening by the Ukrainian customs authorities of the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border for the export and transit of Transnistrian goods. This customs measure was introduced immediately after the meeting that the Ukrainian and Russian president had on 19 March in Kiev, in spite of the changes operated by President Yushchenko in the leadership of the customs services and his tough critique at the activity of the customs services, invoking breaches and smuggling traffic across the Moldova-Ukrainian frontier, as well as a high level of unprofessionalism and corruption.
Thus, while the �orange' Ukraine is trying to assert its adherence to European values, it seems that the lower echelons of power act behind the back of President Yushchenko and continue to promote the Kuchma-style policy of Ukraine on the Transnistrian issue. At the same time, Ukrainian observers have noted, Kiev is now the decisive actor in solving the Transnistrian crisis, because only the economic isolation of the region and, in particular, the blocking of shadow activities over the border could determine the Transnistrian break away regime to compromise and give up its vanity inspired by the Kremlin. An effective input by the post-Kuchma Ukraine into the Transnistrian conflict resolution process could be an important first step towards accomplishing its European aspirations.
1. European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova
The Institute of Public Policies (IPP) unveiled on April 13 the European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova (ESRM)1. More than 30 national experts participated in drafting this document, while IPP and the Foreign Ministry of Moldova coordinated their activity.
According to IPP, the drafting of this document had started before the European Commission launched the consultations on the E.U. Action Plan for Moldova, and after elaboration of the concept on Moldova's integration in the E.U. It is worth to note in the context that the latter appeared in August 2003, after the National Commission for European Integration (NCEI) in charge with drafting and unveiling the strategy on European integration of Moldova to the parliament, as well as with drafting and approving the action plan for this strategy2, was created on November 13, 2002 through a presidential decree. Under the activity plan of the government for the first quarter of 2003, the strategy should be finished by March 14, 2003. Surprisingly, as the presidential decree required the drafting of strategy, we had been witnesses of a serendipity phenomenon - the concept on integration of Moldova in the E.U., not the strategy appeared after activity of NCEI in 2003. Thus, the IPP draft European Strategy comes to eliminate an older arrear of Moldovan authorities.
According to IPP, the structure of ESRM was drafted on basis of experience of many countries, as well as of the E.U. regulations on enlargement process. The ESRM was adjusted to the plan after consultations on the Action Plan.The European Strategy comprises the following basic fields for every sector of activity: analysis of legislative framework of Moldova; analysis of institutional framework; formulation of existing problems; formulation of short- and medium-term priorities.
ESRM will be periodically reviewed according as implementation of the E.U. Action Plan for Moldova, and this would allow its use as tool for monitoring of the process of implementation of this plan. The IPP estimated that Moldova would hold the right to seek the progress of contract bases with the E.U. in 2008, when the term of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) runs off, if it respects the three-year deadline for implementation of the Action Plan. Under these conditions, if Brussels has enough political will, it could advance the status of dialogue with Moldova by signing a new qualitative document - an agreement (on association or neighbourhood), a new action plan or a strategy. According to IPP, the new document should be based on an analysis of situation in all areas of cooperation - legislative framework and institutional framework on cooperation, problems and priorities of future cooperation, regardless of the E.U. further stance. The European Strategy plays this role. The draft ESRM was published on the website of IPP, so that the interested people enjoy the opportunity to study it.
2. The Republic of Moldova - NATO
Jean Fournet, deputy secretary-general of NATO for public diplomacy, was on an official visit to Chisinau on April 5. He had meetings with President Vladimir Voronin and Defence Minister Valeriu Plesca. The meetings focussed on the following issues: reformation of the national security system; Moldova's presence in the Partnership for Peace Programme; opening of a regional anti-trafficking centre in Chisinau to coordinate the efforts aimed to reduce the sizes of trafficking in human beings; introduction of an international monitoring on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, as well as enhanced cooperation aimed to ensure regional and international security.
In the context of talks on Moldova's participation in the Partnership for Peace Programme, President Voronin expressed the readiness of the Moldovan authorities to upgrade Chisinau's participation in this programme, while the defence minister informed the NATO high ranking official about training of a team of bomb experts, military observers, and a company for participation in a peacekeeping mission. The NATO deputy secretary-general said in the context of NATO enlargement to the Proute that the adoption of an Individual Action Plan of NATO for Moldova is opportune for optimization of cooperation with Moldova.
3. Meeting of the GUUAM Committee of National Coordinators
Chisinau hosted a special meeting of the GUUAM Committee of National Coordinators early this month. Taking part in the meeting were representatives of all member states of this regional project, as well as of the U.S. Department of State. Also, representatives of the U.S., Ukrainian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Turkish, and Polish Embassies attended the meeting as observers.
According to the press service of the Moldovan Foreign Ministry, the meeting examined issues related to organisation of the April 22-scheduled GUUAM summit, implementation of projects within this dialogue frame, including the trade and transportation facilitation project.
The GUUAM summit
Igor Botan
Chisinau will host the GUUAM summit on April 22. The interest for this regional structure has reappeared in Moldova with a couple of weeks before the March 6 parliamentary elections. Indeed, the authorities had pleaded for upgrading of the GUUAM about half a year ago. The attitude towards GUUAM was more than reticent until then. Vladimir Voronin said after being elected as chief of state in 2001 that Moldova would withdraw from GUUAM because this organisation follows anti-Russian goals.
There were many reasons after all, with all of them being related to the support of the Russian Federation for the Transdnestrian separatist regime, and they made the Moldovan authorities reconsider their attitude towards GUUAM in the past half a year, and two of these motives were decisive: a) the refusal of the Russian Federation to back the initiative on the Stability and Security Pact for Moldova (SSPM) released by President Voronin on June 1, 2004; b) repeated threats of the Russian State Duma to introduce economic sanctions against Moldova for its attitude towards the Transdnestrian separatist regime, with the threats aiming to obstruct the reelection of Vladimir Voronin as chief of state.
The evolution of attitude of Moldovan authorities towards GUUAM is interesting from these reasons. At the very beginning, President Voronin believed that implementation of the SSPM would ensure a "multilateral compromise" between Russia, the United States, Romania, Ukraine, and the European Union (EU) "on a number of principle problems of Moldovan statehood�representing the guarantee of a long-term stability in this region." The compromise was clearly envisaging the Transdnestria settlement. Voronin mentioned then that if the sides fail to reach a mutual agreement, this "failure would have evident impacts on stability and security in region." The SSPM was the first resonance initiative released by the chief of state, aimed to search new solutions to the Transdnestrian conflict, after the confusion related to refusal to sign the "Kozak Memorandum" in November 2003. Launching the SSPM, the Moldovan authorities wanted to avoid any actions which could provoke negative reactions from Russia. Perhaps this is the explanation why President Voronin had turned down the invitation of newly-elected Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to attend the GUUAM summit in Batumi after Abashidze's run to Moscow.
As it was mentioned already the attitude towards GUUAM was changed after Russia had categorically turned down the SSPM. Russia's ostentatious support for the Transdnestrian separatist regime after failure of the "Kozak Memorandum", as well as the refusal to withdraw its military and ammunition from the eastern region of Moldova, required new approaches of problems related to settlement of the Transdnestrian conflict. As it seems, it was reached a conclusion that the approach of this issue, including through a regional organisation to which Russia is not member with its typical interests in Transdnestria, would be a solution in this regard. GUUAM is the only structure of this kind.
It is interesting to highlight that the public authorities did not adopt any important documents on GUUAM till Russia's refusal to back the SSPM, though Moldova is part of this organisation since 1997. Instead, the situation has significantly changed after the Russian authorities turned down the SSPM, especially after the December 6-7, 2004 OSCE summit in Sofia, which discussed this initiative. The government order on creation of a task force to draft and implement the national plan on implementation of the project on facilitation of trade and transportation within GUUAM was published on December 10, 2004, and the plan was worked out and unveiled on February 25, 2005. Also, the government included the 17,300-dollar GUUAM membership fee for 2005 in the decision on payment of membership fees and debts of Moldova towards international and regional organisations from the 2005 state budget, published on January 28, 2005.
As it was said, this change of attitude towards GUUAM had one more justification. The lawmakers of the Russian State Duma, who initiated the adoption of three resolutions by the Russian State Duma last February, recommending the executive to apply economic sanctions against Moldova, publicly admitted that they wanted to obstruct Party of Moldovan Communists (PCRM) from winning the March 6 parliamentary elections and to halt the reelection of Vladimir Voronin as Moldova's chief of state. This sort of ostentatious actions of the State Duma made President Voronin behave the necessary way. His initiative to pay a flash visit to Kiev on March 1 in order to discuss a number of problems including the upgrading of GUUAM with President Viktor Yushchenko, as well as the immediately accepted invitation to Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to visit Moldova on March 2, made the impression of some coordinated actions including with influent foreign political centres.
Undoubtedly, this initiative means that the Moldovan authorities decided to join the Carpathian Declaration on European development of Ukraine and Georgia, signed by Presidents Yushchenko and Saakashvili in early January 2005. President Voronin and his counterparts Yushchenko and, respectively, Saakashvili discussed on March 1 and 2 almost the same set of issues related to: a) regional security and combat of separatism; b) diversification of energy providing sources; c) upgrading of GUUAM for a joint settlement of regional problems; d) coordination of efforts for European integration. It was decided to convoke the GUUAM summit in Chisinau on April 22 for a better approach of these problems.
Expectations related to the GUUAM summit generated both optimism, and much scepticism. Indeed, a first positive effect of convocation of the GUUAM summit in Chisinau was already observed in the internal policy of Moldova. One part of opposition gave up intention to block up the election of Moldovan president, with the need to set up the new central power bodies after elections and before the GUUAM summit being one of reasons invoked in this regard. As a result, the parliament ratified on April 15 the following documents under emergency regime: a) Yalta Chart of GUUAM, the basic juridical document on constitution of organisation; b) GUUAM agreement on creation of free trade zone; c) agreement on creation of the GUUAM Information Office. However, the development perspectives of GUUAM after upgrading leave room for many questions related to:
a) interests and cohesion level of GUUAM-member states. At the very beginning, the tasks of the GUUAM-member states aimed to join efforts in order to ensure the conditions needed for an economic growth based on: development and implementation of joint projects on economics, trade, transportation, communications, financial cooperation; border, customs, scientific, etc. cooperation. Later, as the GUUAM members faced defiance, the tasks were reformulated: peaceful settlement of regional conflicts on basis of principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders; combat of aggressive separatism and international terrorism; coordination of cooperation of member states with international institutions (United Nations, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Council of Europe, Consultative Group of member states of Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, etc.)
However, a series of political and economic factors had jeopardized the development of GUUAM in the past years. The political factors comprise first of all the conflicts in member countries, for example between Moldova and Ukraine regarding the attitude towards the Transdnestrian separatism regime. Secondly, the West's attitude over the former Ukrainian administration of president Kuchma made the latter seriously consider the possibility to mainly focus on Russia-promoted projects - the Euro-Asiatic Economic Union, Joint Economic Space, etc.
As for economic factors, Russia had efficiently used the opportunities to defend its economic interests and to demonstrate the economic flabbiness of GUUAM. The decision to start the construction of the petrol pipe Baku-Tbilisi-Cheyhan had significantly reduced the interest of Azerbaijan and Georgia for transit of petrol through territories of other GUUAM states, as the Azerbaijani oil reserves were insufficient for building of other pipes. Once Russia had joined the Baku-Tbilisi-Cheyhan project, it found other energy compromise solutions with Azerbaijan, making this country more reticent over projects of GUUAM. The Russian authorities and oil business had successfully persuaded the former Kiev administration to use the Odessa-Brody pipe under reverse regime, contrary to initial plans on exportation of Caspian petrol to Poland's borders and further enlargement of the pipe to Gdansk. As this pipe surrounded Moldova's territory, the latter regarded this gesture as elimination from GUUAM projects, showing a similar behaviour towards this organisation. Nor Uzbekistan was forgotten, as the Gazprom concern signed agreements on exploitation and transportation of gas with this country as well. In addition, estimations of Russian experts aim to demonstrate that China's increasing interest for energy resources could offer a better perspective to countries in the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia to export hydrocarbons to this country with an impressive economic potential. It also means that there are evident contradictions between the EU and USA regarding the exportation of energy resources of Iran to the West.
If we add that the volume of mutual trade represents only two percent of the total volume of external trade of GUUAM states, we can conclude that mainly political factors and less economic factors dictated the upgrading of GUUAM so far.
The upgrading of GUUAM really follows the beginning of a new electoral cycle in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Russia's direct meddling in elections in Abkhazya, Ukraine and Moldova; support for separatism in Georgia and Moldova; incitement for separatism in Ukraine through participation of Russian officials in the December 10, 2004 Severodonetsk congress seem to decisively determine the upgrading of GUUAM. It seems that the GUUAM-member states had reached the conclusion that defiance provoked by foreign meddling can be stopped only through joint efforts within this regional organisation. For example, the individual efforts of Georgia and Moldova to eliminate the risks related to the separatist regimes supported by Russia are viewed and understood in one way in Brussels and Washington. For sure, the same efforts of a regional organisation such as GUUAM, after Ukraine had also entered the risk zone of separatism, will be regarded on a different way in these capitals.
It can be said in this regard that an eventual success of the GUUAM summit in Chisinau could have a decisive impact on further developments. This success particularly depends on how Ukraine will be able to justify its ambitions of regional leader. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko mentioned in his speech at the Warsaw University on April 12 that he intends to unveil a new concept on regional partnership and leadership at the Chisinau summit. It seems that this concept envisages his Transdnestria settlement initiative. It is known so far that this initiative is based on principles of "respect for Moldova's territorial integrity and insurance of a sufficient autonomy to Transnistria, and this would stabilise the political situation in the entire region." According to Yushchenko, settlement of conflicts near Ukraine's borders is an emergency, since the Ukraine-Moldova frontier is a bridge for illegal migration and trafficking. The participation of the OSCE and USA in equipping the checkpoints in line with modern standards and norms, as well as joint efforts could ensure an efficient settlement. On the other hand, political leaders, experts from Moldova and other countries expressed concern over secret nature of the work on the "project", which has the signs of some internal conflicts between groups of the Kiev administration with different interests in the Transdnestrian region. This may provoke the failure of the "Ukrainian project" in Transdnestria and ambitions of this country to become a regional leader, with negative consequences for GUUAM. The Moldovan authorities had promised to turn down any projects seeking an eventual settlement of the Transdnestrian conflict through federalisation of Moldova.
b) interest of the U.S and E.U. for GUUAM. There is no doubt that the ability of GUUAM to survive and develop is directly proportionate to the interest of the USA and EU in this region. Therefore, the GUUAM members should back this interest. This interest was initially based on possibility to develop the so-called "Transportation Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Caspian Sea", an eventual restoration of the "Silk Road", which opened the access to regions rich of hydrocarbons in Central Asia. There are tries to get rid of the previous incapacity (till elections in Georgia and Ukraine) of the GUUAM-member states to reach the declared goals and maintain the interest of the USA and EU for this regional organisation by giving new valences to this stricture. Invitation of representatives of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, the Baltics, etc. at the GUUAM summit in Chisinau opens perspectives for cooperation within GUUAM by attracting interests for much wider geopolitical projects such as the Black Sea Basin and Baltic Sea - Black Sea cooperation, areas which represent connections between the West and Central Asia. The USA and EU could show an increased interest for these perspectives. Although the economic interests of the USA and EU in region are related to a farther perspective, the interest for political stability and security should be very shaped, since illegal trafficking and migration in region represent a common threat;
c) perception and interest of Russia to oppose the development of GUUAM. The Russian authorities and experts had a negative attitude towards GUUAM from the very beginning, regarding this regional organisation as a threat for its political, economic and security interests in the post-Soviet area. That's why Russia had undertaken different successful measures in order to demonstrate the economic weakness of GUUAM. The recent meddling in elections in Ukraine and Moldova demonstrated that Russia wanted a lot to maintain the political control in region through very typical methods. However, the eventual creation of a collective security system in the GUUAM area had raised the deepest concern. The fact that Ukraine and Moldova had never joined the CIS Collective Security Agreement, while Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan withdrew from this security structure fueled these suspicions. In particular, Russian experts are concerned over declared intentions of Ukraine and Georgia to become NATO members in perspective. Although nobody nourishes illusions regarding the preparation and eventual terms of entry of these countries in NATO, the possibility of an intermediary cooperation between an eventual collective security system GUUAM and Euro-Atlantic structures is not excluded. Russia dislikes very much this sort of eventual cooperation. As it was said, GUUAM is the only regional structure in the CIS to which Russia is not a member, while the announced intention of GUUAM to cooperate for insurance of stability in the Black Sea Basin and the Black Sea-Baltic Sea region, areas where NATO and EU have recently enlarged, only fuels Russia's suspicions that the new NATO and EU members could become strong lawyers of interests of GUUAM states in relations with Washington and Brussels.
Russia had already reacted. It backed the intention of the "separatist international" made up by Transnistria, Abkhazya and South Ossetya to create a military alliance to combat the eventual integrating effects inside GUUAM. Also, Russia is indirectly introducing "economic sanctions" (the recent case of Moldova) by prohibiting the importation of agricultural or food products from veterinary or sanitary security reasons. However, the precedent experience had demonstrated that support for separatism and introduction of "economic sanctions" can have contradictory effects and harm Russia's interests.
The following contributed to this issue:
|
© 2001-2015 Association for Participatory Democracy "ADEPT" Reproduction of the materials is welcomed provided the source is indicated | e-mail: [email protected] |