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e-journal, III year, no. 56, August 1-31, 2005

Activity of Public Institutions

Economic Policies

Transdnistrian Conflict

Foreign Affairs

Studies, Analyses, Comments

Activity of Public Institutions

Government

1.1. Appointments

On August 18, at the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Government appointed Ion Filimon, former Communist MP, as the Republic of Moldova Ambassador to Belarus. The President is to issue a decree in this respect.

1.2. Resolutions


Presidency

2.1. Decrees

On August 5 President Voronin signed the Decree No. 196-IV on Establishing a national Commission Entrusted to Draft and Implement the Individual Action Plan RM - NATO. The Decree also appointed members of the Commission. Under the Decree the Commission is entrusted to: a) develop by March 1, 2006 the Individual Action Plan RM - NATO and submit it for the examination of the Supreme Security Council; b) ensure the implementation of RM - NATO Action Plan; c) brief Supreme Security Council on the Action Plan implementation.

The Decree is a follow up to the President's initiative of June 7, 2005 to sign an Individual Action Plan RM - NATO. During his meeting in Brussels with NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, President Voronin stated "Republic of Moldova wishes to fully exploit the partnership opportunities provided by the Partnership for Peace and boost relations with NATO. We believe it is paramount to develop in this context the goals of National Army reform and actions aimed to improve our army capacity to operate along NATO forces. Moldovan authorities believe the time has come when in order to enhance the political dialogue and cooperation, an Individual Action Plan RM - NATO is to be developed".

2.2 Initiatives

President Voronin convened a meeting to talk Republic of Moldova representative at the European Court for Human Rights. The move came as a follow up to the January 29, 2005 reunion of the judges. At the meeting President Voronin pointed the following: a) the current situation when more and more citizens of the country are dissatisfied with how the justice is done and appeal to ECHR is unacceptable; b) ECHR already passed 17 judgments condemning RM, while other 217 cases have been accepted by the Court; c) it is paramount to urgently amend the Constitution and "enforce national mechanism of human rights protection" by means of the Constitutional Court which is to become a kind of mini-ECHR, thereby Moldovan citizens would have to appeal ECHR in Strasbourg; d) in each of the cases ECHR issued a judgment condemning Moldova, Constitutional Court should take action against the judges whose ruling were contested by ECHR. Moreover, Prosecutor General should investigate those cases, claiming partial or complete recovery of the financial loses the country incurred as a result of the bad judgments; e) Parliament, Government and other specialized institutions should develop an action plan to implement the aforesaid propositions made by the President.

On the other hand, experts from the "Lawyers for the Human Rights" Association stated earlier during the Leadership School held by ADEPT that "that the most frequent violations of the human rights reported by citizens of the country are: a) non-execution of the court rulings; b) certain binding principles are neglected in ensuring free trials; c) the right on property is violated; d) violation of the right on freedom and security; d) also numerous are the appeals against illegal and abusive arrests, 95% of all mandates of arrest fail the scrutiny of ECHR, that is, they are illegal".

Moreover, Lawyers for the Human Rights believe that the increasing number of judgments against Moldova are the result of: a) lack of independence of the judiciary in Moldova; b) corruption in judiciary, which is brought among others by the meager salaries of the judges, lack of adequate premises to do the justice properly, etc. As for granting Constitutional Court the status of "mini-ECHR", there are different opinions in this respect. Theoretically, speaking the proposition seems quite acceptable. However, practically speaking it seems to raise numerous barriers and discourage citizens' access to ECHR. The thing is that the incumbent membership of the Constitutional Court is seen as being extremely loyal to the governors to the expense of its impartiality. An illustration in this respect was the Court refusal to examine a number of appeals citing provisions of the Code of Constitutional Law. The latest example was the appeal submitted to the Court on the constitutionality of Parliament Resolution no. 444-XV of December 24, 2004 on establishing the election date. Previous compositions of the Court did examine such appeals ruling that decisions of the Parliament, Presidency, and Government enter in force after being published in the Official Monitor. However, the incumbent Court refrained from examining the appeal citing incorrect address formula and application procedure, despite the fact that it was developed by a former judge of the Court known for his high professionalism.

2.3. Speeches

On Independence Day, August 27 President Voronin delivered a speech. The gist of the speech referred to: a) Moldovan state managed to affirm itself despite domestic and foreign challenges; b) there is a consensus in the society on the future of the country, regardless of nationality or spoken language, therefore the state is no longer an abstract notion, but rather a home for a multinational people; c) independence would be fully-fledged only when democratic institutions would function, as would rule of law, market economy and European values, inadmissibility of any pressure on mass-media and civil society, opinions equally shared by power and opposition; d) European accession is a provides an unique opportunity to build the Moldovan state; e) RM reunification has become inevitable after the adoption by Moldovan parliament on July 22 of the Law on the future organization of the country.

Interestingly enough, President Voronin speech delivered this year stands out against his previous speeches delivered on Independence Day. Albeit he reiterated the main political tasks part of the "national consensus", still this time they paltry. This specifically refers to RM's strategic goal - accession to EU. He highlighted the need to comply with Copenhagen criteria and named accession the "national idea" in the RM.

This might be explained by the internal and external political context. On the one hand, the problems EU is facing diminish even further the meager chances Moldova had to join the structure. On the other hand, Russia's economic growth, boosted by rising oil prices, strengthens even further its position in the region and increases CIS dependence on it. Russia's message regarding "turning into monetary terms" the economic ties with CIS depending on their loyalty, bears considerable risks for Moldova, which has already suffered from the Russia's ban of agricultural products imports from Moldova.

By passing the "historic law" on the principles of settling Transdnistrian conflict, RM has sharply limited its berth for maneuvers in settling the conflict. In fact, the conflict resolution depends on some external factors outside RM's control, namely Ukraine and Russia.

All the aforesaid factors might raise some significant problems for the incumbent governing, strengthening the positions of the pro-Russian wing in the ruling party. As for the rest, all the President did was to review RM's achievements since he launched his project "Sovereign Moldova" on August 27, 2001, namely: 1) settling Transnistrian conflict and reintegrating the country, 2) edifying a multiethnic and multi-linguistic Moldovan nation; 3) strengthening democracy, consolidating civil society and specifically, judiciary; 4) promoting a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Indeed many of the tasks set back in 2001 have been significantly changed in 2005.


Economic Policies

1. Prices and inflation

2. Financial-bank system

3. Foreign trade

4. Moldova and the world


1 Interests decline when inflationary pressures disappear.


Transdnistrian Conflict

On 30 July the Moldovan Government adopted two decisions in emergency regime: "Regarding the confirmation of main guarantees to the population of Transnistria" and "Regarding the regulation of the movement of goods that are the object of Transnistria's external trade". Both decisions have been adopted at the initiative of President Voronin and as a follow up to the Law on the Basic Provisions regarding the Special Legal Status of Transnistria adopted by the Moldovan Parliament on 22 July 2005.

The guarantees adopted by the Cabinet refer to the property rights of physical and legal entities from Transnistria at the date of entry of the above law into force, and preservation of the current social protection system and access to other social services of all categories of population of Transnistria. In addition, the Moldovan Government guarantees the retention of jobs by all employees of the force departments of Transnistria, prosecutors' offices, courts, lawyers' offices, as well as their access to similar jobs in the rest of Moldova.

According to the second decision, the Transnistrian economic agents will have the possibility to obtain the necessary documents for export-import operations for a period of six months. They will be issued IDNO codes and will be provisionally registered in the Moldovan State Register of enterprises and organizations. The customs procedures and control on export-import of goods from and into Transnistria will be exercised by the Moldovan Customs.

The governmental decision also includes provisions regarding the restitution of import rights, issue of forms certifying the origin of goods and other aspects of external trade activity.

According to the text of the decision, the resumption of the registration of Transnistrian economic agents and the issue of documents for export-import operations has been initiated with the aim of reintegrating the country and overcoming the consequences of the conflict. It is also linked to the forthcoming deployment of an international monitoring mission at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.

Earlier the Ukrainian Government published a series of decisions which have not entered into force yet, on the regulation of the export-import activity at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, whereby goods from Moldova may be transported into Ukraine only on the basis of customs papers bearing Moldovan stamps, and goods coming from the Transnistrian region will only enter Ukraine through the customs check points where Moldova is present.

The two governmental decisions were launched on 29 July at the closing sitting of the spring-summer Parliamentary session by President Voronin, who noted that "the question of guarantees for the Transnistrian population and the legalization of the Transnistrian economy within the legal space of Moldova, are the most important tasks over the short term. ...We have to tell clearly and unequivocally to the Transnistrian inhabitants that the reunification of the country is an advantage for everyone, that there should not be and will not be material or social losses as a result of reintegration". The President asked the Parliament to adopt by 10 October 2005 the entire legislative basis necessary for the application of guarantees.

The two governmental decisions are part of the stated efforts of the current Moldovan leadership to grant humanitarian, political and economic assistance to the Transnistrian population. It is not clear however if Chisinau will find the financial means necessary to apply into practice the adopted guarantees, especially those related to social protection. Moreover, many questions arise in relation to guarantees on the property rights of physical and legal entities given that the Moldovan authorities have repeatedly condemned and ruled out the privatization process being currently carried out in Transnistria.


Foreign Affairs


Studies, Analyses, Comments

Kazan' CIS Summit
Igor Botan

1. Yet another attempt to revive CIS?

Forecasts on the death of the CIS, or on the contrary, the need for its revival have traditionally accompanied any forthcoming CIS Summit. The recent Summit held in Kazan' on August 26, 2005 was not an exception to that. As usual, pessimists claim that "CIS is more dead than alive", while the optimists claim the opposite. The truth is somewhere in the middle, i.e. CIS is in a coma. This explains the numerous initiatives to revive CIS, or to eliminate the "necrosis" by promoting differentiated, gradual, or even "various speed" integration of certain micro-communities within CIS, such as Russia-Belarus Union (RBU); Eurasia Union (EU), Common Economic Space (CES), which despite their potential are still quite ephemeral.

And this largely due to the fact that right from the beginning CIS lacked a clear strategy. Currently, there is much talk that the greatest merit of CIS was to bring "civilized divorce" of the former soviet republics, fact also confirmed recently by President Putin. At the beginning things were quite different; however the low economic integration potential (despite the dozens of summits and hundreds of adopted documents) has brought the general acceptance of this point. In its early stages, the most liberal Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev was claiming that CIS main purpose was to serve the exclusive interests of Russia, while Russian Presidents' Councilor Andranic Migranean went further saying Russia was to promote in CIS a strategy similar to Monroe doctrine. Later on, Russian high rank moguls and pundits issued a string of statements on the CIS role in preserving Russia's influence in the region by means of liberal economic imperialism. A special role in this respect was given to the "security belt" made up of secessionist enclaves that were to prevent some CIS states from leaving Russia's sphere of influence. In response, CIS countries focused on "consolidating their own sovereignty", refrained from any supranational structures within CIS, rather accepting only coordination structures in various fields.

The turning point for CIS was the Yalta Summit held in September 2003, when Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan announced the creation of Common Economic Space (CES). After the Summit, Russia's strategy as regards CIS became quite clear, especially in the three key areas: economy and trade; military and security; humanitarian and informational. There is quite clear distinction. Albeit practically all CIS countries opt for a close economic cooperation, after the Yalta Summit not all of them are eligible for such cooperation. For instance, the first signs of a cool-down between Moldova and Russia showed immediately after the Yalta Summit when Moldova was not invited into the CES. Only the countries endowed with huge economic potential and whose GDP accounted for at least 90% of the CIS' GDP, got invited. Among the four founding countries, Russia and Kazakhstan seem to be self-sufficient economically, largely due to their vast oil and gas reserves. As for Belarus and Ukraine, albeit they are the greatest importers of oil and gas, still they have a huge economic potential and are economically quite attractive for Russia. Lukashenko's regime remains afloat mainly due to Russia's support, which explains his oratorical ardor on Russia-Belarus unification. Ukraine, on the other hand, is attractive due to its economic and geopolitical position as well as historic ties with Russia.

Russia seems to view economic cooperation and integration without a military component, as quite risky for consolidating its influence in CIS. That is why membership in the CIS' Agreement on Joint Security (AJS) seems to be one of the main criteria when deciding economic policy towards certain CIS countries. This is the generally-accepted logic. For instance, former Communist Central European countries first joined NATO and only afterwards EU. Out of the CIS countries invited to the CES only Ukraine is not a member of AJS, however, as it was mentioned, its strategic importance for Russia qualifies it for CES.

The other CIS states having weaker economies and caring about their "sovereignty" that are not AJS members could not even aspire to get into CES club. The mere thing that keeps them in the CIS is the secessionism "security belt" (Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Osetia, Nagornokarabah). Thus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova neither could fully exploit CIS economically, nor could leave it without getting into bigger troubles. What some of them could really do is to get into even more ephemeral structures than CIS, like GUAM.

Evidence to the new Russia's strategy towards CIS is the statement made by Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Federal Assembly, Mikhail Margelov "The change in Russia's foreign policy, its pragmatism, has started five years ago", i.e. once Putin acceded to power. Yet another illustration is the initial agenda of the Kazani Summit, as well as the fact that Ukraine's propositions were neglected. Economic issues were only discussed by the heads of the four CES countries. Military cooperation issues have been on the agenda of AJS countries, while the leftovers - festivities, commemorations, and other general stuff of interest for Russia - where put forward on the agenda for discussions by all the heads of state. Those included among others: Agreement on Humanitarian Cooperation within CIS; preparations for the 60th anniversary of the UN; address to the international community on the 20th anniversary of Cernobyl tragedy; fighting terrorism, extremism, trafficking in human beings and illegal migration.

Great many pundits were quite critical of the Summit given that only one issue saw unanimous support - 20th anniversary of the Cernobyl tragedy. On top of that, Turkmenistan announced its withdrawal from CIS, rather opting for the status of associated member. Still, one should not exaggerate its implications, for instance Ukraine never ratified its adherence to CIS, and is also considered an associated-member. However, the leaders of Ukraine and Georgia, the main revolutionaries within CIS, did praise the summit.

To somehow disguise the CIS deadlock, Russia proposed "reforming and increasing the efficiency of the governing bodies" by establishing "an advisory council" to include well known public figures. The latter is yet another confirmation to the fact that at least for now, CIS is nothing but a discussion club. It also points to the transitional character of the Summit in Kazan', which paves the way to really spectacular events impinged by the new political realities within the CIS and internationally.

2. Context of the CIS Summit

Kazan' Summit happened in a special political context boosting Russia's position in the CIS:

  1. The problems EU is facing after its 2004 enlargement diminish even further the hipotetical accession prospects of the CIS' countries that declared EU integration as their top goal. Ukrainian Prime-Minister Yulia Timoshenko stated recently that it was not the right moment to knock at EU's doors when it was troubled with its own problems. At the same time Kiev administration had to refute the statement made by its Minister of Economy, Sergey Terehin on Ukraine's withdrawal from CIS. On the contrary, Kiev insists on establishing a free-trade zone within SES, of course, without creating any supra-national structures. The latter goes counter to Russia and Kazakhstan's intentions to be limited only to joint customs and tariff systems.

  2. efforts to avoid any potential "colorful revolutions" push leaders of authoritarian CIS states in Russia's arms, including military. Despite certain tensions between Russia and Kazakhstan when the latter decided two yeas ago to equip its airports with American radar systems and its pressure to dissolve AJS headquarters, the military and political integration in the Central Asia is taking place, among others via Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The mere fact that Russian authorities endorsed Nursultan Nazarbaiev's December re-election indicate that the differences are much smaller than the danger of a "colored revolution". The latest developments in Uzbekistan are also illustrative for understanding the regional trends.

  3. despite many problems, Russia's role as EU and US strategic partner is gaining grounds, partly due to its vast oil and gas resources, a major factor given the instability in the oil exporting regions. Oil has become a crucial factor in negotiating not only with CIS, but also with EU. Signing of the Agreement on building a natural gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea by President Putin and Schroder scheduled for September 8 (ten days prior to general elections in Germany) might have a significant impact on election outcomes. Moreover, this project raises many problems for Ukraine and Poland's energetic security, as it neglects the extension of Odessa - Brody pipeline taking oil from Caspian Sea to Poland and further on. In response to Russian-German project, Ukrainian authorities intend to rely on coal and uranium. This apparent ultimatum comes after Russia announced its intention to raise 2-3 time the price on gas, while US was dissatisfied with Ukraine's intention to build a gas pipeline from Iran to Ukraine and Europe.

  4. profits from the skyrocketed prices on oil open new opportunities for Russia to revive its military and to conduct humanitarian operations in the so-called joint informational CIS space. Curiously enough, in some cases Russia weights more economic rather than humanitarian benefits. The conflict between Russia and Turkmenistan arisen two years ago, when the latter decided to cancel the double citizenship for Turkmen citizens. The conflict was settled immediately the two countries reached an agreement on the export of Turkmen gas through Russian pipelines. Apparently, the interests of Russians residing in Turkmenistan were simply forgotten. Accordingly, as long as Turkmenistan exports its gas via Russian pipelines, its withdrawal from CIS does not threaten Russia's interests. In return, CIS states importing oil have to cope with the consequences of humanitarian programs in the joint informational space, i.e. involvement in elections, as was the recent cases of Ukraine and Moldova.

  5. "turning into monetary terms" the relations with CIS depending on their loyalty to Russia - might prove to be the most powerful lever in Russia's hands to wield heavy influence on those countries. Russian officials claim that the move is a clear evidence that Russia gave up on its "imperial ambitions". Sure, this is a false argument. Pretensions that CIS countries in conflict with Russia "should not be sponsored" and have to pay world prices on imported gas, do not take into account the damages incurred by the secessionism supported by Russia and its troops stationed on the soil of those countries. Anyway, the economic and military power remains to be crucial in such kind of disputes.

3. Possible consequences for Moldova

President Voronin's participation in the Kazani Summit is in line with his statement "Moldova would not become a burier of CIS", meaning that Moldova would not leave the structure. The attitude towards the documents put forward for debates resumed to "Moldova signs only the documents that do not run counter to the provisions of the EU-RM Action Plan". This is a respectable position, however given Ukraine's indecisiveness as regards its further integration in CIS, and more importantly, regarding securing the border on Transdnistrian portion, Moldova remains somehow marginalized. Furthermore, RM incurs huge loses given Russia's ban on fruit and vegetable imports from Moldova. An eventual price hike on gas would be yet another blow for Moldova. In the long run, those factors might shape the political landscape in Moldova, especially revive the pro-CIS opposition.


Unemployment: a curse of transition
Valeriu Prohnitchi

Why to analyze unemployment

The analysis of unemployment is part of the most difficult and responsible sides of the economic analysis. The explanation is that human fates and tragedies are behind statistics, rather than an empty economic phenomenon. The governments no matter how liberal they are and how insignificant is their intervention in the game of the economic forces on market, they must do their best to find solutions to joblessness. Many arguments support a careful monitoring of this phenomenon and favor an active employment policy.

Firstly, to be jobless is a social condition, one of the class, rather than a simple economic rating of the individual. This is a label that has a deep psychological impact on whom it concerns. Unemployment becomes a risk factor which may make a human take a criminal way, get addicted to alcohol, or be violent in his family. We often observe such negative influences in Moldova.

Secondly, unemployment is a grave form of spending of resources needed to ensure an economic growth and to raise large incomes. In turn, the growth must generate new jobs, improving living standards for large masses of people and reducing unfairness in distributing incomes. If this does not happen, a relatively small segment of people benefits from created incomes. We face such a situation in Moldova, which is worsened because 40 percent of population is employed or subsisting from agricultural activities which bring very small incomes.

Thirdly, the unemployment may be very expensive in political terms, with many governments in the world failing reelection after unemployment got serious sizes.

Statistics and unemployment

The analysis of unemployment in Moldova becomes complicated because of incomplete statistics. The economically developed countries calculate the joblessness rate on basis of data registered by employment offices. This method does not work in Moldova because most of citizens do not hurry up to get registered with employment offices. These offices registered 27,000 jobless citizens in the 2nd quarter of this year, though the Employment Investigation in Moldova indicated almost 96,000 job seekers. This lack of interest should give some food for thought for politicians. It demonstrates either the inefficiency of the governmental policy on assistance of job seekers, or the distrust of the citizen and the fact that he does not expect anything from the state, with the employment office being a creature of the state authority under these conditions.

The information on joblessness rate was collected on basis of the labor investigation, and this means that the statistics office must "catch" the job seeker. If the citizen has a temporary job, even of a couple of days or weeks (as for example, he is hired by his neighbor by the day for agricultural works), he will not be found at home to fill up the questionnaire. In compliance with the definition recommended by the International Labor Bureau, a job seeker must: 1) have no job; 2) be ready to begin working within two weeks, if he immediately finds a job; 3) seek a job. This is an ample definition, and a better one cannot be imagined. However, the citizen in our country can have a job, but he may not earn an efficient salary for his work (an aberrant phenomenon, but available in European countries). Statistics show that employers had arrears worth 126 million Lei on salary payments in July 2005.

Also, citizens may be unable to start working within two weeks and may not actively seek a job in Moldova, where salaries are very low and even miserable in sectors such as agriculture. Instead, the citizen would rather actively search a tourism agency to help him immigrate abroad, to countries with higher salaries.

Emigration and unemployment

Unemployment in Moldova is in a deep correlation with emigration of labor force abroad. In other terms, emigration is a factor which reduces pressures on labor market and substantially declines the joblessness rate. It is not hard to imagine what social revolts would take place if for certain reasons citizens were prohibited to emigrate.

In 2004, the National Bureau for Statistics (BNS) identified 345,000 people who have left for work abroad1. Let's suppose that they were in the country and added to the number of economically active people. Existing studies show that one third of Moldovan emigrants had no jobs before leaving the country2. Thus, one may assume that 115,000 out of 345,000 citizens who would not emigrate were job seekers. Using the new data, the unemployment rate in 2004 would be 13 percent, not 8 percent. However, half or even more of potential emigrants would become jobless sooner or later, increasing the number of job seekers.

Even more, emigration is followed by remittances from abroad which allow people who remain at home to refuse low-paid jobs. The number of job seekers, even of low-paid jobs, would grow, if the emigration did not exist, producing a significant rise of unemployment rate.

Unemployment and youth

Statistics say that unemployment especially affects youth aged between 15 and 29. They form the largest group of job seekers accounting for 36-percent. They are not accidentally the largest category among emigrants. Youths between 20 and 24 run the highest risk to be jobless, with most of them being graduates from higher institutions. The incidence of unemployment in this age category rose from 15.3 percent in 2002 up to 25.2 percent in 2004. Considering the trends registered in the first two quarters of this year, this indicator will surge up to 30 percent in 2005. The situation is very grave among young men from cities, as they run a higher risk not to find a normal job than the average per country.

More than 20,000 students graduated from professional, secondary and higher education institutions in 2004. We do not know how many of them were hired, but it is well-known that employers prefer experienced specialists instead of fresh graduates. The government makes some timid attempts to encourage the employment of young graduates, but the resources allocated for this purpose are too small and this policy envisages only the budget-financed students3.

The trends demonstrated by indicators of labor market and inefficiency of governmental policy on employment say that emigration will be fueled in continuation and may even grow on account of youths who are pessimistic to get employed in the country. Recent statistics say that emigration does not show any reverse signs. BNS identified in the 2nd quarter of 2005 more than 380,000 people who have left the country, and we may expect that this number exceed 400,000 persons by late 2005.

The national economy is unable to offer jobs to people who are part of the economically active population category. If a job is available, the salary makes the worker leave his employer shortly. Moldova organized a number of job fairs for youths in April-June 2005, with a public official saying on this occasion that the average salary offered at fairs accounted for 900 Lei. Such an earning is absolutely unacceptable for graduates from higher education institutions, as many of them have invested hard 4-5 years in their knowledge.

Graduates also face other problems. Firstly, the quality of knowledge and skills depends on requirements of managers. Graduates are theoretically prepared well and sometimes very well, but they lack any experience. Secondly, the higher education system offers specialties which reflect the current demand for "prestigious" faculties: 22 percent of graduates come from law faculties, 21 percent from economics faculties, 12 percent from philology and foreign languages. However, this distribution does not respond to the current demand on labor market, which needs more and more mechanical engineers, IT specialists and construction workers. Most of young lawyers, economists and translators will either have to accept offers which does not match their education, or will leave for abroad. There are few countries which afford the luxury to train job seekers and emigrants with higher education like Moldova.


1 See "Active, Employed Population and Unemployment in the 2nd Quarter of 2005", communication, August 2005, BNS

2 Ghencea Boris and Gudumac Igor, "Labor Migration and Remittances in the Republic of Moldova", sponsored by AMM and Moldova-Soros Foundation, March 14, 2004

3 See the June 20, 2005 Government Decision # 594 on approval of procedures aimed to encourage employers to hire state-financed graduates from educational institutions, Monitorul Oficial # 89-91 (1688-1690)


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