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e-journal, III year, no. 64, 6-19 December, 2005

Activity of Public Institutions

Economic Policies

Transdnistrian Conflict

Foreign Affairs

Studies, Analyses, Comments

Activity of Public Institutions

Parliament

1.1. Appointments. Immunities

1.2. Legislative documents

1.3. Parliamentary control

Interpellations


Government

2.1. Reshuffles

The Government has proposed the recalling of Dumitru Croitor from the posts of Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova to the Swiss Confederation, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the United Nations Office in Geneva. Croitor was elected governor of the Administrative Territorial Unit of Gagauzia in 1999, but he tendered his resignation on summer 2002, after many pressures of the central administration and police forces in the region. He was nominated as ambassador to Switzerland in autumn 2002. Elections for the Gagauzian governor post are scheduled for 2006.

2.2. Decisions

2.3. Sittings. Decisions


3. Presidency

3.1. Decrees

Vladimir Voronin has signed a decree on appointment of Petru Railean, former chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC), as judge of the Economic Court of the Republic of Moldova. Before being appointed as CEC chairman, Railean had run the Economic Court, but this post remains vacant until the Superior Council of Magistrates proposes a candidate to the Moldovan president.

3.2. Sittings. Statements


Economic Policies

1. Economic year 2005 - preliminary evaluations

2. Business environment

3. Privatisation

4. Labour market

5. Agriculture sector


Transdnistrian Conflict

The negotiations round of 15-16 December 2005

On 15-16 December, in Chisinau and Tiraspol took place a new round of negotiations on Transnistria in the format "5+2", attended by representatives of the Moldovan and Transnistrian parties, mediators on behalf of the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, and observers on behalf of the US and the EU.

The participants in the talks adopted a final protocol, which states that by the next round the OSCE will prepare a draft mandate for the international assessment mission to evaluate the situation in Transnistria in view of organising democratic elections there; the Transnistrian side will provide full information regarding its troops and weapons in accordance with the package of draft documents on confidence building measures and security presented to the two parties in July 2005 by the OSCE; participants addressed a request to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to deploy to the region an international mission to monitor the Transnistrian military-industrial complex; participants discussed the situation in the security zone regarding which the OSCE made a number of recommendations to the parties. The next round of talks was scheduled for 26-27 January in Tiraspol and Chisinau.

According to the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, William Hill, it was "very difficult" to achieve agreement on all issues discussed, but certain results were achieved, which is "better than nothing". According to Hill, the most debated was the situation in the security zone, in particular the one near the Dorotkaia village. The OSCE Mission prepared a series of proposals regarding the freedom of movement of goods and people, the utilization and cultivation of agricultural land, the functioning of customs and police check points etc., which the mediators and the observers recommended to the two parties. The situation will be re-examined at the next round of talks, upon which a special working group will be created to look at the situation further. Likewise, the parties could not reach an agreement regarding the setting up of an international assessment mission to evaluate the situation in Transnistria in view of organising democratic elections in the region. The parties only agreed that the OSCE Mission will prepare a draft mandate for the mission until the next negotiations round.

The talks started on the same day when the Russian and Ukrainian presidents made a joint statement on Transnistria. According to the statement, the Russian Federation welcomes the Ukrainian initiatives on Transnistria, and Ukraine regards as "substantial" the latest Russian proposals on the margins of those initiatives. Russia and Ukraine reaffirm their support for all agreements on Transnistria reached to date, and state that the sustainability of any agreed solution will need to be ensured through a complex mechanism of guarantees. The two Presidents mention the stabilising role played by the current peacekeepers and consider opportune to transform it into an operation of peace guarantors under the OSCE aegis upon the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.

The statement was not commented upon officially by the Moldovan side, but was called by the Moldovan Reintegration Minister Vasile Sova an "interference" in the internal affairs of Moldova. According to the electronic magazine Kommersant.ru, which quotes Moldovan governmental sources, the Moldovan side is unhappy with the statement because it confirms the intention of the Russian Federation to grant the 1,500 troops stationed in Transnistria the status of peacekeepers, and then persuade the OSCE to let them stay in the region under OSCE aegis. This manoeuvre will allow Russia to declare that it has fulfilled its Istanbul commitments, but at the same time preserve its military presence on Moldovan soil.

The OSCE Ministerial Council in Ljubliana

The OSCE Ministerial Council taking place in Ljubliana on 5-6 December ended, for the third time, without having adopted a Final Political Statement, due to Russia's refusal to include in the final text a clause stating the lack of progress in the Russian troops and weapons withdrawal from the Transnistrian region of Moldova.

In his final statement, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Slovenian Foreign Minister, Dmitrej Rupel, stated that "most ministers stated the lack of progress in 2005 in the process of Russian forces withdrawal from Moldova" and that "the ministers reaffirmed their shared determination to promote the fulfilment of these commitments as soon as possible to open the way to the adoption of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe". We would like to remind that the Treaty has been ratified by only four states- Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. All other signatory states have conditioned the ratification of the Treaty by the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops and weapons from Moldova.

The Russian Foreign Minister, Serghei Lavrov, told a press conference after the OSCE Council that Russia attaches little significance to the Council's failure to adopt a final declaration. Lavrov explained Russia's refusal to sign the final document through the presence of a number of "unacceptable" clauses related to the ways of solving the Transnistrian conflict. Lavrov also stated that Russian had fulfilled all its commitments related to the CFE Treaty by withdrawing from Moldova all relevant equipment. The weapons that are still in the region will be withdrawn when the "right conditions" are in place, meaning the resumption of the negotiations on Transnistria.

Observers in Chisinau have deplored the OSCE Summit failure to adopt a final document, but noted that Moldova had achieved a symbolic victory at the Summit due to the universal consensus that existed among the participating states, except Russia, regarding the principles of solving the Transnistrian conflict, and the need for the unconditioned withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldovan soil. At the same time, the Russian veto on the final document and its conditioning of withdrawal through the "right conditions" have revealed a tougher and more assertive Russian foreign policy, which seems to be applying to the Transnistrian problem as well.

Elections to the Transnistrian "Supreme Soviet"

On 11 December in the Transnistrian region took place the so-called elections to the region's "Supreme Soviet", elections that have not been recognised by the international community. The elections were held in the best of Soviet traditions in an atmosphere of holiday, ordered by the Transnistrian authorities to ensure the 25% validating voter turnout. For the 43 "deputy" mandates ran 179 candidates, mostly representatives of two key electoral blocs - the pro-Smirnov movement "Respublica" and the movement backed by the big businesses from the region "Obnovlenie".

According to Olvia-press, little over 50% of the approximately 400,000 registered voters participated in the elections. The deputy mandates were won by 23 candidates from "Obnovlenie", 13 candidates from "Respublica" and 7 candidates from other socio-political movements and independent candidates. 27 deputies from the old legislature were re-elected, including the "perennial" Supreme Soviet Chairman, Grigori Maracuta.

The deputies elected on behalf of the winning bloc "Obnovlenie" are mostly representatives of big financial-industrial circles from the region, including the Firm "Scheriff" and the Metallurgical Factory from Ribnita. These have been reportedly the main losers from the economic restrictions imposed by the Moldovan Government on Transnistrian businesses in August 2004, and, as such, some of the most interested stakeholders in finding a compromise on the status of the region. The movement controlled 17 out of the 43 deputies in the former parliament, and its leader, Evghenii Sevciuc, is known to be the author of a number of modernising initiatives such as the constitutional reform, the legislative initiative to turn the Transnistrian official TV into a public company, and the campaign to dismiss the former "Justice Minister" Victor Balala.

At the same time, the two political movements, although promote different interests, did not show their differences too much, and have equally pleaded for the international recognition of Transnistria and the fortification of its "statehood".

As a political intrigue of the electoral campaign lacked, the break away authorities concentrated all their efforts on achieving international recognition of the elections. Thus, according to official statement, dozens of observers from the CIS, Israel, Poland, Ireland, Moldova etc. monitored the elections and stated unanimously that the elections were free and fair.

The Moldovan authorities did not recognise the ballot, which they called a new undemocratic "electoral farce", out of line with international standards. At the same time, the Russian authorities published a communique which stated that although elections were held in an unrecognised entity, the comments of observers and the media showed that elections took place in conditions a "genuine competitiveness" among the candidates and that no violations were registered during the voting process.


Foreign Affairs

The Republic of Moldova - Council of Europe

The Republic of Moldova - European Union

The Republic of Moldova - OSCE

The Republic of Moldova - Romania

The Republic of Moldova - Russian Federation

Moldova in the world

Claudia Nolte, developer of a resolution on the Republic of Moldova that the German Bundestag unanimously adopted in 2004 and had a positive resonance on the European arena, has described the situation in our country in an interview with a Chisinau-based publication. According to the German parliamentarian, the democracy in Moldova is not "true" yet because fundamental freedoms and independence of public mass media is formal, while democratic culture has an insufficient level. Nolte sees the solution of Moldova's problem in reorganisation and modernisation of public services, education of a new generation of politicians to follow the rules of democracy accepted by Europeans.


Studies, Analyses, Comments

A branch of "orange evolution"?
Igor Botan

a) Year 2005 - year of elections

The political year 2005 was unquestionably a year of elections, both regarding number of elections and their impact on the social-political situation.

The parliamentary elections scheduled for March 6, 2005 generated expectations related to cardinal changes in the political life. However, an eventual "orange revolution" has been discussed with much scepticism, knowing the parameters of revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, held by movements that: a) ranked the second place at the electoral competition at a very short distance from the party or candidate of the power; b) did not recognise the results of elections because of flagrant frauds of the same power; c) had former insiders as leaders (Mikhail Saakashvili was justice minister during presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze, while Viktor Yushchenko was prime minister during presidency of Leonid Kuchma). The leaders of chromatic revolutions were motivated to risk in order to "gain everything" unless they run the risk to lose everything. The decisive role of former insiders in the chromatic revolutions was also confirmed at elections in other CIS states, which took place after the parliamentary scrutiny in Moldova. Thus, Kurmanbec Bakiev, former prime minister during presidency of Ascar Akayev has become one of leaders of "revolution of tulips" in Kyrgyzstan. The revolutionary perspective has determined Azerbaijani President Ilkham Alyev to take preventive measures (but it doesn't matter if these measures were or were not grounded in this case) against an eventual "chromatic revolution", holding certain members of the government (insiders) before the October 2005 parliamentary elections. Obviously, the further attention must focus on the case of Kasyanov from Russia.

As regards the existence of technologies needed to hold chromatic revolutions, we should presume that the Democratic Moldova Bloc (BMD) could organise such a revolution in Moldova, because: a) it ranked the second place after the Moldovan Party of Communists (PCRM) at elections; b) was led by a former insider, Serafim Urechean, member of the Tarlev Government as mayor of the capital, who was eliminated later through modification of the law on status of the Chisinau municipality in 2002; c) refused to recognise the legality of the March 6, 2005 parliamentary elections.

The expectations that the Christian Democratic People's Party (PPCD) could start an eventual "orange revolution" under these conditions, as it has assimilated revolutionary symbols and rhetoric before elections, and BMD could join it later were groundless. BMD became for PPCD an opponent with much more vague intentions than those declared by PCRM in the conjuncture before elections.

As a result, PCRM has managed to channel the "revolutionary elan" into an evolutionist riverbed, proposing the opposition to join the "Declaration on political partnership for implementation of European integration objectives." The unanimous voting of the declaration on "national consensus" at the first sitting of the new legislature, including by those who did not recognise the results of elections, has disqualified any further pretensions of BMD to overturn the PCRM by blocking the procedure of election of the chief of state by Parliament and organisation of early parliamentary elections. By contrary, the subsequent events related to election of the chief of state and distribution of leading offices in the legislative body took place within "consensus" but without participation of the Our Moldova Alliance (AMN) faction headed by Serafim Urechean after collapse of BMD.

The confusion related to the expectation of "change" at the national level was reproduced through a confusion related to the "change" at the level of the Chisinau municipality. A series of attempts to elect a new mayor have failed after AMN leader Serafim Urechean decided to step down from the post of Chisinau mayor and "last bastion of democracy in the Republic of Moldova" in favour of the post of lawmaker and leader of the AMN parliamentary faction, and this fact justifies the naming of 2005 as "year of elections". However, a novel political phenomenon has appeared in Moldova from an electoral confusion like the chaos develops into order.

b) Impact of elections in capital city

Objectively, the positive or negative consequences of the "orange evolution" that took place within the "national consensus" will be visible after a longer period. The immediate results are not relevant because you can change and improve a set of laws rapidly, adjusting them to the highest standards, but you cannot immediately combat the inertia force of conduct of reforming institutions related to behaviour of their staffs.

However, the immediate consequences of "national consensus" have outlined after the four elections of the Chisinau mayor. Two things related to these elections have captured the attention of public: their invalidation because of the turnout of electors below 1/3; distribution of votes for electoral competitors. Thus, the absenteeism phenomenon stirred interpretations and speculations, including of propaganda nature, because of the lack of surveys. The causes of absenteeism included among others: a) the inadequate period for organisation of elections; b) the mandate of only one year and half of the new mayor, which has generated the disinterest of strong parties and candidates; c) meddling of central authorities in affairs of local administration in the capital; d) loss of confidence of the electorate in the political class; e) too often elections (five elections in the Chisinau municipality in only nine months); f) the "April 4, 2005 vote" of a part of the opposition (PPCD, Democratic Party (PD) and Social Liberal Party (PSL)) in favour of re-election of the PCRM leader as chief of state, etc.

It is important to take into account the fact that the absenteeism phenomenon is also present in developed democracies, where special studies demonstrate a deep correlation between turnout and: a) the attitude of citizens towards the institution for which the elections take place; b) the electoral offer of competitors in a certain context (the context can generate the interest or disinterest through itself); c) the way the competitors are received (their quality). Thus, the turnout at legislative, regional (local) elections and for the European Parliament in a number of states of the European Union, almost in the same general political context has the following rates: 80-70 percent; 55-45 percent; 45-35 percent. The participation in local elections in the CIS area is usually very low. As for example, the average in Russia is 20-30 percent.

Resuming the absenteeism problem in Moldova, all the causes invoked above taken altogether give a right image of this phenomenon. From that reason, making evident one of them mispresents dramatically the state of things and this was especially visible in the opposition press that supported the AMN. Thus, the invoking of the "April 4 vote" as main cause of the absenteeism neglects a series of other factors related to distribution of votes in favour of candidates. The "April 4 vote" should disgust only the voters of the three opposition parties who supported the re-election of the PCRM head, the electors of the latter could not be misled by fact that the party and the leader that they back seize the entire power in the state with the support of a part of opposition, avoiding a political crisis. But why the number of votes for the PCRM candidates at the mayoral elections had declined almost proportionally with the number of participants in elections? At the same time, the percent of PCRM candidates remained in the limit of "norm" of expectations for this party related to the results of the 2003 mayoral elections.

Indeed, the "April 4 vote" had a decisive impact on distribution of votes for opposition candidates rather than on absenteeism. The biggest surprise for promoters of the idea of the negative impact of the "April 4 vote" should be the fact that the candidate of PPCD, which faces the most ardent criticism for this vote, has lost about 1/2 of the percentage of PPCD in Chisinau (compared with the March 6, 2005 elections), while the AMN candidate lost about 2/3 of this percentage. The results of PL and PSL candidates were not relevant and they fit the limits of "norm" of expectations.

The apparent conclusion is that the "orange evolution" and the permanent dispute between supporters of AMN and PPCD in connection with accusations and justifications regarding the "April 4 vote" disfavour both parties, but in a different measure. The dissatisfaction of electors related to these events goes to a new direction. The protest is expressed through "leaking" of votes of these parties to the deputy chairman of the Liberal Party (PL), Dorin Chirtoaca, who participated in three out of four failed elections and garnered 7; 25 and 35 percent of valid votes.

The phenomenon Dorin Chirtoaca (the "DC" phenomenon further on) is novel for Moldova. Being only 28 years old, he has almost no deep relationship with the present political class of Moldova. Although he is part of PL and used the name of the party, this helped him only to avoid collecting 10,000 signatures needed to register an independent candidate. From this viewpoint, the "DC" detached from PL (like the new ballot from counterfoil) may be compared to a new branch, a co-lateral product of the "orange evolution" (the branch is a subdivision of the "political regna" superior to the class". The Moldovan "political class" has the system of political parties based on three pillars as support: a) the Party of Communists, which is considered and it is successor of the Communist Party of MSSR that dominated the political life in Moldova in the past 50 years with very short breaks; b) PPCD, which is considered and it is the only successor of the People's Front that appeared 17 years ago and developed by contesting the domination of PCRM; c) parties - emanations of the power in the period when the PCRM was not a ruling party. All other more or less significant political parties are emanations and fragmental combinations of the three mentioned categories of parties. Only PCRM and PPCD have deep roots in the Moldovan political soil like thesis and antithesis (while the "national consensus" is a kind of synthesis). From that reason, the PCRM and PPCD manage to lead the top of domestic political life. Respectively, the recoil of sympathies for PPCD is easier to recover in principle than in the case of AMN. Even more, PPCD assumed a risk through the "April 4 vote" that could be finally justified, while AMN, which does not have "roots in the political soil," except for the plots in the Chisinau municipality, has produced a series of confusions, including unrecognising of results of the March 6 elections without the chromatic revolutionary logic and leaving the "last bastion of democracy" without battle, and this leaves few chances to recover. Perhaps, this is the origin of the unexpected recoil which is deeper in case of AMN than of PPCD.

The "DC" phenomenon has chances to perpetuate like an alternative firstly of what does not have "deep roots". The percentage that "DC" has garnered under very special conditions which are not typical to campaigns with very important stakes reflects only a new but very strong trend on the centre-right political wing. The big advantage of the "DC" is that it cannot be reproached with anything for the time being, and hopes and not only optimism can be invested in him. However, it will be hard to maintain and develop this promising trend without branched territorial structures, without financial, logistic, and other resources. To cut it short, there are a lot of hopes and expectations about "DC", but it would be very difficult to avoid being included in the Red Book of the Moldovan "political regna".

It should be also mentioned that a "leaking" of votes of protest to the Patria-Rodina-Ravnopravye is observed, and this bloc promotes a pro-CIS message and hopes to succeed the electoral threshold at the future parliamentary elections.

c) Expectations for 2006

If 2005 was the "year of elections", then 2006 will be unquestionably the year of manifestation of consequences of "monetisation" of relations between the Russian Federation and the CIS members, including with the Republic of Moldova. Of course, the consequences will affect the ruling party above all from political point of view. Under these conditions, the continuation of the PCRM governing is a kind of "moment of truth and justice". In 2001, PCRM has reached the power in a favourable conjuncture: its predecessors implemented unpopular but necessary reforms; they eliminated the negative consequences of the August 1998 financial collapse in Russia which dramatically affected Moldova, landing their rating. In addition, the constantly increasing inflow of remittances of Moldovans working abroad favoured the PCRM governance. Now, holding the mandate of citizens and ruling in a period of radical changes of the political-economic conjuncture, PCRM is the most indicated party to apply the experience it has obtained in four years of governing, not only to get through conjuncture adversities of the fate, but also to open new opportunities for increasing development of Moldova in compliance with multiple strategies and plans that it has drafted and adopted.

The new conjuncture cannot be an occasion of joy for opponents of PCRM, since consequences will affect the entire society from social point of view. Once "monetised", no political force claiming to be able to restore the good relations with the former mother country will be capable to "demonetise" the relations with Russia. That's why it can be said that the "national consensus" is welcome. In other terms, the "consensual objectives" may contribute to a rebalancing of influences on political arena.


Gas is coming from East
Iurie Gotisan

Shock of gas. The rise of the natural gas price is being discussed much but the topic has turned from a genuine rhetoric into practical actions. Thus, if Moldova has received natural gas for 80 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres until now, Gazprom proposes an abrupt price rise of up to 160 dollars starting 2006. If this scenario is implemented, both the Chisinau administration and common consumers will experience a true shock, the budget will start cracking and not even additional revenues declared in the latest period will rescue it. The worst side of this problem is that the planned price rise intervenes right in full winter.

It is clear why every country is trying to find a best solution to this situation. We can say frankly that there are almost no alternatives for the Russian gas our way. Ukraine has tried to agree with Turkmenistan, but Gazprom went ahead. Georgia has seemingly found a formula with Kazakhstan, but the transit of gas crosses Russia's territory and Moscow could impose its conditions again, like in the case of Moldova indeed, when Chisinau has tried to obtain natural gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

Consequences. The question of questions which troubles everybody is related to consequences of higher gas prices on Moldova's economy in general and pockets of population in particular.

Firstly, the effects of the price rise would affect the household consumers, especially because the daily expenditure for public services is high on many positions. Secondly, if we take into account the rise of price of gas and many other services, in which the share of gas is dominant, the situation is not good at all.

As for example, the share of gas in electricity production of CET-1 counts for 80 percent at present. If the price of gas grows, the share of fuel in the finished product, it means of electricity, will count for about 95 percent. As a result, thermo-energy stations (CETs) will have to review their tariffs for energy supplied to all consumers. If 1 GK of heating costs about 140 lei at present and a KW/h costs 0.44 lei, then these tariffs would grow by at least 90 percent for sure, if the gas price doubles, and these are estimates of a simple economic reason.

In addition, higher gas prices could destroy very rapidly the myth about "successful economy" of Moldova. Followed by a rise of electricity, heating tariffs, higher natural gas prices could increase the inflation up to a rate of two figures. The deficit of trade balance of the country would have an additional rise factor. The exchange rate of domestic currency would experience a strong pressure. Producers and transporters would experience one more burden after a rise of payments for acquisition of energy agents, and this fact would have a negative influence on production volume and provided services.

Conditions. As nothing is impossible nowadays and everything can be solved, Gazprom is capable to step back but, of course, under certain conditions. As regards Moldova, it seems that Gazprom does not have any concrete economic interests. However, there is another thing - the problem of natural gas seems to be a lever of pressure on Chisinau in the Transnistrian issue.

However, the mode and arguments that Chisinau tables at negotiations are the most important things. Many news agencies reported that Moldovan officials will have to negotiate a gradual rise of gas prices with the Russian side, it means within 4-5 years. Perhaps, this was the goal of the visit of the Moldovan delegation which negotiated the Russian gas price with the Kremlin last week.

Indeed, this gradual rise could attenuate a potential shock on consumers. Moldova's economy could not afford a price higher than 110-120 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres for the time being, because it lacks capacities or, if you want, technologies needed to handle a price of 160 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres.

In addition, because of very high production costs and old equipment of enterprises, which are the main consumers of natural gas and main debtors of the company Moldova-Gaz, perhaps Moldovan strategists already hold projects on reorganisation of the energy system that could be implemented within 4-5 years. Chisinau would manage meanwhile to modernise the CETs and the energy transportation infrastructure, reducing or stopping all losses in network.

Finally, this gradual rise could be easily afforded by household consumers, and eventually, some social problems would be avoided. The government may intervene in the next draft budget law with salary rises, subsidies or indemnities, growths that could attenuate the impact of higher gas tariffs among population at least from psychological point of view.

In this context, it should be mentioned that Moldova does not have meters in its territory to measure the real consumption of natural gas. However, these meters are very necessary, so that the payment not be based only on data of Ukraine. Indeed, the adjustment of gas tariff to the level of prices for Central European countries has also an advantage: Russia would lose any possibility to blackmail Moldova in future.


The following contributed to this issue:


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