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e-journal, IV year, no. 67, 1-14 February 2006

Activity of Public Institutions

Economic Policies

Transdnistrian Conflict

Foreign Affairs

Studies, Analyses, Comments

Activity of Public Institutions

Parliament

1.1. Appointments. Reshuffles

The parliamentary commission for foreign policy and European integration has considered a proposal of the Foreign Ministry to appoint Lidia Gutu as Moldovan ambassador to Romania. The parliamentarian and chairman of the Social Liberal Party, Oleg Serebrian, member of the parliamentary commission for foreign policy, has informed the public opinion about examination of this issue. If the executive proposes candidate Lidia Gutu to the president and the chief of state appoints her to this post, her mandate of lawmaker will become vacant, while the next candidate in the list of the electoral bloc Democratic Moldova is a representative of the Moldovan Democratic Party and he will probably join this faction in the Parliament. It should be mentioned in the context that the Moldovan ambassador to Romania was recalled in December 2005 and there were many cases within bilateral relations when the post of Moldovan ambassador was vacant for a long time, in spite of mentioning the "priority and special nature" of relations between the two countries.

Alexandr Barbov, a journalist specialised in economics and politics who has earlier cooperated with the TV channel "Pervy Kanal v Moldove", the newspaper "Moldavsckye Vedomosti" and other online publications, was appointed as spokesman for the Parliament. The dismissal of his predecessor Alexandru Gisca was not motivated.

1.2. Legislative documents

1.3. Parliamentary control

Hearings

Minister of Industry and Infrastructure has reported on situation in energy sector to lawmakers. Vladimir Antosii said that the economic indicators of energy enterprises are on the rise compared with 2004. In 2005, 143 localities were connected to the gas pipes, while the overall number in the republic is 614 establishments. As much as 250 million lei was allocated for construction of gas pipes from the state budget for 20005. The building of the thoroughfare pipe Tocuz-Cainari-Mereni, which will cover all the additional gas needs of the Chisinau municipality, districts of Ialoveni and Causeni, is a priority of gasification. Projects on insurance of energy from regenerating resources (solar energy, biomass energy, wind energy) were studied as alternative energy sources, but they would cover maximum 6 percent of needs.

The price that Moldova will pay to the Russian Federation after April 1, 2006, was not established yet, but the Government is trying to sign contracts on supply of gas from alternative sources from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Representatives of the parliamentary opposition have demanded information about the imminent rise of natural gas price after April 1, 2006, but it was not confirmed or declined. Also, the need of a fair solution to the problem of ownership of the Moldova-Gaz enterprise on gas pipes, which are built with the financial support of population but are transferred under the balance of this business, was indicated. Representatives of the parliamentary majority have highlighted the need to speed up the construction of power plants, as well as of systems of interconnection with Ukraine and Romania. Also, the need to resume the electricity supplies from the Cuciurgan power station was outlined. It should be noted in the context that the parliamentary faction of PPCD has described the Government's agreement on transit of electricity produced by the Cuciurgan plant as an "economic complicity with the Tiraspol regime" and "violation of provisions of legislation that describe the privatisation of the state patrimony as illegal." In reply, a representative of the executive said that the Republic of Moldova could raise 6-7 million dollars from transportation of electricity produced by the Cuciurgan plant.

Questions and interpellations


Government

2.1. Reshuffles

The Government has proposed to recall Victor Borsevici from the post of Moldovan Ambassador to China. Some members of administration of the OSCE Mission to Moldova are to be changed soon and heads of the Moldovan diplomatic missions to Sweden and the Czech Republic are to be appointed.

The executive approved the relief of Adrian Fetescu, deputy director of the Licensing Chamber from office. The cause of dismissal was not made public.

2.2. Decisions

2.3. Sittings. Decisions. Statements


3. Presidency

3.1. Decrees

The President of Moldova appointed Petru Railean as chairman of the Economic Court of Appeal for a four-year term on February 2, 2006. This post was vacant the entire period when Petru Railean headed the Central Election Commission and the deputy chairman of this court has fulfilled the duties of ad-interim chairman.

3.2. Sittings. Statements

Meeting with representatives of security councils of Russia and Ukraine

The President of Moldova has received Yuri Zubakov, deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council, and Sergey Pirozhkov, deputy secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, and the sides examined issues related to the regional security in the Transnistrian settlement context. Zubakov and Pirozhkov told the meeting that their common visit to Moldova is "a continuation of approaching of stances and stable partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine as participants in the Transnistrian settlement process." The sitting examined problems related to mechanisms of destruction and withdrawal of ammunition and military hardware from depots in the Cobasna village, legalisation of Transnistrian businesses, monitoring of enterprises working in the industrial-military complex of the secessionist republic of Transnistria, with the participation of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE.

Drafting of national security concept

A sitting convoked by the chief of state has approved the structure of the National Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova, containing references to dimensions, basic fields and objectives of activity of insurance of national interests of the country under present geopolitical and geo-economic conditions. According to participants in the sitting, the National Security Concept must become a fundamental document with support for all national strategies. The draft concept must be completed by late February.

Quality of health services

The chief of state has chaired a sitting that summarised the activity of the healthcare system in 2005 under conditions of the mandatory health insurance system. The main problems of the system are the deficit of staff, lack of medical services in a number of villages, need to optimise the management of medicine, improvement of situation in primary medicine. Vladimir Voronin insisted on a better quality of medical services, reduction of spending related to maintenance of buildings and other payments related to providing of health services, need to create a mechanism for a better use of allocations.

Enlarged college of Interior Ministry

Participating in a sitting of the enlarged college of the Interior Ministry, Vladimir Voronin appreciated the activity of police and their tasks for future. He insisted on the need to combat corruption, smuggling, economic crimes, to improve the staff policy, to enhance professionalism, legality of police actions, and cooperation between the Interior Ministry and civil society. The chief of state noted that crime leaders have changed their tactic, trying to legalise illegal sources, to invest money raised from different economic projects on illicit ways. On the other hand, he indicated the need to combat the association of former policemen and law enforcement agents with criminal groups. It may be presumed that the latest events, holding and investigation of managers of security agencies in Chisinau and responsible functionaries of the Interior Ministry are related to these statements of the chief of state.

Migration problems

A sitting with the participation of decision-making officials of the Government, Foreign and European Integration Ministry, services in charge with migration convoked by the chief of state has examined a series of problems related to respect for legality in the migration process. The president highlighted the importance of legal entry and leaving of foreign citizens at the state border of Moldova and noted that the legality of migration process is becoming current in perspective of negotiations with the European Union regarding the simplification of the visa regime with the E.U. members. It should be mentioned in the context that the Government has recently tabled a legislative initiative proposing the dissolution of the National Bureau for Migration as central authority subordinated to the executive, without presenting any clear argument of these changes, a fact signalled by parliamentarians who have also tackled this draft.

Interview with the radio channel Yekho Moskvi

Vladimir Voronin spoke out about developments in Moldova and Moldovan-Russian relations in an interview with the Moscow-based radio channel.

The Moldovan president described the Transnistrian conflict as a "conflict of interests" noting that there are structures in the secessionist region with branches in Moldova, Ukraine and Russia, which follow financial interests resulted from the annual "laundering" of about two billion dollars from production and sale of weapons, smuggling. Voronin considers that "impostors in Transnistria buy all those whom they need" with this money and this is the cause why the agreement on the new regime of transit of Transnistrian goods through the Moldovan-Ukrainian border was not implemented.

Speaking about the 2003 memorandum proposed by the Russian Federation, Voronin said that it was unacceptable because it was proposing a federation, while "Moldova lacks conditions for this purpose," while the Moldovan president could not sign a document capable to allow Transnistria to withdraw from federation and to become a recognised subject of international law. In this regard, the president noted that the issue of creation of a federation "could be solved with a majority of votes of parliamentarians, if the problem of open danger did not exist," but fell short of revealing the correlation of this decision with the constitutional norms (Art.142), which say that the orders on unitary nature of the state can be reviewed only with their approval by most of citizens included in the electoral lists at a referendum.

Voronin outlined the need to meet with Vladimir Putin and promised that Moldova will launch soon an initiative in this regard. Also, he regretted the collapse of USSR, said that that the communists in Moldova are of new style and they understand the mistakes of history and build their policy on modern social principles, through they contribute to installation of some monuments dedicated to Lenin, to functioning of organisations of komsomolists and pioneers in the republic.

Speaking about the filing of a new case against Valeriu Pasat regarding the attempt to overthrow the state power and to kill some political leaders, Voronin said that he does not hold official information, but the fling of a penal case "must be immediately taken to notice of the person concerned." He noted that the Prosecutor-General's Office is not obliged to communicate him all the cases it files and he does not collect facts on such matters. With a couple of days after this interview, representatives of the Prosecutor-General's Office confirmed the institution of new penal proceeding against Valeriu Pasat for usurpation of the state power and frame-up of an assassination.


Economic Policies

1. Financial-bank sector

2. Foreign trade


Transdnistrian Conflict

Russian, Ukrainian security council representatives visit Transnistria

On 7-9 February 2006 a delegation of representatives of the Russian and Ukrainian security councils visited Moldova, headed by the First Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Iuri Zubakov, and the Deputy Secretary of Ukraine's Security and Defence Council, Serghei Pirojkov. On 7 February the delegation met with Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin. During the meeting the parties noted the importance of regional security aspects in the context of the Transnistrian conflict resolution efforts and tackled such topics as the mechanism of withdrawal and destruction of the Russian weapons from Colbasna, the mechanisms of legalisation of the activity of Transnistrian economic agents and the international monitoring of the Transnistrian military-industrial complex.

On 8-9 February the Russian-Ukrainian delegation travelled to Transnistria, where it visited the "Electromas" factory, "Litmas" factory, the Ribnita steel factory and the Russian weapons depots in Colbasna. "We have not found any evidence at the enterprises we visited and where we met with employees and employers that they produce weapons ", stated Iuri Zubakov at the concluding press conference in Tiraspol. Serghei Pirojkov said, in his turn, that Ukraine regards Transnistria as an important border area. "We want that people here, including the Ukrainians, are guaranteed the basic rights", told Pirojkov the press, noting that the application of the Yushcenko plan will allow for the removal of all obstacles to a normal life in Transnistria. According to Pirojkov, quoted by de Infotag, not all participants in the settlement process show "enough political will", and, as a result of this, certain "confrontational models" are being thrown out into the negotiations process.

According to the two officials, an international monitoring mission under the OSCE aegis is to be deployed soon to monitor the Transnistrian military industrial complex, which will have the final say on this subject.

The Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov showed happy with the findings of the Russian-Ukrainian mission and said that after the mission under OSCE mission confirms that Transnistria is not dealing with the production and smuggling of weapons, the Moldovan leadership and President Voronin will have to apologise to the "Transnistrian people" for their false accusations and "black PR".

On the other hand, the Moldovan Reintegration Minister Vasile Sova said he did not regard the visit of Russian and Ukrainian Security Council representatives as a monitoring one, and will only comment the situation from the enterprises concerned only following an international mission under OSCE aegis, according to AP Flux. "The Russian and Ukrainian delegations visited these enterprises but we should in no way regard this visit as a monitoring one", said Sova further.

The issue of international monitoring of the military-industrial complex of Transnistria will be examined at the next round of talks in the "5+2" format scheduled for 27-28 February.

Unified Moldovan-Ukrainian customs procedures

Following suspension by Ukraine of the unified Moldovan-Ukrainian customs procedures, on 1 February in Odessa took place a round of bilateral Moldova - Ukrainian consultations regarding the application of unified customs procedures at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. The talks lasted for many hours but ended with no results. The Moldovan Deputy Reintegration Minister, Victor Postolache, declared at the beginning of talks that the unified rules on passing of goods over the Moldova-Ukrainian frontier need to enter into force without changes, and if the Transnistrian economic agents want to really work, they will have to comply to Moldovan laws. Transnistrian representatives, on the other hand, insisted that Transnistria has the right to conduct international commercial business independently in line with agreements signed within the settlement process and that should the new customs regime enter into force a lot of Transnistrian enterprises will stop working and there will be a humanitarian crisis in Transnistria.

The Moldovan-Ukrainian consultations in this subject were to continue on 6-7 February, but were postponed.

According to the President of the State Registration Chamber of Moldova, Alexandr Ghiduleanov, quoted by "Vremea" newspaper, from 25 January 2006, when the simplified procedure of registration for Transnistrian enterprises entered into force, 16 Transnistrian economic agents registered provisionally in Moldova, including a number of big enterprises such as the Moldovan Power Station, the Ribnita Cement Factory, factories "Buchet Moldavii", "Moldavkabeli", etc. At present about 50 Transnistrian enterprises are registered in Moldova on a permanent basis.

President Voronin interview with "Eho Moskvi" Radio Station

On 4 February the Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin gave a lengthy interview to the Moscow-based "Eho Moskvi" Radio Station (www.echo.msk.ru), whose key subject was Transnistria. The interview has had a large resonance in Moldova due to a number of points made by the President on this and other topics. President Voronin noted that the conflict is not an ethnic, cultural or religious one, but rather a "conflict of interests" sustained by some deep rooted "criminal enclaves" which launder annually through Transnistria about 2 billion USD and which have ties in Chisinau, Kyiv and Moscow. These interests are the main impediment to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and this is the reason why the Moldovan authorities have requested the adherence of the US and EU to the negotiations format. Voronin has also blamed on these interests Ukraine's decision to suspend the application of unified customs rules that were to enter into force from 25 January. Asked about the reasons why the so-called Kozak Memorandum failed, Voronin said that the federative model envisaged in the memorandum was in breach of the Moldovan Constitution and was trap towards recognition of Transnistria. Speaking of the current Moldovan-Russian relations, President Voronin said Moldova wants "normal, good neighbourhood relations" and that "it would be quickest and most appropriate if we could solve the Transnistrian problem with Russia rather than seek support in various European and world [organisations]". "This would be a good foundation for new relations with Russia for many years ahead", said Voronin.


Foreign Affairs

The Republic of Moldova - Council of Europe

The Republic of Moldova - European Union

The Republic of Moldova - Romania

The Republic of Moldova - Russian Federation

Moldova in the world

The Republic of Moldova and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have decided to sign a preliminary crediting agreement worth 117 million dollars overall. IMF mission head Thomas Richardson said that this credit will be released to the National Bank of Moldova for maintenance of the balance of payments and currency reserves of the state, with the purpose to ensure a macroeconomic stability. The IMF Board of Directors is to pass a final decision on this agreement next spring. The new credit of IMF is expected to be released under a preferential regime, for a 0.5-percent interest rate, for a 10-year period and a 5-year grace period, while the transfer of means in instalments will be preceded by periodical estimation of accomplishments of Moldova's authorities. The resumption of the IMF financing is the main condition for restart of cooperation with other foreign financiers, with the Government targeting at many credits and grants that will be obtained by 2009. The previous programme with IMF was stopped in 2003.

The chairman of the parliamentary commission for foreign relations and European integration said that the Republic of Moldova will not participate in the CIS institute for monitoring of democratic development, consolidation of parliamentarism and respect for electoral right of citizens. This institute, which is being created in the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, will have similar tasks as other international structures specialised in monitoring of elections, especially of the OSCE and CoE. Moldova did not invite CIS observers at the 2005 local and parliamentary elections, but it ratified the convention on standards of democratic elections, electoral rights and freedoms in CIS member states.


Studies, Analyses, Comments

New concepts on foreign policy and national security
Igor Botan

I. Drafting of new concepts on foreign policy and national security

In compliance with the December 22, 2005 # 374-IV and January 16, 2006 # 414-IV presidential decrees, national commissions made up by high-ranking state officials are due to draft the national security concept and foreign policy concept of the Republic of Moldova by March 1, 2006. These documents are to replace the ones adopted 11 years ago through the May 5, 1995 # 445-XIII and February 8, 1995 # 368-XIII decisions of the Parliament.

We can ascertain after more than one decade that these concepts misestimated or ignored the true dangers against the Republic of Moldova, establishing wrong priorities. The events in the past years, especially in 2005, impose the reconsideration of dangers capable to undermine the security of Moldova and the establishing of new objectives of the interior and foreign policies.

The major priorities of the Republic of Moldova include again after 11 years: the insurance of territorial integrity; promotion of social-economic reforms; boost of population welfare; building of the state based on the rule of law in which the rights will be guaranteed and adjusted to the international rights, etc. The difference is that the internal objectives should be fulfilled including through promotion of a foreign policy on integration in the CIS, while now they are studied better and must be accomplished in the European Union's Neighbourhood Policy, without knowing the exact perspectives of the Republic of Moldova to join the E.U.

Unquestionably, the new concepts will be explained in an appropriate legal and diplomatic language, but they should cover the major objectives and dangers capable to undermine their fulfilment, as clear and argued as possible. It could be presumed that the new objectives of foreign policy and security of the Republic of Moldova are found again in strategies, concepts and plans adopted by state institutions in the past 2-3 years, which the chief of state synthesised somehow in an address to the diplomatic corps to Moldova on January 27, 2006.

Anyhow, the fulfilment of major objectives of interior and foreign policy will depend on the quality of relations with close neighbours of Romania and Ukraine, especially with the Russian Federation.

II. Relations with the Russian Federation

It is obvious that the only resource of the Moldovan foreign policy in relations with the Russian Federation rests with capacity to argue own interests and to find influent partners and supporters. At present, three problems with major impact on bilateral relations can be identified: a) Transnistrian problem; b) "monetisation" of relations within CIS and access to the Russian market; c) initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding the elaboration of the "state programme on facilitation of moving of fellow countrymen who reside other countries to Russia" (under the Russian federation's legislation, citizens who were born in the territory of the Russian Empire, USSR and Russian Federation, as well as their descendants are fellow countrymen) .

These problems, which seem to be very different, are interdependent and highlight several things: a) CIS is not a priority for Russia anymore; b) "human factor" of policies in the post-Soviet area is re-dimensioned in bilateral relations with Russia. This is the new expression of pragmatism of President Vladimir Putin, which seems to be reduced to the priority development of relations in the Common Economic Area and Euro-Asian Economic Union, it means where a relatively developed energy and economic potential exists.

There is no doubt that the separatist enclaves of Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan will be maintained through all means in Russia's area of attraction. There is no room for ambiguous interpretations here; there is a definitive judgment of the European Court of Human Rights on " Ilascu case", which elucidates Russia's role in this conflict, there are the 1995, 1996, 1999, 2005 resolutions of the State Duma, which unquestionably demonstrate this role. The strategy on "comeback of co-nationals to Russia" follows the major goal to stop the demographic crisis in Russia, but it also envisages directly the states that contest the policy of Russia in the separatist areas and those with which Russia has bad relations. This conclusion is based on the fact that this policy was tested on the Baltic Countries and 70,000 citizens who fall under incidence of the notion of "fellow countrymen" of this country are to be "moved by will" to the Kaliningrad region. Although 200 million dollars has been allocated for this project, it has collapsed. The cause is that the quality of life and individual freedoms in the Baltic Countries, E.U. members, are better and the problem of insurance of rights of the Russian minority was exaggerated.

As regards the poor country such as the Republic of Moldova, this strategy may have an unexpected impact. Firstly, more than half out of about 400,000 Moldovan citizens working abroad are in Russia, according to official statistics. Secondly, Russian experts say that the "permutation policy" and simplified awarding of the Russian citizenship will be based on certain criteria, with the most important ones resting with professional qualification and health. Thirdly, the eventual "permutation" of the most qualified labour force will be made on account of these states, which will finance the project by paying two-fold, three-fold, etc. higher prices for natural gas and becoming poorer, so that the eventual migrants will be motivated to give green light to Russia's offer.

We may admit that the things are exaggerated, but they must be taken into account in order to keep the most qualified citizens, regardless of their ethnic membership. The danger does not seem to be exaggerated if we take into account the fact that the E.U. obliges Romania to introduce the visa regime on one hand, while on the other hand Russia will have a simplified citizenship awarding policy and will probably allocate huge amounts for permutation.

Of course, Moldova will be incapable to get through new provocations alone. Even more, the Republic of Moldova should take into account the policies of Russia, which do not envisage it directly, but polarise the international relations directly. It means that Moldova will have to decide what its pole of attraction is. Such a tackling does not seem to be exaggerated, but we observe that Russia is implementing its new strategies, resorting to the tactic of "taking by surprise." It's another problem if Russia has calculated well its forces when it developed and decided to go ahead to all fronts of its interest at the same time:

  1. Russia demonstrated indeed through its energy policy that the E.U. itself has become its area of energy influence;
  2. Russia has established a special relationship with Iran regarding the much contested problem of nuclear development of this country;
  3. the recent stance of President Putin over settlement of the "Kosovo problem" by invoking the "universal" implementation of the principles of resolution of problems with an apparently similar nature is an evident threat that Russia will recognise the separatist regimes in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Mountainous Karabakh;
  4. President Putin has invited leaders of HAMAS in Moscow, saying that he does not regard the HAMAS as terrorist movement.

Only two of these big problems envisage the Republic of Moldova directly, but they can persuade Moldova, if estimated altogether, that the outlined polarisation of international policies is almost unavoidable:

  1. The E.U. has realised that it needs a new energy security strategy and it is trying to get through this provocation;
  2. The E.U. and the U.S. have to overcome the recent divergences in order to hold out together the energy provocations, eventual nuclear dangers from Iran and new developments in the Middle East;
  3. President Putin ignores deliberately the fact that the "universal implementation" of the eventual solution for Kosovo is almost impossible. Russia realises perfectly that this "universal principle" cannot be applied on Taiwan. However, Russia can reduce the "universality of the principle" by using it only on Moldova and Georgia. China will unlikely accept such "general principles", especially because China adopted a document last year that admits the use of military force to protect its interests. That's why the West insists on the particularity of the "Kosovo case".
  4. The victory of HAMAS at the elections in Palestine has shocked the West, providing Russia the chance to affirm itself like very influent international force. The West, which cannot afford financial support for a governing seized by a political force that he regards as terrorist, the way it has done until recently, will probably review its strategy in the region. Logically, it could propose Russia to resume the financing of Palestine's budget since it does not regard HAMAS as a terrorist movement, though it did not give up intention to destroy Israel on an armed way. Perhaps, Russia will have to cooperate with Iran in order to recover its area of influence. Thus, Russia could provide financial assistance for the civil side of the Palestinian budget, while Iran could offer military support. Russia holds financial resources, especially because it has reduced the collections to the OSCE budget and threatens to do the same with the Council of Europe. At the same time, President Putin will permanently have to give explanations to public opinion why HAMAS is not a terrorist movement while Chechen rebels are terrorists, of course, regarding the applying of the "universal principles".

Thus, the increasing role of Russia, in countersense with the role of the West based on the "universal principles" applied selectively to satisfy the own interest, will oblige the Republic of Moldova to choose a pole of attraction. In addition, by making this choice, Moldova will have to take into considerations the internal processes in the Russian Federation, which will imminently extend on its satellites (see the cases of Belarus, Uzbekistan, etc). On one hand, Russia achieves an impressive economic rise, while on the other hand it builds a corporatist state ruled by oligarchic elite; it cannot stop the continued rise of the influence of xenophobe movements (about 80 persons were killed from ethnic and racial reasons in the past two years); it shelters or supports a cohort of doubtful characters (Mutalibov, Akaev, Abasidze, Gheorgadze, Bodelean, etc); defies the internal democratic norms, but posts claims to democratise the CIS area (just one example: the former vice president of USSR(!), Alexander Rutskoy, was withdrawn from the electoral race for the post of lawmaker in the State Duma from the Kursk constituency at the December 2003 elections because he forgot to mention in his biography that he was deputy rector of a Moscow-based academy and holds the title of professor (!), while lots of uninvited electoral observers such as CIS-EMO, who have surprisingly neglected the Rutskoy case, are concerned with the quality of the electoral process in Moldova), etc.

These examples based on very concrete facts, as well as the fact that the new interior and foreign policies of Russia will be of long term and will have an immense inertia must be taken into consideration. However, the efforts to establish some good bilateral relations with Russia based on mutuality must remain of current time.

III. Relations with Ukraine

Problems related to Moldova's belongings in Ukraine's territory, delimitation of borders, the Giurgiulesti terminal, Palanca portion, especially those related to obstacles on way of transit of Moldovan goods exported to the CIS through Ukraine's territory demonstrated that Ukraine is an inconvenient (unsure) partner.

Even more, the support for the separatist regime in Transnistria, which fuels its survival, indeed; repeated ignorance (three times!) of obligations assumed in relations with the Republic of Moldova and E.U. on regulation of entry and transit of Transnistrian goods through Ukraine; President Yushchenko's ignorance of the Moldovan law on basic provisions of the special juridical status of Transnistria adopted on basis of the May 16, 2005 Ukrainian plan and acceptance of a new settlement plan based on the Kozak Memorandum with the agreement of Russian President Vladimir Putin make Ukraine's claims to be a regional leader in the GUAM area and Community of Democratic Option futile.

The Republic of Moldova must learn the lesson from the practice of the years of independence - representatives of Ukrainian political elites have demonstrated that they cannot be credible partners. That's why the idea that President Vladimir Voronin has expressed on different occasions regarding the coordination of the European integration efforts with Ukraine must be abandoned. However, the good bilateral relations with Ukraine are very important for the Republic of Moldova, especially regarding the energy security and they must be developed in continuation in the limit of possibilities, by taking into consideration the precedent experience.

IV. Relations with Romania

The relations between the Republic of Moldova and Romania improved essentially last year. This improvement was due to the change of focus on political-legal state of things and postponement of ethno-linguistic, historical, etc. clearings up. The fact that Romania can help Moldova learn the "aquis communitaire" rapidly and make "advocacy" for its European integration is a hardly estimable trump.

However, nobody must nourish illusions that the new relations are not deeply marked by the earlier promoted counter-position "Moldovenism-Romanianism". The inertia of this counter-position is very big and will be undoubtedly manifested, relapsing, being provoked including deliberately. Under these circumstances, the good relations will depend on capacity of elites from Bucharest and Chisinau to cooperate in the limits of pragmatism imposed by the European integration process, leaving the sensitive problems on account of time and favourable circumstances.

V. Conclusions

  1. The clauses of the foreign policy and security concepts of the Republic of Moldova must be as clear as possible, based on sincere aspirations, real and argued estimates of dangers faced by Moldova. Any allusions to intentions to "play on contradictions" between great powers or between neighbours must be avoided, the way the developers of a draft foreign policy concept launched in October 2002 said. The premeditated game on contradictions is the prerogative of some subjects of significant importance for those of whose contradictions it is wanted to profit. As for example, Ukraine. If the Republic of Moldova will try to play on contradictions between great powers or between neighbours, it will be simply ignored and abandoned in the "zone of buffer" with all its unsettled problems.

  2. The compliance of internal processes to political criteria for European integration must be a priority for the Republic of Moldova. The compliance with economic criteria must not be underestimated, but the fact that the Moldovan population represents less than one percent of the E.U. population, while the economy that must be reformed represents approximately 0.03 percent of the E.U. economy, may offer economic support to Moldova, if it complies with political criteria.

  3. A very serious examination of the problem of giving up the status of neutrality of the Republic of Moldova is needed. If Moldova wants to remain neutral in a polarising world in metaphoric terms, it should assume the risks of existence on an isle between two oscillating tectonic plates, it means the risks of the buffer area.


Hedgehopping of Moldovan economy
Galina Selari, Anatol Gudim

While adapting to the "independence" and the market, already has been six years in a row (2000 - 2005) when Moldovan economy started show signs of growth, but neither government, nor business or population have any confidence in its sustainability.

Why is it so? The answer lies in the results of the year 2005 and paradoxes of economic growth during the post-crisis period as a whole.

So, for the first time in the new Moldova's history, the Government - in complete concordance with the President and the Parliament - worked for whole electorate cycle and was mandated for the new 4-year term. It is our 10th government since 1990 and it is important that, as President V. Voronin put it, "the current Government did not come to an empty place, as it was in 2001. The ground for fruitful work has been paved."1 What is more, the Tarlev-2-Government has a quite considerable package of mid-term strategies in reserve, including Strategy of Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction (2004 - 2006) and Action Plan Republic of Moldova - European Union (2005 - 2007). These documents are still considered as the Government's declarations of intentions to realize structural reforms in a very broad range of directions. One could expect though that, if these intentions are realized (and transposed to the scale of EBRD ratings), our country could notably advance along the way of creating reliable prerequisites for sustainable economic growth. For the time being results of reforms in the Moldovan economy are unconvincing. And in most cases the indicators confirmed that it is in "hedge-hopping flight" (see Graph)

Dynamics of economic changes in Moldova2

Click to enlarge

At first glance, economic situation seems to be evolving successfully: GDP and production are growing, inflation is under control, and quality of macroeconomic policy is evaluated positively by a number of international agencies. As well as we look good according to statistics: Moldova enjoyed higher growth rate in 2005 (during 9 months of 2005) - 8.4%, than Romania and Bulgaria (5%), Ukraine (2.8) and CIS mean (6%).

At the same time, according to the National Statistics Office, Moldova's economic indicators in 2005 were contradictory:3

As for GDP figures, according to our estimates, 7% growth expected during the design of the mid-term expenditures forecast (2006 - 2008) failed to realize in 2005; it will be lower and will not exceed 6%. The question whether this is much or not has no simple answer and requires explanations. What are the causes of growth rates slowing down as compared with 2004? How could be this growth be assessed as regards its sources and external effects?

It is quite obvious, the government tried to improve situation in the economy and processes of deregulation started. Among them are: reduction of administrative barriers to entrepreneurial activity, improvement of the budgetary process and inter-budget relations; gradual renewal of capital assets, growth of the National Bank's monetary reserves, decline in inflation have been observed also. The reform of public administration has started, and solutions proposed within its framework quite correspond to challenges of the time: more precise definition of the executive power functions, reduction of possibilities for emerging conflicts of interests within state bodies (that's what the Guillotine Law is aimed at), and fight against corruption. As a result, as compared with the previous structure, number of central bodies of public administration reduced from 31 (16 ministries and 15 other agencies) to 28 (15 and 13).. At that, the dragging drafting of regulations on the newly created and re-organized ministries and departments, as well as the announced considerable reduction of the state apparatus' staff (down to 70%!), as one could expect, caused a lot of conflicts. Difficulties in the field of justice still exist, and existing level of corruption in the courts harms both entrepreneurs and population.

It is obvious that possibilities of consolidation of economic growth mainly through improvement of legislation have been exhausted: it is already clear to everyone that it's insufficient to have a good legislation, and it's important so that its norms were observed in practice, which requires efficient state apparatus, just courts, adequate law-enforcement and consistent legal system. No law can yield expected results without all state bodies ensuring its execution and courts defending citizens or entrepreneurs be their rights violated.

Undoubtedly, Moldova needs economic growth. The question lies in its quality. GDP has to show both through expansion of employment, increase in incomes and reduction of social inequality. For the time being, with reference to the Moldovan economy, one can mainly speak of restoration growth, i.e. which results mainly from involvement of standing capacities to production. Hence problems of quality of growth: productivity of social labor (value added produced per one employed in the economy) shows digressive growth - 10% in 2005 compared with 15% and 11% in 2003 and 2004 correspondingly. At that, number of those employed in the economy is also stably decreasing, while underemployment increases (+ 12% as compared to 2004).

Moldova is a country of a small and open economy. And it is quite vulnerable to impact of external factors of economic growth. This can be seen from the paradox: domestic demand in Moldova exceeds the country's GDP by more than 30%, import is twice as large as export. According to the data of the National Statistics Office, in 2005 export was 10% smaller than the trade deficit. At that, volume of the declared export (information of the Customs Service) as compared to 2004 decreased (!) by 5%. Keeping tradition, the National Bank introduces a certain amount of optimism: in 2005, for the first time, services black ink was registered, which somewhat compensates critical situation concerning export of goods. Which means that the opinion stating that economic growth (final households' consumption) is mainly conditioned by the inflow of funds earned by Moldovan citizens abroad, is still correct (these funds have been covering 70% of the deficit of goods and services lately).

Search for an answer to the questions - when and how abruptly the "tsunami" of remittances will subside? and what will happen with all this? - become more and more topical. The majority thinks that GDP growth rate will drop considerably given that inflow of remittances from abroad subsides. An extreme variant can be that growth will turn into recession. Unfortunately, the future is unpredictable. But sound policy should foresee it. Such situations can usually be explained well post factum, but it's just not enough for the fate of the country and its population.

Thus, one can agree with the fact that "the ground for fruitful work has been paved", even if we proceeded to realization of the main task - to change the growth paradigm, we did it in a timid way.

An outsider can see this well. So, the Rating Agency Fitch IBCA didn't change Moldova's credit ratings in December of 2005 again (long-term ones in foreign and national currencies at "B-" and "B" correspondingly and short-term in the national currency - at "B"), having assessed economic situation as an extremely difficult one (considerable labor migration, narrow production basis, insufficient inflow of investments to the economy, although it noted adequate quality of the existing labor force). At that, the stably low "B-"rating is related to relatively uncertain relations of the country with creditors, members of the Paris Club, first of all.

Moldovan population also shares the point of view of international experts: the results of an opinion poll conducted in internet by the sociological service "Opinia" show that 70% of respondents consider socio-economic situation in the country to improve a bit or remained unchanged in 2005, but is still bad (the same 70%)4. And everyone knows that even under the annual GDP growth rate equaled to 7%, the level of 1990 will be achieved only by 2015.

The time has come to proceed from PR-economy -we have had the good results on that - to intensive realization of the tactics of socio-economic break-through that would ensure transition to a new model of economic growth - from the post-crisis growth to the investment one.

And it is very important that it would be the current year of 2006 when this transition would show materially. It is this year after all when summation of implementation of EG PRSP and Action Plan RM-EU (interim) is set. It is time to make government intentions, reforms and actions of previous years accumulate at last in positive changes in the economy.

The following should become priorities of 2006 for all players - government, business community, civil and donor societies:

Finally, both economy and population require creation of conditions for improvement of human capabilities and competitiveness in Moldova - improvement of efficiency of healthcare, education, social protection, housing policy, and poverty and inequality elimination. For the time being though, according to the latest UN Report Moldova slipped down the human development index again.


1 Nezavisinaia Moldova, 29.04.2005

2 http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/series/tr.htm
Estimates of indicators are given on the scale of 1 to 4+, where 1 characterizes complete lack of reformation process of the strictly constructed planned economy and 4+ characterizes achievement of market economy standards accepted in industrially developed countries.

3 Real growth rates as compared to 2004. The latest (September 2005) estimation of indicators by the Ministry of Economy and Trade is given in parenthesis; Monitorul Oficial, � 148-150, p. 9

4 Infotag, 31.01.2006

5 Доклад о мировых инвестициях 2005, с.114


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