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e-journal, year V, issue 97, June 1–15, 2007

Activity of Public Institutions

Transdnistrian Problem

Foreign Affairs

Studies, Analyses, Comments

Activity of Public Institutions

Parliament

1.1. Legal acts

Law on mediation. The law introduces a mechanism of mediation in civil and criminal cases as an alternative of trials. The mediation means empowering a neutral person (mediator) to intermediate the communication between sides, with the purpose to reach a consensus in a conflict. The mediation is believed to be chosen for terms and costs and anti-distress protection of the person involved in trials. The document is part of the European Union-Moldova Action Plan and it should be adopted by late 2006.

Law on limited societies. It regulates the building, functioning, reorganisation and shutting up of limited societies, which are legal entities, whose registered capital is divided into social shares accordingly to constitution acts, and their bonds are guaranteed by patrimony of society. Parliamentarians gave up in the final reading the idea to increase the minimum registered capital (up to 30,000 lei) needed to build limited societies, keeping the present quota of 5,400 lei. Maximum 50 associates may create a limited society, while societies with more than 50 associates will have to turn into stock societies. The Parliament adopted the law in spite of basic regulations on limited societies stipulated by Civil Code, though it was earlier estimated that a distinct document is useless. According to press reports, there are approximately 55,000 limited societies in Moldova, this being the favourite organisational form for economic activities.

Law on zoological gardens. The law creates a framework for implementation of the March 29, 1999 European Directive 1999/22/CE concerning zoological gardens, regulating the special regime of building, administrating and closing zoos, protecting wild fauna and preserving the biodiversity, studying the wild fauna under conditions of captivity, for cognitive, cultural and scientific goals.

Law on traffic security. The document regulates the legal-social relations in traffic, establishes the tasks, duties, rights of competent authorities and motorists.

Law on modification and completion of some legal acts (mega regulator of financial market). The legislation undergoes changes concerning reorganisation of the National Commission for Securities into the National Commission of Financial Market in charge with regulating and controlling the extra-bank capital market: non-state pension insurance, insolvency, activity of investment funds, savings and loan associations, microfinance organisations, etc.

Law on rectification of the 2007 state budget. Incomes and expenses grow by 620 million lei each, of them 150 million lei is allocated for implementation of the law on remuneration of budgetary sector. A large amount worth 100 million lei is allocated to increase the registered capital of the state-owned railway company of Moldova CFA. The law was rectified to cover

15.4 million lei allocated for general local elections. The allocation of more than 32.5 million lei to the Ministry of Culture to acquire the entertainment centre Moscova, where the Eugene Ionesco Theatre will be located, under an order by Moldovan president, has raised hot debates. Under amendments, the total revenue of the state budget will account for 12.708 billion lei, while expenses will amount to 12.781 billion lei.

Draft law on conflict of interests. It is expected to regulate incompatibilities and restrictions for public functionaries, to settle conflicts of interests, to regulate the presentation of statements on conflicts of interests. Conflict of interests can be defined as a situation in which someone in a public position must make a decision or participate in making a decision or take other actions that influence or may influence the personal interests or the interests of close persons. First-ranking dignitaries, public functionaries in central administration, judges, prosecutors, councillors, diplomatic functionaries, customs officers, police, security and law enforcement bodies, officers of the Centre for the Struggle Against Economic Crimes and Corruption, the Information and Security Service, heads of public institutions, state or municipal enterprises, state-run economic agents will fall under incidence of this law.

Draft law on compensation of gas connection. The document adopted in the first reading stipulates that teachers, doctors, and artists from villages have the right to single compensations for connection to natural gas pipes. Every member of families in which both spouses are teachers, doctors or artists, are graduates from higher or secondary professional education will receive by 1,500 lei. The same amount will be paid to lonely teachers, doctors and artists, while families in which one spouse is working in theses fields will be paid 750 lei. According to accounts by the Ministry of Local Public Administration, the connection to low-pressure gas pipe would cost 2,000 lei on average. In reality, the connection to gas pipes in villages costs between 4,000 and 10,000 lei.

Draft law on scientific-technological parks and innovation incubators. Institutions created after implementation of this law will apply the findings of researches and innovations of Moldovan scientists. The law aims to encourage innovations and technological transfers and to develop the findings of scientific researches and innovations into new or better products, services, processes.

1.2. Questions and Interpellations. Statements

Questions and Interpellations

Deputy Valentina Cusnir has appealed to the Prosecutor-General, Centre for the Struggle Against Economic Crimes and Corruption, Central Electoral Commission and Government to identify the involved persons and funds spent for cars of public institutions, state participating in electoral campaign to support the Party of Communists of Moldova. She told the numbering plates of these automobiles.

Democratic Deputy Vladimir Filat has asked the Government to table an ample report on implementation of the package of laws on economic liberalisation.

Statements

The Our Moldova Alliance (OMA) faction has released a statement titled "We Actively Support the Cooperation of Non-Communists" concerning cooperation of democratic forces against Communist representatives in 1st and 2nd-level elective bodies.

The parliamentary faction representing the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CDPP) has released a statement contesting the electoral campaign and results of elections in a number of localities.

Parliamentarian Gheorghe Susarenco has read a statement describing the first round of local elections in political-legal terms. Susarenco considers that the Moldovan legislature has flagrantly breached the Constitution of Moldova, the Parliament’s Regulation and the law on status of parliamentarians by suspending the spring-summer session; involving lawmakers in granting political support to some categories of persons or political parties in detriment of others; abusively using public administrative levers and resources (cars, telephones, offices, earning of salaries as lawmakers). In particular, the lawmaker indicated the conduct of speaker, who has called upon Chisinau residents to support the Communist candidate. Finally, Susarenco demanded the Chamber of Auditors to hold a control in order to estimate what deputy Chisinau mayor Veaceslav Iordan has accomplished in two months when he was interim mayor-general.


Government

2.1. Appointments. Reshuffles

The Government has sought the recalling of Moldovan Ambassador to Italy Nicolae Dudau.

2.2. Decisions

Decision concerning control on mandatory foreign civil motor responsibility insurance. The document prohibits motorists to cross the Moldovan border without mandatory foreign civil motor responsibility insurance (Green Card). The Border Guard Service will be in charge with controlling this field and banning motorists without necessary acts to cross the border.

Decision approving the regulation on restitution of value of goods by paying compensations to victims of political repressions and payment of compensation for death after political repressions. The document was published on June 8, 2006, though the Law (#186-XVI) which served as a basis for this act was adopted on June 29, 2006 and it obliges the Government to adjust its acts within 3 months. Earlier, victims of repressions and their predecessors have protested against delayed restitution of goods and reticence of authorities, with the European Court of Human Rights sentencing Moldova on these matters.

Decision approving the framework regulation on secretariat works in central and local public administrations and subordinated institutions.

Decision on Government’s diploma. The Government will award its diploma "to individuals and legal entities in various fields of activity for merits and successes."

Decision approving the regulation on implementation of fiscal amnesty. Fiscal bodies will be in charge with amnesty, while acts for amnestied tax payers will be issued "at demand". The number of amnestied tax payers and "pardoned" amounts will be reported in August.

Decisions approving some programmes, concepts, strategies:

Decisions approving draft laws:

2.3. Sittings. Decisions. Statements

Production of drugs

Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev has convoked decision makers in charge with development of drug industry. According to communications, competent authorities have taken a number of actions in the past three years to encourage domestic enterprises to make drugs and, therefore, the technical and financial condition of these companies (stock society Farmaco) has essentially improved. Tarlev outlined the importance of developing the drug industry in order to provide population with quality drugs for accessible prices and supported the development plan of drug industry, seeking more efficient actions to attract necessary investments.

Development of dwelling-communal sector

It was reported at a sitting convoked by prime minister that 30 residential blocks comprising about 3,000 apartments have been put into operation with the state support in municipalities of Chisinau, Balti, in Hincesti, Ungheni, Basarabeasca and Cimislia, etc. At the same time, authorities take measures to create an efficient legal-normative base for housing: draft laws on social apartments, on condominium, on mortgage, etc. Premier Tarlev noted that public authorities of all levels must create normal living conditions for citizens and urged competent bodies to finish the social and mortgage housing building programme. He raised concern with condition of very old blocks, underling the need of surveying all old blocks in Moldova, in order to issue technical passports and consolidate or destroy them.

Central Administration Reform

Premier Tarlev has chaired a sitting of the Consultative Committee for Supervision of central public administration reform, which heard a report on accomplishments of the reform in January-May 2007 and traced long-term goals and tasks. Committee members concluded on basis of the assessment report that most of actions stipulated by implementation plan of the central public administration reform strategy have been achieved. They signalled following difficulties and shortcomings: low capacity of central public authorities to work out own reorganisation/modernisation plans; lack of a directorate to analyse the coordination of sectoral policies; late finalisation of the draft law on central public administration; lack of concepts on classification of public functions and remuneration of public functionaries.


Presidency

3.1. Decrees

Moldova’s president has signed a decree on revocation of Defence Minister Valeriu Plesca. According to press reports, he was revoked after a person has died in a tragic incident on shooting field in Bulboaca.

3.2. Sittings. Decisions. Statements

Reconstruction of some routes

Moldovan president has visited reconstruction sites on Chisinau-Leuseni, Cimislia-Comrat routes, central route of the Cricova city. He appreciated the paces of rebuilding works and the specialised modern equipment used by builders, noted the rigorous labour control on quality of building materials. Vladimir Voronin warned persons in charge with highway repairing works over the need of strictly respecting the European quality norms and standards in the field, seeking a strict control in this respect.

Trips to other countries

Informal CIS summit in Sank Petersburg

CIS leaders have exchanged opinions at the informal summit regarding a draft CIS reformation concept worked out by a joint working group. They agreed to debate and approve the new CIS development concept at the October 5–6, 2007 CIS Summit in Dushanbe. Also, they decided to signal a priority problem every year and identify consensus solution to this problem, with migration being the first issue. Cooperation in this regard will be confirmed under an agreement. They indicated among other priority issues the cooperation in the field of transportation, energy, telecommunication and education. President Voronin had a bilateral meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin during the summit, attended the 11th International Economic Forum and visited the Innovation Technologies exhibition.

Formal visit to Greece

The visit agenda of Moldovan president included meetings with Greek President Karolos Papoulias, Green Speaker Anna Psarouda-Benaki and Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis. Also, he met Athens Mayor Nikitas Kaklamanis and representatives of opposition parties represented in the Greek Parliament (Socialist Party, Left Coalition of the Greek Environmental Movement and Communist Party of Greece). The visit agenda also included a meeting between President Voronin and members of Moldovan Diaspora in Greece.


Transdnistrian Problem

US propose transforming the peacekeeping operation in Transnistria

On the eve of the Extraordinary Conference on the CFE Treaty, the US have proposed deploying a multinational peacekeeping force to Transnistria, also to include Russia, as a solution to the dispute on the illegal stationing of Russian troops and ammunition in Moldova. The US have reiterated their call for an immediate completion of the withdrawal of Russian ammunition from Transnistria, as a precondition for ratification by the US and other parties of the adapted CFE Treaty.

Daniel Fried, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, stated on the eve of the CFE Conference that Russia has not fulfilled its obligations assumed in Istanbul in 1999 with regard to its troops and ammunitions in Transnistria. Fried called for a "creative compromise" that would allow for the fulfilment of Russia’s Istanbul commitments and that would be acceptable to Russia. "Russians sometimes argue that their forces are in Transnistria, performing a legitimate and peaceful peacekeeping function. Well, if it’s a peacekeeping function, maybe we ought to consider how a modest peacekeeping function can be properly institutionalised", the high level American diplomat stated.

The Moldovan delegation to the Vienna conference reiterated in its turn the need to transform the current peacekeeping mechanism, which "has repeatedly demonstrated its incapacity to control the situation and solve current problems in the security zone". Moldova joined the US and other states parties to the CFE Treaty, and conditioned ratification of the adapted Treaty with the fulfilment by Russia of its Istanbul commitments regarding Moldova.

Deputy Head of Russian Delegation to the Vienna Conference, Mihail Ulianov, said the Kremlin was ready to examine the US proposals regarding the deployment of an international peacekeeping mechanism in Transnistria. But as the Vienna conference ended with no result having only exacerbated the division between Russia and the West on a number of issues of European security, it might happen so that Russia will change its mind. All the more so as the Transnistrian leader, Igor Smirnov, has already declared he would not allow deployment of a "foreign" peace operation in the region. And as Russia has since long claimed it could not withdraw its ammunition from Transnistria because it was hindered to do so by the Transnistrian authorities, Russian officials could again blame the intransigence of the Transnistrian leader for not agreeing to the US proposals on an international peace operation in the region.

Voronin, Putin talk Transnistrian problem

At the CIS Summit in Saint Petersburg on 10–11 June, President Voronin had a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. Press services of the two presidents published little information regarding the contents of the discussion, and only mentioned that they tackled bilateral relations and Transnistrian settlement.

Earlier international media reported about an alleged settlement plan negotiated in secret by Moldova and Russia, and which was to be signed during the Voronin-Putin meeting in Saint Petersburg. Chisinau officials have denied the existence of such a plan, as well as any intention to sign a bilateral agreement with Russia on Transnistria. However, such statements came only late after a series of questions raised by media and civil society.

It seems Western counterparts were equally concerned with the rumours of a Moldovan-Russian deal on Transnistria. Thus, on the eve of his departure to Saint Petersburg, President Voronin met with US Ambassador to Moldova, Michael D.Kirby, and the Head of the EC Delegation to Moldova, Cesare de Montis, with whom he discussed, among other things, the Transnistrian problem. On the same day, Voronin had a telephone conversation with the EU High Commissioner for CFSP, Javier Solana.

It is to be noted, that on the eve of the Saint Petersburg Summit, representatives of civil society organisations and international think tanks published an Open Letter for a European settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. The authors have expressed concern regarding the non-transparent way in which Moldovan-Russian negotiations on Transnistria are being held, outside of the "5+2" format, which fact could irrevocably compromise the European prospects of Moldova. The signatories have called Moldovan authorities to found their Transnistrian settlement efforts on the objective of European integration of Moldova, and on the principles and legislation adopted by Moldova on this issue.

In response to this open letter, the Ministry of Reintegration issued a communique in which it rejected the "accusations" against the Moldovan authorities, which "have acted in a transparent manner both towards its foreign partners and the civil society and political class of Moldova". At the same time, Ministry of Reintegration regretted the fact that a series of its partners from the civil society have forgotten about the consultations carried out regularly with the Ministry and qualified as "deliberate disinformation the publication of the open letter which puts under question mark the objectivity of signatory organisations".

The exact contents of the Saint Petersburg meeting remains a mystery, one of its announced results – the resumption of Moldovan wine exports to Russia – having more of an electoral character and, according to analysts, little immediate practical application. It seems though that discussions between the two heads of state will continue – on 15 June, for the third time in 2007, Chisinau was visited by the Deputy Secretary of the Russian Secuirty Council, Iuri Zubakov, who this time led the traditional discussions about "bilateral relations" in the context of a new Putin-Voronin meeting planned for end of June.


Foreign Affairs

European integration

The last preparations for the June 19-scheduled sitting of the European Union-Moldova Cooperation Council in Luxembourg have been made in the period covered by this issue of the e-journal Governing and Democracy in Moldova. The interest for this event is on the rise, as the E.U. is expected to tell its opinion regarding the future relations with Moldova after February 2008, when the term for implementation of the E.U.-Moldova Action Plan (EUMAP) is over.

Signals coming various ways are not encouraging so far. There are speculations in certain circles that the E.U. will criticise much on June 19 the way Chisinau has accomplished the EUMAP goals until now. Given the progress in implementing the EUMAP, it is believed that the E.U. could extend the term of implementation of this plan and would accept to consider the possibility of promoting the relations with Chisinau at a new quality level only after a satisfactory accomplishment of the EUMAP goals.

Bilateral cooperation

Republic of Moldova – Ukraine

Moldovan Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Andrei Stratan visited Ukraine on June 7 and met there Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and his counterpart Arseny Yatsenyuk. According to the press service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI), Stratan and Yushchenko have exchanged opinions regarding bilateral relations under various aspects and evolutions of the Transnistria settlement process.

The meeting with Yatsenyuk focussed on travel regime with Ukraine. In particular, the sides discussed difficulties faced by Moldovan citizens to cross the Moldovan-Ukrainian border along with minors who do not have passports and are included in passports of parents. In this context, the Ukrainian foreign minister assured that difficulties related to border crossing will be remedied.

MFAEI of Moldova has released a communication after that meeting, confirming the maintenance of the same crossing regime at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. It means that minors can further travel to Ukraine together with one or both parents, if they are registered in passports of their parents or if they hold nominal passports and are accompanied by their legal representatives.

Republic of Moldova – Russia

The long-discussed meeting between Moldovan and Russian Presidents Vladimir Voronin and Vladimir Putin took place on June 10. Media outlets reported before the meeting that the two presidents could sign a secretly negotiated Transnistria settlement plan, which favours Moscow in detriment of Chisinau.

Presidential press services were very laconic in reporting the talks between Voronin and Putin after the meeting. Nothing was told about the alleged plan. The public opinion was informed that Presidents Voronin and Putin have discussed the development of Moldovan-Russian cooperation on various plans, prospect of settling the Transnistrian conflict and resuming Moldovan wine exports to the Russian Federation.

Shortly after that meeting, news agencies said that Moldova will restart wine exports to Russia and this problem was solved at the Voronin-Putin meeting. Acording to Moldpres, President Putin has instructed Russian Minister of Agriculture Aleksy Gordeyev, head of the Federal Customs Service Andrei Velyaminov and Rospotrebnadzor head Gennady Onishcheko after the informal CIS summit in Sankt Petersburg to resume immediately the wine imports from Moldova. This political solution comes to solve a problem that Russian specialised services have linked to the bad quality of Moldovan wines. The "sovereign democracy" in Russia is in its own right.

Many observers are trying now to answer this question: What has Chisinau ceded? There is no absolute answer to this question, especially given the uncertainty around the return of Moldovan wines to the Russian market. It was promised after the November 2006 meeting of Moldovan and Russian presidents that Russian citizens would drink Moldovan champagne on the 2007 New Year, but it was not so. Now Moldovan exporters stay cautiously optimistic after many petty promises.

In this context, officials of Moldova-Vin Agency stated that wine exports are expected to restart soon, authorities are technically working very insistently and they cannot say now what companies or what quantities of wines will be exported.

The Russian publication Kommersant confirms the eventual return of Moldovan alcohol exports to Russia and gives a possible answer to the question above. Kommersant says that Moldovan wines will return to Russia only after Chisinau will cede some brands to the Russian state company Soyuzplodoimport, which is exclusively in charge with imports from Moldova. According to Kommersant, Belyi Aist is the first brand to be ceded.

Multilateral cooperation

Republic of Moldova – Council of Europe

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has sentenced Moldova in three cases in the period concerned.

The Strasbourg-based Court has established in the case Gutu vs. Moldova the violation of the right to freedom, the right to private life and effective appeal. Moldova was told to pay 5,000 Euros in non-pecuniary damages and 1,500 Euros in costs and expenses to the applicant.

In the second case Malahov vs. Moldova, the ECHR has found out the violation of the right to a fair trial. It obliged the Moldovan Government to pay 1,800 Euros to the applicant in pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages and 600 Euros in costs and expenses.

The Court has ascertained in the third case Flux vs. Moldova the restriction of the right to freedom of expression. It obliged the Moldovan authorities to pay 260 Euros to Flux newspaper in pecuniary damages, 3,000 Euros in non-pecuniary damages and 1,200 Euros in costs and expenses.

Republic of Moldova – CIS

Sankt Petersburg hosted an informal summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on June 10. President Vladimir Voronin represented Moldova at the meeting. We recall that the summit took place a couple of days after the Yalta summit of CIS premiers attended by Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev and the 28th plenary sitting of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly in Sankt Petersburg attended by President Voronin.

According to the presidential press service, CIS leaders heard on June 10 a report by CIS executive secretary Vladimir Rushaylo concerning the CIS reformation concept and participants exchanged opinions on this document.


Studies, Analyses, Comments

Aggregated victory of dispersed opposition
Igor Botan, 14 June 2007


I. Assessment of potential of political parties

Estimating the potential of preparing for participation in the 2009 parliamentary elections was one of declared collateral goals of political parties launched at the June 3, 2007 local elections. The exercise was successful, with eventual alliances and mergers of parties being based on concrete data.

24 out of 28 parties registered with the Ministry of Justice participated in the elections. It is simpler to name the parties which did not participate in elections in any of the 900 constituencies. The four parties that did not attend the elections are: Social-Political Movement New Force (SPMNF); New Moldovan National Party (NMNP); Romanian National Party (RNP); European Action Movement (EAM). The latter was registered on April 12, two weeks after the electoral campaign has started, and thus it could not attend the elections as an electoral contestant.

All other parties except for the Patria-Rodina Party of Socialists (PRPS) and the Social-Political Movement Ravnopravye (SPMR), which created the Patria-Rodina-Ravnopravye Electoral Bloc (PRREB), have participated in the electoral campaign independently. Table 1 features their acronyms for practical reasons linked to illustration of potential of parties participating in elections.

Table 1. List of parties that attended the June 3 general local elections

  1. DPM — Democratic Party of Moldova
  2. PCRM — Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova
  3. OMA — Our Moldova Alliance
  4. APM — Agrarian Party of Moldova
  5. SPM — Socialist Party of Moldova
  6. PLJ — Party of Law and Justice
  7. CDPP — Christian Democratic People’s Party
  8. SNMPM — Speranta-Nadejda Movement of Professionals of Moldova
  9. LP — Liberal Party
  10. SLP — Social-Liberal Party
  11. SDPM — Social Democratic Party of Moldova
  12. PRREB — Patria-Rodina-Ravnopravye Electoral Bloc
  13. EPMGA — Environmental Party of Moldova Green Alliance
  14. RPP — Republican People’s Party
  15. RPM — Republican Party of Moldova
  16. LUPR — Labour Union Patria-Rodina
  17. CUM — Centrist Union of Moldova
  18. EP — European Party
  19. HPM — Humanist Party of Moldova
  20. UMSDP — United Moldova Spiritual Development Party
  21. PSDM — Party of Social Democracy of Moldova
  22. CP — Conservative Party
  23. NLP — National Liberal Party
  24. IC — Independent Candidates

a) Territorial branches

The electoral race in 932 constituencies of 1st and 2nd levels revealed the degree of development of territorial branches of political parties. In order to estimate the approximate development, it is enough to see in how many constituencies one or another party has registered its lists of candidates to local councillor offices. Table 2 reveals a general image of the number of offices of mayors and district, urban and rural councillors for which political parties have competed.

Table 2. Number of mandates claimed by electoral candidates

No.LocalitiesNumber of mandates of district/ municipal councillors (of 2nd level)Number of (localities) mandates of mayorsTotal number of mandates of rural/urban councillors (of 1st level)
1.Chisinau5119290
2.Anenii Noi3326322
3.Balti35324
4.Basarabeasca27793
5.Briceni3328332
6.Cahul3537445
7.Cantemir3327305
8.Calarasi3328338
9.Causeni3527339
10.Cimislia3323267
11.Criuleni3325305
12.Donduseni2722234
13.Drochia3328346
14.Dubasari2711135
15.Edinet3332364
16.Falesti3333378
17.Floresti3340444
18.Glodeni3319243
19.Hincesti3539473
20.Ialoveni3325325
21.Leova3325269
22.Nisporeni3323260
23.Ocnita3321241
24.Orhei3538446
25.Rezina3325271
26.Riscani3328324
27.Singerei3326334
28.Soroca3535387
29.Straseni3327329
30.Soldanesti2723253
31.Stefan Voda3323273
32.Taraclia2715171
33.Telenesti3331349
34.Ungheni3533350
35.ATU Gagauzia-26378
 Total112489810637
 Average number of candidates per seat>9>5>5

Table 3 reveals the answers of political parties to needs mentioned above and the ramification of district branches of political parties.

Table 3.

Number of 2nd-level constituencies where electoral competitors registered candidates

Table 3 is not relevant for conclusions; it reveals only the ambitions of political parties. In principle, the registration of some lists of candidates at district level should not be a problem for any political party. In particular, the number of candidates included in district lists could comprise at least half of the mandates disputed in the constituency concerned. In this respect, Table 3 reveals rather the very weak parties in terms of district territorial structures.

Table 4 contains much more relevant information on ramifications of district territorial structures of political parties and capacity to register lists of candidates to village and town councils.

Table 4.

Number of 1st-level constituencies (towns/villages) where electoral contestants registered lists of candidates for councillor office

Comparing Tables 3 and 4, we observe that the contour lines revealing the number of district constituencies (of 2nd level) and town/village constituencies (of 2nd level) where parties submitted lists of candidates to these councils are changing. The change of contour lines from the two tables allows the assessment of relation between electoral ambitions of parties and real ramification of territorial branches.

Table 4 reveals that only the first five parties were capable to register lists of candidates to local council in more than half of localities. PSDM and SLP have registered their lists of candidates in more than one third of localities. SDPM and RPP have registered their lists in more than one fourth of localities. The Liberal Party, which has provided one of the greatest surprises at these elections, registered the list of candidates for councillor offices in less than one fifth of localities, ranking 9th in terms of local structures. Another five parties have demonstrated a very poor development of territorial branches, registering candidates to councillor offices in more than one tenth of localities.

As the mayor position is regarded one of most prestigious offices in localities, the territorial potential is also tested by capacity of registering as many as possible candidates to mayoral posts. Table 5 actually reproduces Table 4, and this fact confirms the verticality of human potential of parties and correctness of such estimates. The only remarkable difference for the group of parties with a strong potential (functional structures in more than one fourth of localities) is that SDPM has candidates to mayor offices (Table 5) in more constituencies than SLP, unlike candidates to local councillor positions. This fact may be described as an interesting fluctuation rather than as an indicator of development level of territorial branches.

Table 5.

Number of candidates to mayoral offices appointed by electoral competitors
b) Human resources

The quantity of human potential of parties participating in the recent elections may be estimated both in Table 5 and particularly in Table 6. Examined together, the tables provide a suggestive image to understand what authentic parties are and what so-called “pitch parties” are.

Table 6.

Number of candidates registered by electoral contestants in 1st-level councils (towns/villages)

Indeed, the need of a very tight correlation between the degree of ramification of territorial branches and human potential of parties was clear a priori. However, the fact that the electoral legislation allows parties to submit lists with candidates half filled up compared with the number of mandates disputed in those constituencies leaves room for more precise estimates of human potential of parties. In this regard, it is worth to note that the strongest party — PCRM — did not nominate candidates to mayor offices in only 71 localities or approximately 8 percent. On the other hand, PCRM did not submit lists of candidates to local councillor offices in only 3 out of 898 localities.

The Liberal Party, which was capable to register approximately five times fewer candidates to local councils than PCRM, is ranked at the other pole of the group of parties with a strong potential.

c) Capacity of raising funds

The capacity of raising funds along with the degree of ramification of territorial branches and human potential allows for a complex estimation of parties’ potential. Table 7 reveals the data released by CEC prior to the Election Day.

However, reports on funds do not seem credible. Given the default of details, it seems that all parties have declared only the funds used for verifiable expenses. In particular, they declared the resources used to publish electoral materials, post advertising, and broadcast advertising on radio and television. The expenditures for electoral staffs, transportation and fuel for them, employment of PR experts, invitation of music stars, etc., may be easily hidden and they usually remain obscure. In this regard, the current electoral campaign is like the precedent ones. The situation will probably be the same in future, even after the new law on parties and its provisions on financing are adopted, the financing of parties and their campaigns will remain a topic of great interest, yet covered in a very approximate way.

Table 7.

Funds used for electoral campaign (Millions of Moldovan Lei)
d) Correlation between exposed potential and results

The publication of results of elections in 2nd-level (district) constituencies has updated the real ratings of political parties. Besides the organisational-financial, human potential and doctrine affinities, the updated ratings establish new reference points for elaboration of strategies in preparation for the 2009 parliamentary elections.

Table 8.

Percent garnered by parties in 2nd-level (rayon) constituencies

There is a very tight correlation between potential of parties estimated above and final results of elections, except for LP. Six political parties have garnered more than 4 percent of the political votes in 2nd-level (district) constituencies. These parties will be the main players to gain the mandates of parliamentarians in 2009. Another three parties — SDPM, RPP and SLP — have demonstrated a strong potential to improve their chances, so that at least to be rated as eventual partners of electoral alliances.

For example, RPP may improve its potential for sure on account of an eventual support in the Gagauz autonomy, as Gagauz Governor Mihail Formuzal enjoys support in the autonomy and he is a RPP leader. This support was not observed at the current elections because Gagauzia is only an administrative constituency at local elections, not a 2nd-level constituency like districts. SLP has demonstrated a strong human potential and a wide ramification of territorial branches.

Table 8 and precedent tables clearly reveal that the perspectives of 5–6 parties with a weak potential still are uncertain. It seems that other 8–9 parties added to the four parties that did not participate in elections have a very weak potential.

II. Underlined phenomena and trends set by election results

a) Sudden decline of PCRM rating

The political support for PCRM has declined much below expectations, from approximately 46 percent at the 2005 elections down to 34.4 percent at the 2007 local elections. The sudden decline of the rating by more than 10 percent after a slow fall trend was observed during two electoral campaigns after 2001, of about 2 percent at every ballot, are clear signs that the PCRM needs to revise its public policies, its human resources strategy and its intention announced five years ago to modernise the party, which it never did.

Table 9.

Evolution of PCRM rating at national level

The decline of PCRM has got clear dimensions in quality terms. Thus, PCRM has gained simple majorities after the recent elections, notably more than 50 percent in 2 districts, compared with 16 in 2003; more than 40 percent in 10 districts, compared with 14 in 2003; more than 30 percent in 13 districts, compared with 4 in 2003; more than 20 percent in 9 districts, compared to no district where PCRM did not garner less than 30 percent in 2003. It may mean that promoting its staff to key leading offices in approximately one third of districts is the best the PCRM could do. In another one third of districts the PCRM could have relatively strong but not dominant positions, holding more than 30 percent.

However, the PCRM has suffered the most painful losses in symbol constituencies — Gagauzia and Chisinau. It garnered only 13 percent of the votes in Gagauzia, which is approximately two-fold less than at the 2003 local elections. It gained only 26.6 percent of the votes for the Chisinau Municipal Council, compared with 43.7 percent in 2003.

Table 10.

Votes for Chisinau Municipal Council

As a result, the PCRM has won only 16 out of 51 mandates in the Chisinau Municipal Council, which is less than one third, and it has no chances to co-participate in a ruling majority.

Table 11.

Mandates in Chisinau Municipal Council

Gaining the runoff vote for the Chisinau mayor office could be the only consolation for PCRM. The PCRM candidate has gained a relatively modest result of only 27.7 percent in the first round of elections, compared with 41 percent in 2003.

Table 12.

Number of votes for Chisinau mayor office

The victory of the PCRM candidate at the runoff vote is less and less unlikely, even if opposition political parties disperse themselves. Voters of opposition forces count for 2/3 compared with PCRM supporters. Thus, the mass media affiliated to PCRM has libelled the rival of the PCRM candidate, trying to inoculate the fear toward his eventual victory as a motivational factor to gain the support of the PCRM candidate.

b) Performance of opposition — consequence of “April 4 vote”

The results of recent elections reveal indeed an “aggregated” victory of the “dispersed” opposition. New trends that have been earlier observed are being consolidated now. They disadvantage the ruling party in particular and encourage the opposition in general.

Changes and new significant trends are consequences of the “April 4 vote” for sure. Expectations linked to manifestation of effects of the “April 4 vote” have not become true. The “intransigent” opposition did not defeat the “constructive” opposition, nor did the opposite happen. Thus, the recent elections reduced the need of speculating this problem. The ascension of a new political leader, perhaps of a new movement, is the authentic effect of the “April 4 vote” manifested and confirmed at the recent elections. But they come out from extra-parliamentary opposition, just like the proverb — where two are fighting, the third wins.

Although the decline of the rating of any ruling party imminently increases the rating of the opposition, the relatively good performance of the opposition is based on many reasons in this case. They deserve to be analysed on segments:

1. The “constructive” opposition made up by DPM and CDPP have gained an honourable result, even better than expected. The rating of DPM has grown by 2 percent per country, from 7.7 percent in 2003 up to 9.7 percent in 2007. DPM has generally doubled its electoral support in the Chisinau municipality, from 2.9 percent in 2003 up to 6.8 percent in 2007. It may be said that the “April 4 vote” did not affect at all the DPM. As declared “centrist” party, the DPM has openly committed itself in 2002 to persuade and support the eventual “modernisation” of PCRM by conversion to socialism or social democracy. The eventual “betrayal” of DPM was predictable in the eyes of the anti-communist press and, for this reason, the DPM was not so criticised like the other “treacherous” parties participating in the “April 4 vote” for re-electing the PCRM leader Vladimir Voronin as chief of state.

The better score of DPM at the recent elections is based on several reasons, with the main causes being linked to the remarkable campaign held by DPM candidate to the Chisinau mayor office, Vladimir Filat; attraction of notorious personalities of public life such as “the father of Moldovan social democracy,” Oazu Nantoi, in DPM, etc.

CDPP has garnered 8.5 percent of the votes on country, compared with 8.9 percent at the 2003 local elections and 9.1 percent at the 2005 parliamentary elections. It may be said that the CDPP has maintained its rating in the margin which does not leave room for forecasting significant recoil. The result rather reveals the stability of rating and a certain performance. CDPP has constantly been in the past two years the favourite target of anti-communist media, which maintained the accusations of “betrayal” for the “April 4 vote” on agenda.

The result of CDPP nationwide conceals the impact of the “April 4 vote”. This impact clearly manifests in the inversion of preferences for this party in the Chisinau municipality and all country. The rating of CDPP was approximately two times higher in Chisinau than in other localities at all precedent elections. Thus, the CDPP has garnered 15 percent of the votes in Chisinau at the 2003 elections and only 7 percent in the rest of the country. But things have changed at the recent elections, as the CDPP gained 7 percent of the votes in Chisinau and 8.9 percent in the rest of the country.

The democratic media, which does not like the CDPP, has exploited at maximum the conflicts insides this party — the withdrawal of three MPs from the CDPP parliamentary faction; dissolution of the CDPP faction in the Chisinau Municipal Council. These internal conflicts were a consequence of the “April 4 vote”.

The conflicts caused by the adoption and implementation of the new broadcasting legislation, the privatisation of the municipal broadcasters Antena C and Euro TV were also presented as negative consequences of the “April 4 vote” and of the cooperation between CDPP and PCRM. Finally, the modification of the Parliament’s Regulation together with the PCRM faction, ceasing this way the live broadcasting of plenary sittings of legislature, had negative echoes particularly among electors in Chisinau who seek better information.

For comparison, all accusations brought by media against CDPP could not be imposed to the other component of the constructive opposition — DPM. Therefore, the DPM has doubled its rating, while the rating of CDPP has declined two-fold in the Chisinau municipality.

2. The “intransigent” opposition has gained an honourable score in general. As expected, it has criticised the ruling party and the “constructive” opposition for the April 4, 2005 “betrayal”.

The Our Moldova Alliance (OMA) has gained 16.7 percent of the votes nationwide, compared with 20 percent garnered by Electoral Bloc Social Liberal Alliance Our Moldova (EBSLAOM) at the 2003 local elections. The score of OMA is three-fold lower than the one claimed by this party. Nevertheless, this confirmed the status of OMA as “the strongest opposition party”.

For certain reasons, the route and perspectives of the “intransigent” opposition deserves a concise summary. EBSLAOM was initially an electoral bloc made up of six parties to participate in the 2003 general local elections: Alliance of Independents (AI), Social Democratic Alliance (SDA), Liberal Party, Environmental Party Green Alliance of Moldova (EPGAM), Democratic People’s Party (DPP) and Party of Reform (PR). Immediately after the 2003 elections, three of the six parties, AI, SDA and (old) Liberal Party have merged into a new political entity called OMA. The latter together with DPM and SLP created the Democratic Moldova Bloc (DMB) in 2004 to participate in the 2005 parliamentary elections. The failure of DMB to defeat PCRM has disintegrated the bloc immediately after the parliamentary elections, followed by a series of further divisions of OMA. As a result, the Party of Social Democracy of Moldova (PSDM) was built on the former SDA and the National Liberal Party (NLP) was built on basis of the old Liberal Party. The Party of Reform has seized the temporary disappearance of the old Liberal Party (2003–2005), taking over this name and making its debut at the current local general elections, providing the great surprise this way.

These details follow one goal — to show that all former members of the SLAOM of 2003 and of the DMB of 2005 have reached after the June 3, 2007 local elections the point from which they started before the 2003 local elections. Really, taken together the former components of SLAOM have garnered more votes at the recent elections, notably 23 percent compared with 20 percent in 2003.

The former members of the DMB of 2005 have gained more votes at the recent elections than the bloc won in 2005 — 35.8 percent versus 28 percent. The difference is clear. It brings to and end the useless talks that MPs elected on behalf of DMB have won their mandates thanks to OMA, whose leader has brought them to the Parliament like a kangaroo in its pouch. The results of parties which have immediately quit the DMB: DPM — 9.7 percent, SLP — 3.2 percent, and of those which withdrew from OMA later: PSDM — 4.77 percent; NLP — 1.3 percent, reveal indeed that nobody owes anything to anybody. All have the parliamentary representation share they deserve. At present, after the votes of citizens have tested the potential of every party, one would welcome the change of intransigent optic, its inversion in exchange for coalitions and mergers, but this time on the basis of criteria capable to consolidate their potential.

One essential observation is that in the case of OMA too the preferences of the electorate in the capital and the rest of the country have also inversed like in case of CDPP. Thus, SLAOM gained 25.1 percent of the votes at the 2003 elections in Chisinau, compared with 12.3 percent at the recent elections, with the OMA rating being two-fold lower than previously. OMA has garnered 17.9 percent of the votes in the rest of the country. A direct consequence of asserting this fact is a statement by OMA leader AMN Serafim Urechean: “Voters’ option requires that approaches determined by the 4 April 2005 vote are left for history.” This is true, because the LP is the main operator and beneficiary of inversion of preferences toward OMA and CDPP.

3. Extra-parliamentary opposition, particularly one of many extra-parliamentary parties — Liberal Party — provided the greatest sensation on June 3, 2007. LP ranked 2nd in the Chisinau municipality, losing to the ruling party only.

The success of LP is impressive for its disproportion. Really, the LP candidate to the Chisinau mayor office has gained 24.3 percent of the votes in the first round; the list of LP candidates to the Chisinau Municipal Council won 18.3 percent of the votes; 4.8 percent in 2nd-level constituencies on country; 1.8 percent in 2nd-level constituencies outside of the Chisinau municipality. This range provides precise figures to confirm a fact — the great success of LP is particularly due to its candidate to the Chisinau mayor office, Dorin Chirtoaca, LP deputy chairman.

The electoral success of LP compared to organisational, human, financial, etc. resources mentioned above outlines more the disproportions, indicating the consolidation of a new trend of electoral conduct of citizens. This trend appeared at the 2005 new municipal elections in Chisinau and consolidated at the recent scrutiny. The trends work most for those who have intuition and intelligence to use them. The modest results registered by LP in the rest of the country are some reverberations of the success gained in Chisinau. However, it is worth to note the efforts made by LP in the past two years to consolidate its territorial branches and to attract a human potential capable to spread in territory the success harvested in capital.

A proof for this conclusion is the fact that before Dorin Chirtoaca joined the LP in 2005, this party lacked a minimum potential to participate at least formally in the 2005 parliamentary elections with a list of candidates, the way it has done in 2001, when it gained 0.67 percent of the votes as part of the Electoral Bloc Faith and Justice.

The rounds of success of Dorin Chirtoaca deserve a short summary, as well as of its objective and subjective components: a) the “April 4 vote” divided the opposition into “constructive” and “intransigent” elements involved in disputes and mutual accusations on background of governing of a dominant party; b) the vacancy of the Chisinau mayor office occurred in 2005 has challenged new elections, which apparently were held in vain and were invalidated four times because of the absenteeism, but it provided an unimaginable frame for political advertising and make names known; c) personal skills of Dorin Chirtoaca — knowledge, intuition, coherent language accordingly to expectations of a significant segment of citizens, the sincere self-seeking of an intellectual young man, etc.

These factors have constructively attracted the support of more than 45,000 voters by the end of the sterile electoral marathon held in four rounds. The increase in Chirtoaca’s rating in less than half a year, from scrutiny to scrutiny, from 7 percent to 25 percent to 35 percent later was also due to the loss of interest of Moldovan political elite for the office of Chisinau mayor with a mandate of 1.5 years only, from December 2005 till the June 2007 general local elections.

III. Conclusions

  1. The results of the June 3, 2007 local elections mark the beginning of a special situation, with eventual significant impacts on Moldova.
  2. The decline of the PCRM rating down to one third of the electorate’s support makes the ruling party feel uncomfortable. PCRM has made only political enemies during the absolute domination on political scene. Its conduct aimed at persecuting the opposition candidates, including of the “constructive” opposition at the recent elections has rejected all potential partners of coalitions.
  3. In this situation, PCRM will have to draw appropriate conclusions and choose another conduct to inhibit the negative trends. Achieving the long-declared modernisation of PCRM and co-participating in building a socialist political or social-democratic pole would be the alternative of a policy on more severe attitudes toward political opponents and confrontation between central and local authorities controlled by opposition. The first option could have negative consequences on Moldova, while the second one seems to be too nice a dream to become true.
  4. Eventual attempts by the PCRM to regain its electorate will face difficulties. An analysis of data on participation and distribution of votes between electoral competitors reveals a new essence of electoral conduct, which cannot be explained by absenteeism only. The change is due to public policies promoted by ruling party. Truly, electors hold the right to ask why a communist, not liberal party must declare and hold a “liberal revolution” if this is needed?
  5. The incoherence of actions could easily disperse the “aggregated” victory of opposition. Eventual coalitions of opposition parties to make up majorities and elect the leadership in most of districts and Chisinau municipality could manifest in various ways. The perspective of reproducing small ADRs at district level should make opposition leaders tremble. On the other hand, maintaining a balance of relations between district administrations controlled by opposition and central government could help preserve the trends observed at the recent elections until the 2009 parliamentary elections. Anyway, they favour the opposition in general.
  6. Eventual attempts by the opposition to shake the fundament under the “vertical of state power” at district level could trigger reactions from the ruling party. Radicalisation of the power-opposition relations on background of bitter criticism of government for state of mass media, electoral process, etc. would justify the refusal of the European Union to award a higher status to relations with the Republic of Moldova. As a result, the ruling party could revert to open CIS oriented policies, as stated on a number of occasion intention that seems to be confirmed by recent statements.
  7. The opposition shall take measures to stop the dispersion. This will be impossible without consolidating the new trends observed at the recent local elections. Traditions of Moldovan political culture leave little chances of optimism in this respect, with capacity of cooperation between opposition leaders who “created conditions” for new trends and their exponent remaining a big problem.
  8. In all likelihood, the political instability will grow until the 2009 parliamentary elections. This is risky both for political class and for electors who might end up but with “lost illusions”.


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