Alegerile parlamentare din 2021 în Republica Moldova -

AIE in zeitnot

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Igor Botan / November 1, 2011
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Courage to own up the mistake

The October 13 demarche of the premier and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), Vlad Filat, pretexted the July ‘raider assaults’, which would have revealed the non-professionalism or even the complicity of some state institutions politically and algorithmically controlled by the other two members of the Alliance for European Integration (AIE), the Democratic Party of Moldova and the Liberal Party (PL). The premier’s report addressing the Parliament stressed that the evil which undermines the activity of AIE consists in politicisation of law and security institutions, which serve some persons in the detriment of public interests. The programmatic theses from the premier’s report were expected to challenge active actions aimed to eliminate the reasons which enhanced the danger of “mafiotisation” of the country over the risk of “communisation”, underlining the following facts:

The same day, 69 MPs representing the factions of PLDM and the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) adopted a Parliament Decision on activity of some state institutions, on the basis of the premier’s report. The decision concerned:

Despite his strong decision, the impetus of premier and his party was enough just for the day when the report was released and the Parliament Decision was adopted. In consequence, the demarche aimed to remove institutions from political control ended with the dismissal of SIS and CNFP heads, while terms for resignation of Prosecutor-General and governmental reshuffles were ignored, perhaps because of unpredictable circumstances. Howsoever, the premier’s courage to indicate the evil which undermined the normal functioning of AIE is worth of appreciation, but the way he tried to find excuses to go all the way and fulfil the pledged goals is not welcome.

Unachieved dreams and threats…

The Constitutional Court (CC) Decision from September 20 marked cardinally the conduct of parliamentary parties. The decision concerned dashed all expectations of leaders of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) and the Liberal Party (PL) regarding ways to overcome the institutional crisis by avoiding an express constitutional norm. As well, it was noted that the election of chief of state is an emergency, while the Parliament did not make necessary efforts for this purpose. In consequence, PDM and PL leaders saw little chances to be elected chief of state and head of the Parliament respectively, accordingly to the AIE Agreement. Pressures against the two AIE members increased once Premier Vlad Filat announced his plans to operate governmental reshuffles and to launch a campaign aimed to depoliticize law enforcement and judicial institutions. As the declared intentions of premier were never discussed by AIE, it was supposed that the prime minister and his party made a deal with the PCRM, which has repeatedly sought the resignation of heads of a number of public institutions.

The developments explained above designed the framework for AIE leaders to engage in a tactical performance of redistributing influences in the alliance. Leastways the public statements of PDM and PL leaders reveal that the intention to reset the AIE, accordingly to schemes of Premier Vlad Filat, was interpreted as an attempt on positions of these parties. In the background of AIE leaders’ tactical games, the PCRM declared its strategic goal to regain the rule inclusively by building a large coalition, which would allow both the identification and the voting of a compromise-based candidate as chief of state, and participation in the governance. Otherwise, the PCRM did not rule out the possibility of settling the crisis by provoking early parliamentary elections.

Preoccupied with tactical manoeuvres aimed to accomplish the plan of resetting the AIE and believing that he has time on his hand to find a solution to election of chief of state, Premier Vlad Filat and his party were taken aback. Thus, a practised action of the PCRM faction which was constantly seeking at every parliamentary sitting the introduction into agenda of a draft decision on release of the presidential election procedure was suddenly accepted by the PDM leader and faction. The PDM faction had to vote along with PCRM and PDLM the scheduling of presidential elections for November 18, 2011. This happened exactly one week after the premier tabled his report to the Parliament and after the adoption of the decision on dismissals aimed to depoliticise institutions and operate governmental reshuffles, which should reset the AIE. In consequence, instead of reshuffles and dismissal of Prosecutor-General and eventually of the Parliament speaker, the PLDM had to back away, manipulating and looking for excuses to postpone actions which should be taken in line with the Parliament Decision.

Opening of count-down

The unexpected decision of PDM leader Marian Lupu to back the PCRM demand regarding the opening of the presidential election procedure does not come under the logic aimed to reach incisive goals. It is rather a clear plan to undermine the PLDM goals. Perhaps, the reaction of the PDM leader to the premier threat released an unexpected action, as the latter told a news conference shortly after tabling his report to the legislature that the resistance of the Parliament speaker against dismissal of Prosecutor-General “would mean that we will have another head of the Parliament who will do so.”

In fact, the PDM leader made some steps and other moves are further expected. For the time being, he refused to start away the dismissal of the Prosecutor-General, saying that the latter provided reports on charges filed against high-ranking dignitaries who represent both the AIE, and the opposition. This announcement woke up the attention of PCRM leader Vladimir Voronin, who manifested his interest to let the Prosecutor-General inform the Parliament before any resignation.

The PCRM leader needed this guise to calm down the PLDM bluster, as the latter was explaining to the public opinion that the PCRM is acting the way the PLDM wants, without any special deal. In addition, the PCRM proved that he enjoys a large field of action in relations with PDM and even with PL. It seems that this was a surprise for PLDM, as its leaders reiterated the formula that Marian Lupu is so far the AIE candidate to run for the seat of chief of state. However, the repetition of this formula does not impress Marian Lupu any longer after the September 20 CC decision. Contrariwise, Lupu said that he will likely call for a compromise-based candidate, assuring that both the PCRM and PLDM fellows dislike his election as chief of state, as the PLDM hinted on diverse occasions that it regards him as a “marionette” of the famous “jigger”. Thereafter, AIE found itself short of candidates to run for the seat of chief of state and faces a shortage of time, when nothing is clear and the situation could worsen because of misinterpretation of actions of partners and opponents.

Being held in the shortage of time by the unexpected scheduling of presidential elections, the disputed AIE members come to be played astutely by PCRM. Genuinely, the release of presidential elections has a strategic importance, and the expected result is either to bring back the PCRM rule in one or another formula, or to challenge early parliamentary elections. Both results would advantage the PCRM to design the executive authority with the participation of PCRM. This way, the tactical games of PLDM to reset the AIE took a back seat, requiring manoeuvres which the least would not “burn bridges” between AIE partners and the Communist opposition. Hence, the PCRM is suddenly enjoying a condition that it could have just dreamed about. It enjoys the opportunity of handling between AIE components, without making any deal, without assuming any obligation towards any AIE member, antagonising and discrediting each of them in the lump. AIE leaders realise very well what is happening, but cannot refrain from blows below the belt.


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