Moldova will mark on September 11, 2011 two years since it has no elected chief of state and one year on September 28, 2011 since the Parliament was dissolved, so that no obstacles and grounded justifications could postpone now the procedure of election of the chief of state. The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM) contest the expectations of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) and the Liberal Party (PL) that the September 20 bill of the Constitutional Court will give green light to the elaboration of a simplified procedure, with derogation from express provisions of the Constitution which require a qualified majority of at least 3/5 votes of elected deputies. Therefore, the autumn political season could be very hot, but it is not clear what scenario is credited with best chances to succeed.
It is certain so far that AIE member parties do not want the eventual launching of the president election procedure to fail and challenge early parliamentary elections. Premier and PLDM leader Vlad Filat reiterated at a news conference on August 26 that “the chief of state will be elected this autumn,” and “early elections would be a catastrophe for the Republic of Moldova.” Premier Filat’s statements that “things are wrong” and Moldova runs the risk of “mafiotisation” explain why he fears that eventual early parliamentary elections would be “a catastrophe for the Republic of Moldova.” Indeed, they would be a catastrophe for AIE, which persuaded the public opinion that intestinal dissensions obstruct it to rule the country.
It is worth to note in this context that Premier Filat’s conviction that “the chief of state will be elected this autumn” was followed by an immediate reaction by PCRM leader Vladimir Voronin, who informed that Zinaida Greceanii will run for presidential elections on behalf of his party. Since AIE is not capable any longer to nominate a candidate to run for the post of chief of state, it is logical for PCRM to take over the initiative and impose its own candidate, turning down any formerly announced possibility of compromise such as the consent to choose a candidate. PCRM does not need any longer to boycott the election of president, since there is no risk now that AIE could convert several PCRM deputies to elect the consolidated candidate of AIE. On the contrary, PCRM is interested to give a death blow to AIE.
By promoting an own candidate to the office of chief of state, PCRM breaks out of suspicions that it would like to maintain the political instability or challenge early parliamentary elections. The political instability is fuelled by tensions and disputes inside of AIE. Even more, PDM and PL leaders have constantly disliked the idea of reaching a compromise to choose an “apolitical” candidate. That’s why the PCRM is ready to act accordingly to approaches by PDM and PL. By promoting an own candidate, the PCRM imposes AIE components either to elect it, or to be blamed for eventual early parliamentary elections.
The first case deals with the so-called broad coalition, which the PCRM would gradually reduce to the convenient formula needed to take over control on executive authority, by eliminating “nationalist extremists” and “mafia” elements. If early parliamentary elections take place, the PCRM can build upon an absolute victory, as the recent local elections proved a very high rating of the party. Anyway, the PCRM has almost certain chances to become the key centre of coagulation for a coalition. It is worth to note that the PCRM will hold the best and most persuasive campaign in case of eventual early parliamentary elections, and it would just have to use in its electoral clips excerpts from statements of AIE leaders about each other and “crimes” they committed. In addition, the ethnic-linguistic fragmentation of society preserved with efforts of PCRM on one hand and of PL on the other hand makes preferences of electors very rigid and implies the improvement of electoral sector of PCRM and perhaps of PL in an almost guaranteed manner. Of course, this would be done on account of “pragmatic” parties PDM and PLDM, whose leaders are key producers of irreconcilable conflicts inside of AIE.
In both cases described above the PCRM would enjoy the largest field of manoeuvre between PLDM or PDM, which would probably compete for the honour to be subordinated partners of PCRM. For these reasons, it could happen that Premier Vlad Filat hurried up to assure that “the chief of state will be elected this autumn.” He could need more time to meditate on eventual scenarios. So, he could have to make a choice between becoming a subordinated partner of PCRM and keeping a firm hold on the CC bill along with PDM and PL, so that to save time and hope that parties are still able “to mend matters”. But there could also be original solutions that the public opinion has no idea about.