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Transnistrian Conflict on June 14–27, 2004

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High OSCE dignitaries visit Moldova

In June Chisinau hosted a series of visits by high OSCE officials. Thus, following the study visit on 9–12 June by 26 ambassadors accredited at the OSCE, Chisinau hosted on 17–18 June a delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and on 21–22 June Chisinau was visited by the OSCE Chairman in Office, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy.

The visit of Solomon Passy had the objective “to support efforts towards the Transnistrian conflict resolution and encourage democratisation and the reform process in the entire country”. Passy had a number of visits with high Moldovan officials, including the Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and the Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Stratan, as well as with representatives of civil society organisations and political parties. Passy also visited Tiraspol, where he had a meeting with the break away leader Igor Smirnov. During meetings with both sides, Passy presented them a package of draft agreements on a balanced reduction of military forces as well as confidence-building and transparency measures, worked earlier in June by the OSCE Mission to Moldova.

At the end of his visit, Passy held a press conference, during which he called upon the Moldovan and the Transnistrian authorities to speed up negotiations on the Transnistrian settlement. Referring to the current negotiations format, Passy said that “it is not a dogma” and may be changed, but he did not believe it rational to make “changes for the sake of changes”.

Asked to comment on his meting with the Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, Passy said that Smirnov seemed ready to engage in dialogue. “We presented him our proposals, and he engaged to examine them”, said Passy. In his general assessment of a viable solution of the Transnistria conflict, he said that it is essential that such a solution is accepted by all sides.

The negotiations round on 23–24 June

One day after the end of the visit of Solomon Passy to Moldova, in Chisinau and Tiraspol a new round of negotiations took place. During the round, Chisinau officially joined the political plan drafted under the OSCE aegis and which included some of the Moldovan proposals on the Transnistrian settlement.

At a press conference held at the end of the round, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Chisinau, William Hill, said that Moldova’s move was a positive result of the talks and an important step towards a political settlement. At the same time, Hill regretted that the Transnistrian delegation did not attend the talks, after the mediators had not accepted Transnistrians’ proposal to postpone the round for 30 June to allow them enough time to examine the demilitarisation proposals presented to them by Solomon Passy. Thus, in the absence of the Transnistrian delegation, Hill said the round was rather one of “consultations” and reminded the Transnistrian side that their verbal commitment to attend negotiation rounds should be proved by acts.

During the same press conference, Hill referred briefly to the demilitarisation proposals presented by Solomon Passy and explained that both sides accepted to examine them. Hill specified that Moldova’s demilitarisation had nothing to do with the withdrawal of Russian weapons and troops from Transnistria, which falls under the commitments assumed by Russia at the OSCE Summits in Istanbul and Porto.

The next round of talks with the participation of the Russian, Ukrainian and OSCE mediators has been scheduled for 21 and 22 July.

New ICG Report on Moldova

The International Crisis Group (ICG), an independent think tank working through field based analysis and high level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflicts, published on 17 June 2004 a new report on Moldova, “Moldova: Regional tensions Over Transnistria”. The report asserts that “resolving the Transnistrian secessionist dispute in Moldova is vital to remove a potential source of chaos on the periphery of the expanding European Union, to implement an important part of the post-Cold War settlement, and to make Moldova itself a more viable state,” and advocates for “greater U.S. and EU engagement with the stalled peace process” as essential to bringing a settlement of the dispute.

The report analyses the motivations governing Russian and Ukrainian policy towards Moldova and Transnistria, and outlines the attempts by the Transnistrian officials to enhance their influence in those two countries. The report refutes the orthodox view held by the opposition forces in Chisinau that that external support to Transnistria stems solely from Russia, and argues that the break away leadership has constantly tried to diversify its external support and secure greater backing from Ukraine. Over the years, Transnistria has developed into “a self aware political entity with own interests that it is able to advance through lobbying, economic opportunism, political posturing and creative negotiating”.

Referring to Russia’s role in the Transnistrian conflict settlement, the report devotes particular attention to Russia’s unilateral effort to push through a settlement in 2003 (the “Kozak Memorandum” affair). The report discloses a wealth of detail about the background of the document and the diplomacy surrounding it, most of which have been unknown to the Moldovan public opinion. The report argues that the failure of the plan has been an indication of the limits of Russian influence, which has proved unable to push through a settlement without the support of Moldova and of the international community. At the same time the affair has also showed that the latter needs Russia and its considerable influence over the Transnistrian leadership if it is to mediate a political settlement.

The report concludes that “Russia’s heavy handed role in the negotiations has produced the opposite effect, as illustrated by the fact that a communist government in Chisinau has made European integration its highest foreign policy goal”. Finally, the report advocates for greater Western support, especially in tackling the illegal business activity and the external support that sustains the break away regime in Transnistria.

The full text of the report may be found at CrisisGroup.org. This is the second report in a series of IGC reports of Moldova. The first report “Moldova: No Quick Fix” was published last August and included an analysis of the background of the conflict and of the past and current conflict resolution efforts.

May 31 – June 13, 2004 June 28 – July 11, 2004