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Transnistrian Conflict on May 23 – June 5, 2005

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Within a special session on 10 June 2005, the Moldovan Parliament is to adopt a statement on the Transnistrian settlement plan proposed by Ukrainian President Victor Yushcenko. This decision was taken on 6 June at a working meeting of President Voronin with the leadership of the legislative body. According to a communique from the presidential press service, the meeting noted that the Ukrainian plan “reflects the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, is based on the Moldovan Constitution and takes into account the interests of the population from both sides of Nistru River, as well as the aspiration to European integration of Ukraine and Moldova.”

This comes a few days after the June 2 meeting between the Moldovan and Ukrainian presidents in Iasiki Odessa, whose key theme was Ukraine’s settlement plan and joint measures in support of the plan. The two presidents signed a joint letter to Javier Solana, Secretary General of the EU Council, and Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, in which they call for EU assistance in instituting an international customs control on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border and in setting up an efficient mechanism of international monitoring of the border. According to a presidential press service communique, President Voronin told the press at the end of the meeting that he appreciated the Ukrainian settlement plan and that the active involvement of Ukraine and European bodies in the settlement process create the necessary premises for the identification and application of a viable solution to the Transnistrian crisis. President Voronin is undertaking a visit to Brussels and Strasbourg on 7–8 June, where he will meet both with Solana and Barroso, but also with NATO Secretary General, with whom he will discuss primarily the prospects of regional and international cooperation in resolving the Transnistrian dispute.

On the other hand, immediately after the Iasiki meeting, Piotr Poroshenko, Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security Council, on an assignment from President Yushcenko visited Tiraspol, where he met with the Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov behind closed doors to discuss Ukraine’s proposals. After the meeting, the Ukrainian dignitary told the press that the Transnistrian leadership had shown understanding of the prospects offered by the settlement process and that a number of compromises had been reached that had opened up new opportunities. He mentioned that a key task now is to resume the negotiations process because a viable solution may be found only at the negotiations table. An official Transnistrian position on the plan has still not been published, while the Transnistrian official press has interpreted the visit of Poroshenko as one reassuring against unilateral moves by the Moldovan Government and guaranteeing that Transnistria is treated on an equal basis with the Moldovan side.

In the meantime, the Ukrainian plan continues to be in the centre of attention of the Moldovan public opinion. The Association for Foreign Policy of Moldova, a Moldovan think-tank, has issued on 31 May a Declaration on the plan, in which it salutes Ukraine’s intention to play a more active role in the Transnistrian conflict settlement process, but describes the plan as one unlikely to secure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Moldova, let alone Moldova’s strategic objective of European integration. Thus, the plan fails to mention anything about the withdrawal of the Russian army from Transnistria, the need to demilitarise the region, the liberation of the Moldovan political prisoners held in Transnistria and erroneously proposes that Russia and Ukraine, two states with considerable interests in the region, act as guarantees for the settlement agreements, etc. While most observers in Chisinau have acknowledged these shortcomings, some have noted that this sort of tough and controversial provisions would have upset Russia and Transnistria and were omitted deliberately from the plan, so that it is accepted by all parties as a basis of discussion. At the same time, observers note, after the publication of the plan, the Moldovan and Ukrainian Governments have actually taken a number of measures to make up for these shortcomings. The outcomes of the Iasiki meeting, but also President Voronin’s agenda in Brussels and Strasbourg on the eve of the special Moldovan Parliament session on the Transnistrian issue seem to confirm this theory, at least for now.