Transnistrian Conflict on November 17–30, 2003

The Russian Memorandum

The events around the Transdnistrian conflict during the period covered in this e-journal were dominated by the draft Memorandum “On the Principles of State Organisation” proposed to the Moldovan, Transdnistrian and Gagauz authorities by Russia through the Russian Ambassador to the Republic of Moldova Iuri Zubakov in mid-November 2003.

The draft proposed the institution of an asymmetrical federation in which Transnistria and the Territorial Autonomous Unit Gagauz-Yeri would be the subjects of the future federal state to be called the Federal Republic of Moldova. The federal state is to become a neutral and demilitarised state, with a common customs, financial and defence space. The document did not include any political or military post-settlement guarantees (see ADEPT Comment “Memorandum on principles of establishing a unified state” for a thorough description and analysis of the draft).

The Moldovan President welcomed the initiative as one that offers a “realistic, compromise scheme for overcoming the territorial, political and economic disentanglement of our country” and held a series of meetings with the leaders of the three parliamentary factions, the diplomatic representatives in Chisinau, the OSCE Mission in Moldova and even with the two former presidents of the Republic of Moldova in an attempt to gather support for the proposal. His efforts were paralleled by the shuttle diplomacy of the Deputy Head of the Russian Presidential Administration Dmitry Kozak, who is said to have masterminded the said Memorandum, and who had meetings with the leaders of the three Moldovan parliamentary factions and with the Transdnistrian leader Igor Smirnov as well as mediated the talks on the document between the Moldovan and Transdnistrian experts.

The Transdnistrian side shared to a great extent the excitement of the Moldovan President on the Russian draft and thanked the Russian Government for it, but reserved themselves the right to propose a few amendments to the draft, such as a clause on military guarantees to be provided by the Russian army whose presence in Transdnistria was to be legalised for the next 30 years and granting the Russian language the status of state language throughout the territory of the future federation.

Despite the far from positive reactions to the draft from various sectors of the Moldovan civil society and a statement by the OSCE refusing to endorse the Russian plan, by Monday, 24 November the Moldovan and Transdnistrian sides seemed to have reached an agreement and paraphated the draft. The signature was planned for the next day as was the visit to Moldova of the Russian President Vladimir Putin who was to attend the ceremony of signature. Things seemed to be going as smoothly on other fronts — the Moldovans had stopped jamming the Transdnistrian mobile and put an end to the “telephone war” started about two months ago between the right and the left banks of Nistru River, the Moldovan President had passed an amnesty on those imprisoned as a result of the 1992 military clashes between Moldova and the Transdnistrian secessionists and the Transdnistrians had lifted the travel ban that they had imposed on 17 top Moldovan officials in early 2003.

In a sudden change of mind, though, on 25 November the Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin issued a statement, though which he postponed the signature of the Memorandum because of the negative reaction of a significant part of the society to it. President Putin’s visit to Moldova was immediately cancelled and the Russian envoy Kozak left for Moscow but not before accusing the Moldovan authorities of “political irresponsibility” and of lacking “political courage”. On a later occasion, Kozak added that Moldova’s failure to sign the document could protract the conflict resolution efforts for another 10 years.

In the meantime, a number of international experts and organisations commented on the document and highlighted its numerous gaps, including the OSCE CiO, Dutch Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who singled out the lack of a mechanism of solving disputes between the central and regional powers, the lack of a mechanism of multilateral guarantees and the free hand that the draft gives to Transdnistria to block any decision taken at the federal level.

While President Voronin only postponed the document for consultation with international organisations, the Moldovan opposition parties and a number of non-governmental organisations have organised a National Committee for the Defence of the Independence and Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, which since 24 November has co-ordinated the street actions of protest against the Memorandum.

The protest actions climaxed with a Citizen’s Assembly organised by the said Committee on 30 November. The meeting joined of several thousands people coming from throughout Moldova and demanded the rejection of the Russian proposed federalisation plan, which the meeting agreed was a threat to the constitutional order and integrity of the Moldovan state. In addition, the meeting adopted an Appeal to the OSCE Ministerial Council in Maastricht calling upon it to stop the process of federalisation of Moldova, which would result in the recognition of the Transdnistrian secessionist state.

Notably, while initially the main motive behind the protests has been to discourage President Voronin from signing the Russian Memorandum, the Sunday Appeal envisaged a broader protest against the current government. Thus, the Appeal accused the communist power of “incapacity to govern” and demanded its resignation to avoid “the economic default of the country and the complete degradation of the society”. Earlier last week, the protesters burned Russian flags and portraits of the Russian President Vladimir Putin. These moves of the oppositions have made analysts in Moldova and elsewhere question the adequacy and legitimacy of the protests. They therefore have ruled out the repetition of the Georgian scenario in Moldova, to which many have likened the latest events in Moldova.

Meanwhile, the US Ambassador to the OSCE Stephen M. Minikes told the Permanent Council of the OSCE that the US shared the concerns of the OSCE regarding the Russian proposed federalisation plan. The position of the US was supported by representatives of the EU, who told the same meeting that the EU would support a multinational peacekeeping force under the OSCE aegis.

As the OSCE Maastrich Ministerial Council of 1–2 December was getting nearer — and many analysts have accounted for the swift evolution of events around the Transdnistrian conflict lately principally in relation to this event, statements from various stakeholders have indicated that the Transdnistrian issue and the Russian Proposed Memorandum would feature high on the agenda and in speeches of such top dignitaries as the US Secretary of State Collin Powel and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.

e-democracy.md

Transnistrian Conflict on November 17–30, 2003

The Russian Memorandum

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