Transnistrian Conflict on December 1–16, 2007

An article titled “Zubakov Plan” — a pretty real document known by Chisinau and Tiraspol diplomats was published under the aegis of the Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations, which includes Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. This article throws light on the conflict between Transnistrian foreign minister Valery Litskai and the deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Security Council, Yuri Zubakov. Litskai’s dissatisfaction with alleged great yielding from the so-called “Zubakov Plan” in Moldova’s favour is the origin of the conflict occurred in October. The article contains statements that raise interest, but it is not certain that they are true:

“Secrete” negotiations between Zubakov and President Voronin are described as a continuation of the “clamping on the rake” by the Russian Federation, which trusts Voronin so far after the “Kozak Memorandum” story;
The “Zubakov Plan” exists and it was informally delivered to Chisinau and Tiraspol in order to be studied. Chisinau is the co-author of the plan, which is nothing but a “Kozak Memorandum — 2” with a certain yielding in Moldova’s favour;
The “Zubakov Plan” should be institutionalised at the “Five-Plus-Two” meeting in Madrid in mid-October, being a Transnistrian settlement topic;
Chisinau has allegedly accepted to attend the Madrid meeting, supposing that Tiraspol would refuse and invoke the need of reintroducing the status quo antes March 3, 2006. Tiraspol guessed the manoeuvre of Chisinau and accepted to participate, cutting Chisinau out of all feather and forcing the Chisinau authorities to refuse a promised participation. This way, Chisinau has developed the duplicity and plan to diddle Russia in favour of “its Washington masters.”

Beyond “settling accounts” with Zubakov by disclosing the hidden plans of Chisinau, the article has a pragmatic goal to get funds for Transnistria:

In order to maintain its influence in the region, Russia must renounce the Republic of Moldova and focus on strengthening its positions in Transnsitria (of course, by sustaining the economy of the latter);
If it wants to maintain the Republic of Moldova, too, under its influence, it should also invest funds in Moldovan political forces loyal to Russia.

This article raises interest in the light of statements by Moldovan officials who said this year that mediators and participants in the “Five-Plus-Two” process have found a solution to the conflict, envisaging probably the “Zubakov Plan”. Also, the article may be regarded as a symmetrical and ironical reply to the “strategy” by the former advisor of President Voronin, Sergiu Mocanu. One thing is doubtless — the Transnistrian regime does survive thanks to Russia’s financial assistance.

On November 28, 2007, the Tiraspol Supreme Soviet passed in the first reading the 2008 budget of the region, and adopted the budgets of the pension fund, mandatory social insurance fund and employment sustenance fund in the first reading on December 5. Transnistria’s consolidated budget will account for approximately 2.80 billion Transnistrian roubles ($1 ~ 8.5 roubles) in revenues and 3.27 billion roubles in expenses. The deficit is approximately 15 percent. Seventy-five percent of expenses will cover social needs. For comparison, the 2007 consolidated budget of the secessionist region foresaw 1.23 billion roubles in revenues (by 44 percent less than in 2008), 2.03 billion in expenses, and 38 percent in deficit. Transnistria’s survival under such conditions is not an enigma, since the Russian Federation helps it. However, problems related to the improper use of funds occurred in 2007. Transnistria’s maintenance on waterline in 2008 is based on Russian infusions, too. The former advisor of President Putin, Modest Kolerov, recommends that the Russian funds be strictly controlled by the Supreme Soviet. This solution confirms a race between Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov and Supreme Soviet chairman Evgheny Shevchyuk for the amiability of Russian authorities. Thus, there will be no problem to finance the budgetary deficit. The pension fund will gather 850.8 million Transnistrian roubles (about 100 million dollars) in 2008, by 8.7 percent more than in 2007. However, another 58 million roubles will be necessary to pay all pensions in 2008. This deficit will be partly covered by a special additional tax of 0.9 percent for companies which contribute the most to the Transnistrian budget, in particular, Sheriff and the Ribnita-based metallurgical plant. This tax is expected to reduce the deficit by about 35 percent. But following consultations with the cabinet of ministers, the secessionist authorities decided not to use the 0.9-percent additional tax to cover the deficit. Most of the pension fund — 495 million roubles — will come from single social taxes. It is worth to note that the minimum pension in Transnistria will amount to 259 Transnistrian roubles (30.5 dollars) starting January 1, 2008, which is by 31 roubles more than in 2007 (when the minimum pension rose by 22 roubles), while the single birth indemnity for the first child will account for 2,242 roubles (about 264 dollars).

The Russian co-chairman of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), Viktor Shanin, confirmed on December 14, 2007 that “Russian peacekeepers will fulfil their mission in Transnistria until the definitive settlement of the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict.” The Russian diplomat noted that there are a number of problems which maintain a tense situation in the security zone and obstruct measures recommended by Moldovan authorities:

The initiative to replace the 15 peacekeeping units with mobile groups could elude the grounds of the peacekeeping operation and restart armed hostilities;
The West is only interested to liquidate the Russian military presence in the region and that’s why the U.S. initiative to set up an international observance mission in Transnistria raised at the recent Madrid OSCE Summit comes to reach this goal. If so, the relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol will not interest anybody;
The eventual international recognition of Kosovo will create a universal precedent;
The resumption of the “Five-Plus-Two” negotiations faces difficulties because the Moldovan delegation withdrew without any explanations in March 2006 and pretends not to remember this at present;
The recent initiatives by President Voronin are premature, since agreements on the rules of the game should be reached first and the unification of security systems should be discussed later;
Moldova does not want to regard Transnistria on an equal footing, but it wants to impose its unilateral decisions.

The Moldovan Ministry of Reintegration delivered on December 13, 2007 the thematic list of initiatives for talks on implementation of the October initiatives by President Voronin. The thematic of talks was elaborated by expert groups and shared with participants in the “Five-Plus-Two” negotiations. The proposals envisage the economic and commercial cooperation; infrastructure development; healthcare; resolution of social problems; distribution of humanitarian aid; resolution of agriculture-related problems; cooperation in education sector; demilitarisation and security strengthening. On this occasion, the Ministry of Reintegration “has expressed optimism that the Tiraspol administration will welcome this step forward strengthening the confidence and security and will really contribute to the definitive settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in perspective.”

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Transnistrian Conflict on December 1–16, 2007

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