Transnistrian Conflict on May 2–22, 2005

On 16–17 May in the Ukrainian town of Vinita took place a new round of consultations between the conflict parties and the mediators in the Transnistrian conflict settlement. The key issue discussed at the meeting was Ukraine’s plan on the Transnistrian conflict settlement and the seven settlement principles proposed by President Yushcenko at the GUUAM Summit held in Chisinau recently.

In an interview to Radio Free Europe, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, William Hill, said that the Moldovan side reacted positively to Ukraine’s plan, which the OSCE also supports, whereas the Transnistrian side had a number of questions about it. At the same time, Hill said that the Moldovan, Transnistrian, Ukrainian and OSCE representatives decided to invite the EU and US to join the settlement process as observers.

Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities published the plan a few days after the Vinita meeting. The plan reiterates the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, proposes that a special legal status is granted to the Transnistrian region within the Republic of Moldova, provides for Transnistria’s right to self determination only in the event that the Republic of Moldova loses its independence and sovereignty and proposes the creation of a common legal, economic, defence, social, customs and humanitarian space. The plan envisages early free and fair elections to the Transnistrian “supreme soviet” under international monitoring before Moldova recognises this body as the legitimate representative body of the region. The settlement is to take place in threes stages, each stage not exceeding six months in duration. At the first stage, the Moldovan Parliament is to pass a law on the key principles of settling the status of the Transnistrian region, on the basis of which Transnistria adopts a new Constitution. Then, in October-November 2005, free and fair elections to the “supreme soviet” are organised under OSCE aegis. A parliamentary commission composed of Moldovan and Transnistrian deputies then prepare a draft law on the status of Transnistria, which is to be passed by the Moldovan Parliament. The law enters into force upon the approval by the Moldovan Parliament of an Agreement on Guarantees on the Observation by the Republic of Moldova of the Status of Transnistria, concluded among the future guarantors — Russia, Ukraine and OSCE, possibly assisted by the US and the EU. Lastly, a Conciliation Committee is set up of representatives of the two parties, Ukraine, Russia, OSCE and possibly the US and the EU, which is to settle all disputes arising from the implementation and/or interpretation of the provisions of the Law on Transnistria status.

At a press-conference held soon after the plan was published, Minister of Reintegration Sova said that the Moldovan authorities are generally happy with the plan and are ready to start implementing it.

On the other hand, analysts and political party leaders identified a number of weaknesses of the plan, such as the requirement that the law on the status of Transnistria is developed in accordance with previous documents signed within the Transnistrian settlement process, the provision on granting Transnistria the status of “republic”, and a clause allowing Transnistria to participate in foreign policy decisions affecting it, which literally entitles Transnistria to veto any decision on the withdrawal of Russian army from the region.

Although initially the Transnistrian authorities reacted positively to most of President Yushcenko’s seven principles, the tone in Tiraspol has changed now that the entire plan has been disclosed. According to the official news agency Olvia-press, the plan is but a cover under which the Moldovan Government intends to decide the destiny of Transnistria and mobilise international pressure against it. Tiraspol rejects the idea to extend the negotiations format by inviting the US and EU to join it and the democratisation plan which is to result in Moldovan parties and candidates running for the Transnistrian “supreme soviet”. The Olvia-press commentator has reasons to be worried about the new plan, however the most serious threat being faced now by the break away regime comes from inside rather than outside the regime.

Thus, on 19 May, 34 out of the 37 deputies in the Transnistrian “supreme soviet” voted for a number of amendments to the “Transnistrian constitution” intended to scrap the powers of the “president” and increase the role of the “supreme soviet” (the legislative body) in the interpretation of the “Constitution” and its control functions in relation to the administration and use of state property, activity of the Central Bank, the process of denationalisation and privatisation, creation and implementation of “state budget” and the “public spending”. The amendments were initiated by a group of deputies headed by Evghenii Sevciuc, Deputy Speaker of the legislative, who is reportedly linked to wealthy business circles unhappy with the Smirnov regime. The deputies intend to take the constitutional reform as far as to transfer most powers from the executive power to the legislative one.

This unprecedented blow to the Smirnov regime is likely to change radically the internal political dynamics of the Transnistrian region. However, one cannot be sure that this will necessarily benefit the conflict resolution process, as Minister Sova hopes it would thus helping the Moldovans put the Ukrainian plan into place. Evghenii Sevciuc is known as a moderate reformer, but his ultimate aim is to consolidate the independence of Transnistria. However, an eventual split in the Transnistrian ruling elite and the removal of Smirnov from power will eventually weaken the regime, and, with an appropriate dose of diplomatic and economic pressure from both Moldova and its neighbours, one day it might simply collapse.

e-democracy.md

Transnistrian Conflict on May 2–22, 2005

Archive