Transnistrian Conflict on September 1–15, 2006

Developments in and on Transnistria in the past two weeks have centred on the referendum on the region’s relations with Moldova and Russia scheduled for 17 September 2006 (see an extensive analysis of the Transnistrian referendum in our previous issue). Representatives of the international community have continued to deny the legitimacy thereof and rule out any possible consequence of the ballot on the status of the region. Emma Udwin, European Commission spokesperson on external relations said in an interview with Russian daily Nezavisimaia Gazeta that “the EU does not recognize the self-proclaimed entity that calls itself the Transnistrian Moldovan republic. The OSCE has clearly stated its position — this referendum is not legitimate. Accordingly, the European Union will not recognize the results of the referendum.” At the same time, the EC official denied any parallel between the situation in Transnistria and the one in Montenegro. “Such parallels are incorrect. These are different processes: the division between Serbia and Montenegro took place in accordance with an agreement reached between the two sides. There is a completely different situation in Transnistria […]. There is no agreement between Chisinau and Tiraspol regarding the holding of the September referendum,” Emma Udwin told Nezavisimaia Gazeta.

A similar position was reasserted by the US in the person of David J. Kramer, US Secretary of State Deputy Assistant. Speaking to an international conference in Chisinau on 9 September on behalf of the US Government, Kramer stated that the US seek a resolution of the Transnistrian conflict that would fully respect the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Moldova and that there should be an “unambiguous non-recognition of the referendum” by all stakeholders.

In striking contrast with these and other statements by the EU, OSCE, US, Ukraine and other states, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued on 13 September a commentary justifying the Transnistrian referendum.

“The decision of the Transnistrian leadership to consult its population needs to be regarded in the context of the general evolution of the political situation in the region, where lately attempts are being made to impose a unitary model of settlement and to change unilaterally the current security mechanisms”, the Russian commentary states. It calls the referendum “a logical consequence of the decision of Chisinau and Kiev to unilaterally toughen the regime of Transnistrian enterprises access to external markets and factually include them into the Moldovan jurisdiction”. Faced with an “economic blockade” that has triggered a “humanitarian crisis”, the referendum is a method for the Transnistrian population to “reach out” to the international community. “In modern Europe it is hardly correct and politically wise to ignore, let alone disregard such a form of popular consultation”, the Russian MFA further reads.

Earlier, the Russian media quoted the Special Representative of the Russian MFA on relations with CIS, Valeri Keniaikin, as saying that the international community should recognise the referendum in Transnistria as “a fact of political reality” that is not to be ignored in subsequent talks on the status of the region. In another development, the Russian State Duma appointed on 14 September 2006 a group of Russian MPs to visit the region as election observers.

In the meantime the region has seen mass mobilisation of voters to the polls and massive official propaganda calling the “Transnistrian people” to vote for independence and integration into Russia, which, according to Transnistrian leaders’ logic, do not exclude one another. At a press conference on 14 September, the breakaway leader, Igor Smirnov, stated that it is important to “find out the opinion of the people and determine once and for all the external policy vector of the republic”. He said the desire to integrate into Russia is a conscious choice of the “people of Transnistria”, but declined to give details on how the region is going to actually join Russia, stating that this issue is not being considered at the moment. “In Transnistria a process of unification of all spheres of life with the Russian Federation is taking place in order to organically integrate into the economic life of Great Russia”, Smirnov was quoted as saying by Olvia-press.

During the same press-conference Smirnov confirmed his decision to compete for a fourth mandate in the presidential ballot scheduled by the region’s electoral body for 10 December 2006.

Smirnov is so far the only announced candidate for the ballot, while his most likely rival, chair of Transnistrian legislature, Evgheni Sevciuc, has not stated yet whether he will run or not. Sevciuc has shared the official line on the referendum and has called on all public and political associations to join ranks and ask all their followers to come to the referendum and vote for the independence of Transnistria. At the same time, observers have noted a number of moves made by Sevciuc in the past weeks that indicate the rupture with Smirnov’s line on other matters is widening. Speaking earlier this month about the economy of Transnistria, Sevciuc blamed the bad state of the Transnistrian economy not just on the “economic sanctions of Moldova”, but also on the regions’ institutions which had failed “to create favourable conditions to increase the levels of production by economic agents […] overburdened with unnecessary procedures of obtaining various permits and agreements”. This was interpreted by many as a direct critique of the Transnistrian economic policy under Smirnov which has survived mostly due to the income raised from massive privatisation process now coming to an end. Furthermore, the Transnistrian legislature, in which the majority is held by Sevciuc’s “Obnovlenie” (Renewal) faction, has recently turned down a presidential legislative initiative to enhance the powers of the region’s “security ministry”, a key ally of Smirnov.

These developments help understand why many both in Moldova and abroad see the 17 September referendum as nothing but a chance for Mr Smirnov to strengthen his position in relation with possible challengers in the December elections.

e-democracy.md

Transnistrian Conflict on September 1–15, 2006

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