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e-journal #13 |
The members of the Joint Constitutional Commission (JCC) met for the third time and agreed upon the basic principles of Title II of the new federal Constitution, on the fundamental rights and liberties of citizens. The text of the Title will be considered at the next meetings of the JCC. The issue of Transnistrian citizenship, which the Transnistrians demand, and which the Moldovan side does not accept, has not been resolved. In exchange, according to the statements of a member of the Transnistrian delegation to the JCC, a number of other issues have been solved: the sides worked out a compromise formula on the issue of cults, and, upon the proposal of the Transnistrians, an article has been adopted on the “right to oppose”. Apparently, such articles exist in other European federations and envisage the right of individuals to oppose those who challenge the foundations of the constitutional regime.
At the same time, during the meeting, the Transnistrians have handed to the Moldovan delegation their own draft of the future constitution of the Moldovan Federal State. Among the provisions of the draft, there is a number that deserves special attention, such as the one included in the very preamble of the draft (!) and providing for the right of the federal subjects to secede from the federation, the provisions on the equality of rights of the subjects and their representation in the federal structures on the basis of parity, the prevalence of the rights of subjects over the rights of the federation in areas of common interest, the institution of a two-chambered parliament, whose two major factions would represent the deputies from the two sides, the majority of both factions being necessary for the adoption of decisions etc. Thus, in general terms, the Transnistrian draft actually envisages the foundation of a union of independent state or a confederation, which the Transnistrians euphemistically call “contractual federation”. Analysts have described the draft as yet another attempt by the Transnistrians to block the process of adoption of the new constitution and to undermine the support of the USA and the EU for the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict by the end of 2003 (see ADEPT Comment “Transdnistrian project”).
The Joint Control Commission (JCC), a multilateral structure set up in 1992 to supervise the security zone between Moldova and Transnistria and which joins Moldovan and Transnistrian representatives assisted by those of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, has worked out the mechanism of withdrawal of armoured vehicles from the usage of the peacekeeping forces deployed in the security zone along the Nistru River. Thus, the issue of armoured hardware, which has been negotiated since 1994 and which is part of measures to demilitarise the area provided for in the Odessa agreements, has been finally solved. The Moldovan and Transnistrian peacekeeping forces will withdraw 40 and 31 armoured vehicles each, and the 17 Russian armoured vehicles that will stay in the area will be evacuated by the end of 2003 if the situation remains stable.
The issue of withdrawal of armoured vehicles caused a brief crisis in the activity of the JCC last month, when the members of the Transnistrian delegation blocked the work of JCC claiming that the Moldovan side had blocked the process of withdrawal. Although the differences between the two sides over the issue have been overcome, notably with the mediation of the OSCE Mission, the Moldovan side insists that the Transnistrians withdraw not only the vehicles that are owned by its peacekeepers, but also the ones belonging to Transnistrian military and paramilitary forces that are currently deployed in the security area in breach of the cease-fire agreement of 21 July 1992.
Both the OSCE and Russia have welcomed the resolution of the issue of armoured vehicles, which they called a step forward towards the resolution of the Transnistrian conundrum and building confidence between the two sides. However, another conflict has arisen between the two delegations to the JCC last week, this time over the demands of the Transnistrians to disassemble the Joint Moldovan-Transnistrian Operative Group of Investigations in Bender (Tighina) and to move the Moldovan police station from Tighina to Varnita. The Moldovan side has categorically rejected these claims, since the 1992 cease-fire agreement provides that in Tighina the forces of public order of the two sides will work together.
During the period covered here, the American newspaper The Wall Street Journal inserted a polemic on the ways of solving the Transnistrian conflict. The polemic was opened by a letter signed by three American diplomats who refuted the arguments put forward in an article published earlier in the same newspaper by the analyst of the Washington based Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies Vladimir Socor. In his article, Socor wrote that the plan of federalisation of Moldova was “primarily a Russian project” that “will provide Moscow with permanent leverages of influence over Moldova”. The three diplomats these claims, and argued that the federalisation plan launched a year ago by the international mediators is “a first chance in more than a decade to transform Moldova into a stable, unitary and democratic state”.
In a letter of reply, Robert J. Loewenberg, the President of the above mentioned Institute, wrote that the collective reaction of the three diplomats reflected “the issue’s international prominence as well as the U.S. State Department uneasiness in having endorsed this project”. Loewenberg supported Socor’s views and argued that the federalisation plan would force the Moldovan authorities “to share the power with a group of citizens from Russia, who seized Trans-Dniestr in the August 1991 Soviet putsch and control it to this day with a Soviet-style police apparatus, banning all opposition” and advocating openly a Greater Russia. The current mediation mechanism that the three diplomats regarded as satisfactory had been intended from the start to preclude direct international participation in the conflict resolution efforts and guarantee Moscow’s dominance over Moldova. “Is it not official U.S. policy that these troops must withdraw?” asked Loewenberg pointing to the pressures that Russian President Putin currently makes on the Moldovans to legalise the deployment of Russian troops in Transnistria.
Loewenberg’s counter-arguments to the three diplomats were later supported by 15 Moldovan non-governmental organisations in a common press statement. The NGOs reiterated the idea that the current negotiation and mediation mechanisms, as well as the proposed federalisation plan serve Russia’s geopolitical interests. Among the measures that need to be taken to solve the conflict, the NGOs propose to internationalise the conflict resolution efforts, democratise Transnistria and involve the civil society in the process.
Notably, the polemics took place following a number of statements made by high American diplomats who reaffirmed US support for Moldovan authorities’ current efforts at resolving the conflict through federalisation and expressed their hopes that the conflict will be solved by the end of 2003.
In the meantime, the International Crisis Group (ICG), an international think tank working on conflict resolution world-wide, has published a report on the conflict in Transnistria. The report argues that there can be no swift resolution to the conflict by the end of 2003, as proposed by the Dutch Chairmanship of the OSCE. The conflict requires a complex approach, one to take into account the root causes of the conflict and the factors that have prevented its resolution over the past decade. The ICG makes a number of generic recommendations for such an approach: 1) implement a number of measures to reduce and/or abolish the benefits, primarily economic, that the Transnistrians draw from the current status quo, 2) promote an open society in Transnistria, 3) further democratise Moldova to make it more attractive to the Transnistrians, 4) prepare a fair plan of solving the conflict, preferably through a multi-member asymmetrical federation, and 5) work out political and military guarantees including a functional dispute settlement mechanism and an international security presence under OSCE mandate.
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