Monitoring→Politics→Transnistrian Conflict

Russian State Duma’s declaration on separatist enclaves and its effects

• On March 21, 2008, following the March 13 hearings, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted a declaration “concerning Russia’s policy on Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria.” According to the document, after Kosovo has unilaterally declared its independence, Russia had to reclaim its policies on Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, given the will of people from these regions. The Duma backed the foreign policy promoted by the state leadership on the basis of respect for the international law. Also, it noted that the Duma respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova within the internationally recognised borders, but it considers that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence contravenes to the international law. According to the declaration, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, which de facto have constituted themselves as democratic states with all attributes in the years of independence, have more grounds to be proclaimed independent. The declaration clearly delimitates Russia’s attitude towards Moldova and Georgia. It says that Georgia may decide on its relations with NATO, but Russia has the right to protect its citizens and respect their will, as majority of residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are Russians. The Russian legislature noted that the direction to the NATO accession deprives Georgian authorities of the possibility to consolidate the territories and their population. Russian parliamentarians are confident that the Government shall combat any attempts of political, economic and military pressures against the three enclaves. They asked the Government to consolidate the support for Russian citizens from the regions concerned by opening Russian representations, stirring up cooperation and economic assistance, simplifying the border crossing procedures. The Duma insisted on the need of maintaining the existing peacekeeping format as long as a mutually accepted resolution of the conflicts is unavailable.

• The Duma’s declaration has deceived very much the leaders of the separatist enclaves. This is not a surprise, given the previous threats of Russian officials regarding imminent consequences of the “Kosovo precedent”. Leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not hide their deception unlike their Transnistrian fellows who avoided categorical statements. Smirnov said that Transnistrian authorities have omitted cooperation with other states in order to persuade them to support Transnistria (Smirnov demonstrates a false modesty or he forgot the 2006 “project” when the so-called International Council on Democratic Institutions and State Sovereignty published the study “State sovereignty of Pridnetrovskaya Moldovaskaya Respublica (Pridnestrovie) under international law”, lying that it was worked out by known international experts). Instead, some members of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet such as Pyotr Pasat described the Duma’s declaration as “insipid, vague and inconsistent.” Transnistrian speaker Evgeniy Shevchyuk had the most equable attitude based on approaching the situation as a fait accompli, saying among others that Russia considers that the Transnistrian conflict may be settled within the “common state”; the potential of the negotiation process was not used up yet. But the assault on Transnistrian foreign minister Valeri Litskai is the clearest sign of deception and dissatisfaction, as former Transnistrian speaker Grigory Marakutsa, secretary-general of the interparliamentary assembly of the commonwealth For Democracy and Rights of Nations (created by Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, which is also called “separatist international” or CIS-2), blamed him for the irrelevant attitude of the State Duma: the foreign ministry and its head Valeri Litskai are to blame for the failure of Transnistria revealed in the attitude of the State Duma, as the minister is beating about the bush; Litskai is to blame for Moldova’s diplomatic victory against Transnistria; nobody takes the head of the Tiraspol diplomacy into serious and accepts him any longer. Litskai really had an opportunity to “rehabilitate” himself by participating in Transnistria settlement consultations of experts in Kiev shortly after the State Duma has adopted the declaration concerned. Litskai introduced the event as a new trend in the policy of Kiev, which he said was hurt by the attitude of Chisinau that started ignoring Ukraine’s role in the Transnistrian settlement while approaching Russia. Indeed, Litskai hinted the Kievf is irritated over President Voronin’s statements on Moldova’s eventual withdrawal from the GUAM.

Three conferences on Transnistrian conflict

Three conferences on the Transnistrian conflict were organised on March 26–28, 2008, with Chisinau hosting one and Moscow two.

The international conference on “Transnistrian conflict settlement in the context of Moldova’s Europeanisation” was organised under the aegis of the Association for Foreign Policy (AFP) of Moldova. The second edition of the conference was held indeed within the AFP project Transnistrian Dialogues. Although high-ranking dignitaries of Transnistria and Moldova did not give green light to the invitation to attend the conference in order to elucidate the recent “progress” in settling the conflict, debates were very useful in making clear a series of important issues, in particular:

• High-ranking dignitaries from both banks of the Dniester River do not have what or are afraid of debating Transnistrian settlement issues;
• EU Special Representative Kalman Misei said that the sides should not hold on terms such as unitary state, federation and efforts should focus on distribution of competences in the decentralisation process;
• Deputy Minister of Reintegration Ion Stavila indicated premises for making progress in the “5+2” format Transnistrian settlement due to the “package” approach launched by President Voronin in 2006 and generally accepted by the Russian Federation. According to Mr. Stavila, there are premises to advance the status of the United States and European Union within the “5+2 format” from observers to participants. The basic documents on the Transnistrian settlement are the following: the July 22, 2005 law on basic principles of Transnistria’s status and the October presidential initiatives;
• The director of the Institute of CIS member states, Constantin Zatulin, deputy chairman for problems of CIS and fellow countrymen, said that Russia has recently explained its standpoint regarding the Transnistrian conflict via the March 21 Declaration by the State Duma. Russia recognises the territorial integrity of Moldova but as anticipation rather than as a real fact. Zatulin derided the so-called “package” approach by President Voronin, which was allegedly accepted by Russian authorities. He noted that none of Russian parliamentarians has ever seen a “package” but Moldovan authorities introduce their wishes as a fait accompli. However, Zatuluin stressed that the latest rhetoric by Moldovan authorities related to the affirmation of permanent neutrality of Moldova and confidence measures in relations with Tiraspol goes the right direction to remedy disagreements born after President Voronin has turned down the Kozak Memorandum in 2003;
• Western political analyst Vladimir Socor has noted Russia’s competition with the West in settling the Transnistrian conflict. He stressed the efficiency of the soft EU policy on Transnistria settlement, balancing it with the one of Russia, which undermines the security of Moldova and Ukraine by following its goals in Transnistria. Socor welcomed President Voronin’s Transnistria settlement initiatives but he wondered that insisting on Moldova’s neutrality would make Russia pull out its troops from Transnistria. Also, he called against speeding up a pre-electoral resolution, fearing that it would run counter Moldova on a long term;
• Known analyst Oazu Nantoi stated that latest developments, hearings by the State Duma indicate a reduction of Russia’s influence in Transnistria. He recommended not to hurry up to settle the conflict on pre-electoral reasons, called for the democratisation and Europeanisation of Moldova, in order to make it attractive for Transnistrians and prepare the natural reintegration of the country;
• The representative of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch, said that though a rapid resolution of the Transnistrian conflict is expected, now the sides are farer from reaching a compromise than they were in 2006, when the “5+2” negotiations ceased. According to Neukirch, now “negotiations are negotiated” and an unconditional resumption of the “5+2” talks would be the solution;
• Transnistrian analyst Andrei Safonov said that acting Transnistrian authorities will never accept a conflict resolution under the conditions imposed by Moldovan authorities on the basis of the July 2005 Law. He considers that a compromise solution such as Moldova to give up the settlement within a unitary state and Transnistria to accept reasonable concessions will be unlikely found by April 2009;
• AFP director Andrei Popov has drawn the conclusions of the conference, saying that the “package” initiatives and declared international affirmation of Moldova’s neutrality cannot motivate Russia to accept a rapid and lasting settlement of the Transnistrian conflict without affecting Moldova’s interests. Therefore, a rapid resolution by the 2009 parliamentary elections is unlike. In these circumstances, the Transnistrian settlement as a whole shall be tackled for a longer term.

The Institute of Economy of the Russian Academy of Sciences organised a roundtable on “Post-Soviet area: realities and prospects” on March 27. A report by Transnistrian speaker Evgeniy Shevchyuk was released at the roundtable. It states the following:

• The Russian State Duma decided in 1995 and 1996 to declare “Transnistria a region of exceptional interest for Russia,” recommending Russian president to recognise Transnistria as a subject of the international law and to conclude an international agreement with Transnistria in this respect;
• In spite of encouragements and promises to recognise the results of referenda in Transnistria, the Russian Duma recognised Moldova’s territorial integrity in the March 21, 2008 Declaration, avoiding to mention both an eventual recognition of Transnistria and the “postponed status” of Transnistria;
• Recent developments clearly demonstrate the decline of Russia’s interest for Transnistria and its inclination to take into consideration President Voronin’s promises to guarantee Moldova’s neutrality;
• By conceding Transnistria, Russia could find itself in a situation like when it conceded the Alaska Peninsula;
• The Transnistria settlement model by President Voronin is equivalent to the one of Gagauzia. Russia’s consent for this approach means that the settlement in general is postponed, rather than the status of Transnistria, and thus Russia could lose the entire region;
• A careful consideration of the situation indicates that there are legal and historical concessions for geopolitical reasons on account of Transnistria’s interests, so that the will of Transnistrians certified during referenda is ignored. Transnistrians have followed the separation of Montenegro and Kosovo from Serbia and Russia’s reactions that precedents have been created.

On March 28, Moscow hosted a conference themed “After Kosovo, commonwealth of unrecognised states going ahead to international recognition”. Supporters of the independence of separatist enclaves have addressed the conference:

• Modest Kolerov, former advisor for President Putin in 2005–2007 and “architect of civil society from Transnistria”, stated that “Russia may lose the separatist enclaves because their elites may be destroyed or bribed. Unrecognised republics will be incapable to survive without Russia’s support and strong guarantees after an eventual legal recognition, joining thus the enemies of Russia.” Kolerov wondered: is the Transnistrian economy strong and transparent enough to ensure the capitulation of the Moldovan elite in front of that of Transnistria? He noted that the present Transnistrian elite cannot subdue Chisinau;
• The director of the Transnistrian Institute of History, State and Law, Ilya Galinsky, said that the restoration of Transnistria’s territorial unity with Moldova is equivalent to the death of the Transnistrian internationalist project. He noted that Moldova and Transnistria had made different geopolitical choices. Galinsky asked Russia not to be lured by promises of Chisinau to consolidate its neutrality. Anyway, Moldova is continuing the cooperation with NATO while the pro-Russia Transnistria may oppose the NATO enlargement in the region. He warned that “Russia is running the risk to lose the control on Moldova and to lose Transnistria, should it be lured by Voronin’s promised. Russia’s actions to protect interests of its citizens from Transnistria are timid and inefficient.” Galinsky threatened that “the patience of the Transnistrian people is not endless”;
• Tamara Guzenkova, representative of the Russian strategic researching institute, stated that the EU proximity to Transnistria is revealing its effects. “The European idea is attracting masses of people from the region. Transnistrian invalids receive wheelchairs, glasses for free. Transnistrian youths are driven in Brussels and Vienna.” Russia’s aid for Transnistria is significant, but insufficient in front of European allurements. The EU is promoting a well-considered policy on attracting Transnistrian elites and “stiffly hugging” masses of people. This state of things may change electoral sympathies of Transnistrians who could make another choice at the next elections in the region as a sign of protest.

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