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Transnistrian Conflict on December 16–31, 2006

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An optimistic end of the year on the Transnistrian conflict settlement

After a year when the political talks on Transnistria were basically stopped, the joint bodies of control set up according to the ceasefire agreements practically did not function, the Russian Federation has granted more massive and overt political, economic and social support to Transnistria than ever, and the Transnistrian authorities have strengthened their position by staging two actions with significant propagandistic effect – the September referendum and the December “presidential elections”, the end of 2006 has witnessed a number of quite optimistic statements on the prospects of the Transnistrian conflict settlement from Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian officials.

Thus, between 19–20 December the Moldovan Reintegration Minister, Vasile Sova, and the Presidential adviser on foreign policy issues, Mark Tkaciuk, visited Moscow where they discussed Transnistria with a number of high-ranking Russian officials. According to a Ministry of Reintegration communique, the sides stressed the need to continue consultations among all actors regarding the resumption of political talks. The visit has been a reason for the Russian Foreign Minister, Serghei Lavrov, to state that “the dialogue with Moldova proceeds well”. “There is an honest, correct and professional dialogue on all issues, including the commercial-economic ones. All these problems are being solved consistently. We are happy with the way the agreements reached between the Russian and Moldovan Presidents are being implemented”, said Lavrov, referring to the agreements reached between the two presidents during their bilateral meetings in August in Moscow and November in Minsk in 2006.

Resonating with these statements, President Voronin has stated during his end of the year press conference that “certain progresses” have been achieved on the Transnistrian settlement. He expressed his special satisfaction at the course of consultations between Moldovan and Russian officials, “which are taking place in an open manner, with EU Member States ambassadors being kept informed on each round”.

And finally the Transnistrian issue was on the agenda of the discussions between the Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart during the former’s visit to Kiev this December. According to the electronic news portal NR2.ru, during the joint press conference the two spoke about the progresses reached on Transnistria in the past months. “In the past months we believe that certain progresses have been reached. On the one hand, the customs regime is ensured, which has reduced the tension to a large extent, and, on the other hand, the passenger and goods traffic has been re-established as has been the railway transportation between Ukraine, Russia, Transnistria and Moldova”, President Yushcenko stated. “We believe that today there exist all the premises to speak about the prospects of resumption of the «5+2» talks”, Yushcenko added. On the other hand, President Putin stated that Russia and Ukraine “can give a new push to the Transnistrian settlement”.

Smirnov’s “inauguration” and forecasts for the future

In the meantime in Tiraspol took place the “inauguration” of the new elect “president” of Transnistria, Igor Smirnov. The pompous ceremony gathered the cream of the Transnistrian “establishment” as well as guests of honour, such as for example the “president” of another unrecognised republic, Sergei Bagapsh of Abhazia. After making the oath with his hand on the “constitution”, Smirnov held his inaugural speech in which he reiterated the break away entity’s orientation to Russia and has noted the progress already reached in harmonising the Transnistrian laws with the Russian ones, cooperation projects in the social and cultural fields, etc.

The Transnistrian “presidential” elections and Smirnov’s “inauguration” have triggered numerous comments by observers both from Moldova and abroad. Thus the Moldovan political analyst, Oazu Nantoi, has remarked in a comment that Smirnov’s fourth mandate will also be his final one. According to Nantoi, this will happen because in the next years the “value of the Transnistrian pawn for its Moscow masters” will significantly decrease. The latter might want to replace Smirnov with a “cleaner successor” and thus the “absurd theatre show called the Transnistrian conflict will go on”. A more optimistic scenario however could be that the process of territorial reintegration of Moldova might be relaunched before a successor to President Putin takes over in Moscow. According to Nantoi this is the scenario that President Voronin is trying to put into practice and to which the latest developments in the Moldovan-Russian relations indicate.

In a comment published on 14 December, the News Agency Moldpres has forecast that although Smirnov will have to remain loyal to Moscow mainly due to the large Transnistrian debt for Russian gas consumption, Russia might abandon Transnistria at some point in exchange for more loyalty from the West or concessions from Ukraine. According to Moldpress, hence Smirnov’s efforts both during his electoral campaign and after it to maintain Transnistria in the Russian range of attention. At the same time it is expected that Smirnov will reform the Transnistrian administration, which has fully proved its inefficiency. However, his biggest challenge will be to preserve the balance of power with the Scheriff Company whose power ambitions are on the rise, concludes Moldpres.

On the other hand, the British analytical centre, Oxford Analytica, has written that the 10 December “elections” have considerably consolidated Tiraspol’s position in its relations with Chisinau and have considerably distanced an eventual resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. The think tank assumes that the resumption of Moldovan wine exports to Russia might have been conditioned by Moscow with the revitalisation of the ill-fated Kozak Memorandum. And given that Ukraine seems incapable of counter-balance Russian influence, Moldova finds itself in a very vulnerable position and only US and EU support may consolidate Chisinau’s position.

December 2–15, 2006 January 1–31, 2007