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Transnistrian Conflict on March 15–28, 2004

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The official Chisinau urges the resumption of talks in the five-sided format

During a press conference held on 16 March in Chisinau, the Moldovan Minister of Reintegration Vasile Sova called upon the mediators to determine an exact date for the resumption of talks in the pentagonal format. According to Minister Sova, the prospects for resuming the talks are real; however, additional efforts need to be made. He urged the mediators on behalf of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE to initial the necessary consultations in order to summon a five-sided meeting by the end of March, according to the agreements reached in Belgrade.

Vasile Sova reiterated Chisinau’s concerns with regard to the unilateral actions of the Transnistrian administration, which are intended to destabilise the situation and tension the relations with Chisinau, referring to the incidents around the Moldovan police commissariat in Tighina (Bender) and the situation of Romanian language schools in Transnistria. Thus, Sova was quoted by Basa-press as saying that: “one can sense the symptoms of a crisis situation, which could be prevented by resuming negotiations in the widest format. /…/ However, if our efforts prove without result, we will probably have to call for a special meeting of the Permanent Council of the OSCE in Vienna”.

On the other hand, William Hill, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, told the press on 16 March that the Transnistrian authorities are tergiversating purposefully the resumption of talks in the five-sided format. According to Hill, the Transnistrian authorities have declined repeatedly the OSCE requests to name an exact date when they would be available to attend a five-sided meeting along with the Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian and OSCE representatives.

The Russian elections and the priorities of the Transnistrian “foreign policy”

“The foreign policy of Transnistria has remained unchanged and is historically oriented towards priority links with Russia and Ukraine. The maintenance and consolidation of these links represent our strategic priorities”, the Transnistria leader Igor Smirnov was quoted as saying by Transnistrian official news outlets during a pres conference on 22 March in Tiraspol, which was gathered to make an assessment of the political year 2003 and set the foreign policy priorities for 2004. Smirnov thanked the two states for successfully conducting the peace operations in the region and for their contribution to the conflict settlement process. Furthermore, he expressed hope that the two states will continue to play a prominent role both in the settlement process and in the post-settlement reconstruction efforts.

The assertive tone of Smirnov’s statements can be easily attributed to the results of the presidential elections in Russia. On the eve of the election, Smirnov met in Moscow with the Russian President Vladimir Putin, with whom he discussed the Transnistrian issue. On the day of the voting Smirnov called upon Russia to increase its role of the power that ensures the “peace and security” in Transnistria and urged Russia to set permanent military bases in Transnistria and to speed up the process of acquisition of Russian citizenship by the inhabitants of Transnistria. Thus, one can easily understand the context within which the Transnistrians have been calling lately for a final and just settlement of relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, and for the legal consolidation of the Transnistrian statehood on the international arena.

The evacuation of Russian weapons from Transnistria

A trainload of approximately 100 tons of Russian weapons was evacuated from Transnistria on the night from 24 to 25 March. This has been the first trainload of Russian weapons to be evacuated from the region this year, after a three-month pause. The spokesperson of the OSCE Mission to Moldova Claus Neukirch confirmed the fact that the load was evacuated, but specified that the OSCE Mission military experts were not allowed to witness the loading, but were let in only at the end of the operation. According to Neukirch, the Transnistrian authorities have not given a date for the transportation of the next load of weapons.

The Kozak Plan in the attention of the international community

Ambassador Stephen Pifer, Deputy Assistant of the US State Secretary, expressed in Moscow confidence that in the result of the visit to Washington of the Russia Deputy Foreign Minister Veaceslav Trubnikov this April, the Russian settlement plan, also known as the “Kozak Plan”, will be “injected new energy”. According to Russian news agencies, quoted by Basa-press, the American diplomat said that Russia should assume a part of the blame for the failure of the Kozak Plan, because the plan provided for the participation of a 2000 troops strong Russian peacekeeping contingent instead of the maximum 500 that Russia had announced within previous consultations with European officials.

Referring to the same Kozak Plan, the electronic issue of the Moscow daily “Nezavisimaia Gazeta” published on 25 March a comment by the German political analyst Aleksander Rahr. The comment argues that the plan elaborated by one of the most promising men from the Putin team, Dmitri Kozak, was intended as a model for recovering the former Soviet republics. Thus, writes Rahr, the confederation model drafted for Moldova, in the event of success, would have been proposed to Georgia, then to Armenia and Azerbaijan. The transformation of the former Soviet republics into confederal states would have gradually led to the transformation of the CIS into a quasi-confederal entity. Rahr argues that Russia will oppose any proposals for international peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet area, and as long as the West keeps the door to the European Union and NATO closed for the Georgians, the Moldovans and the Ukrainians, Russia’s influence will only be rising. Thus, concludes Rahr, “the fate of the partnership between Russia and the West during Putin’s second mandate will be decided not in the diplomatic saloons of Brussels, Washington, London, Rome or Berlin, but in such hot spots as Batumi, Suhumi or Tiraspol”.

February 23 – March 14, 2004 March 29 – April 11, 2004