Transnistrian Conflict on April 4–17, 2005

The European Union does not have a concrete Transnistrian settlement plan, but is ready to make proposals that might be useful, the EU Special Representative for the Republic of Moldova Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged told a press conference at the end of his visit to Moldova on 11–12 April. According to him, the EU will support any plan that will propose an efficient and working distribution of powers between the centre and the periphery, whatever the settlement principle, be it a federation, a common state, etc.

“This visit has given me the impression that there is a great will to solve the Transnistrian conflict. And we are ready to contribute. I will not stay here permanently, but will visit often. In addition, I will consult Moscow, Kiev, Bucharest, Washington, the OSCE and other EU countries,” Jacobovits said, quoted by the Infotag news agency.

The EU Special Representative noted the “crucial change” in the EU attitude towards Moldova. “The EU Neighbourhood Policy has been approved, so has the EU-Moldova Action Plan. This is an important progress. The European Commission will open an office in Chisinau,” added Jacobovits, announcing his next visit to Moldova for 26 April 2005.

The EU Special Representative for Moldova was appointed by the Council of the European Union on 23 March 2005. His mandate is principally focused on the coordination of the EU contribution to the Transnistrian conflict resolution.

In the meantime, on 12 April President Voronin told a TV show on “Pro TV” that the official Chisinau is working on a draft law on the special status of the Transnistrian region within the Republic of Moldova. According to Voronin, the document will provide for extensive rights of the future autonomy — local parliament, administration, own budget, flag, anthem and other attributes. The banking system, army, customs and foreign policy will remain unique. Speaking of the announced Ukrainian settlement plan, Voronin said he was not aware of its contents, but that Moldova would accept an eventual proposal from Ukraine to solve the Transnistrian issue by the example of Crimea. Voronin denied the roomers that Moldova will withdraw from the CIS and declared that GUUAM is a “purely economic” initiative and is not directed against the CIS.

On the other hand, on the eve of the GUUAM Summit that will take place in Chisinau on 22 April, the Chisinau and Kiev press have published a series of articles regarding to settlement plan that the Ukrainian president is to propose at the Summit, but also on the future role that Ukraine will play in the settlement process. Thus, many Ukrainian political commentators have called upon the Ukrainian authorities to publish the plan ahead of the Summit and discuss it with independent experts both in Ukraine, and in Moldova, Romania, US, EU and OSCE States. Such an approach would be in line with the European style policy of regional leader that Kiev has assumed on the trilateral Kiev-Chisinau-Tbilisi, and would prevent a Kozak Memorandum like failure of the plan.

At the same time, Ukrainian commentators have deplored the “generous” reopening by the Ukrainian customs authorities of the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border for the export and transit of Transnistrian goods. This customs measure was introduced immediately after the meeting that the Ukrainian and Russian president had on 19 March in Kiev, in spite of the changes operated by President Yushchenko in the leadership of the customs services and his tough critique at the activity of the customs services, invoking breaches and smuggling traffic across the Moldova-Ukrainian frontier, as well as a high level of unprofessionalism and corruption.

Thus, while the “orange” Ukraine is trying to assert its adherence to European values, it seems that the lower echelons of power act behind the back of President Yushchenko and continue to promote the Kuchma-style policy of Ukraine on the Transnistrian issue. At the same time, Ukrainian observers have noted, Kiev is now the decisive actor in solving the Transnistrian crisis, because only the economic isolation of the region and, in particular, the blocking of shadow activities over the border could determine the Transnistrian break away regime to compromise and give up its vanity inspired by the Kremlin. An effective input by the post-Kuchma Ukraine into the Transnistrian conflict resolution process could be an important first step towards accomplishing its European aspirations.

e-democracy.md

Transnistrian Conflict on April 4–17, 2005

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