Alegerile parlamentare din 2021 în Republica Moldova - alegeri.md
 Monitoring→Politics→Transnistrian Conflict

Transnistrian Conflict on April 16–30, 2007

|print version|mail| e-journal #94 |
Roomers about a possible new Russian settlement plan on Transnistria negotiated secretly by Chisinau and Russia without the participation of other mediators and the observers on behalf of the EU and US have stirred an unprecedented array of diplomatic visits to Chisinau. Thus, last week the Moldovan capital was visited by the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, David Kramer, EU Special Representative for Moldova, Kalman Mizsei, as well as a representative of the Spanish OSCE Chairmanship. The Special Envoy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Russia’s representative at the Transnistrian talks, Valeri Nesteruskin, also paid a visit to Chisinau last week.

Of the officials mentioned above, only the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, David Kramer, presented the results of his meetings with Moldovan officials in a press conference. Thus, Kramer stated that he received special assurances from President Vladimir Voronin, Ministers Andrei Stratan and Vasile Sova, that there is no new Russian plan on Transnistria. Kramer reiterated the US position whereby the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova, as well as transparency and legitimacy should be the basic principles of any settlement agreement. The withdrawal of Russian troops and weapons from Transnistria should take place in parallel or even ahead of any such agreement. At the same time, the American official supported the idea of transforming the current peace keeping operation in the region into one under international mandate, as earlier proposed by Moldova. Asked about the US views on a future possible status of Transnistria, Kramer supported Chisinau’s position in favour of an autonomy status within Moldova, rather than a federal of confederal arrangement. At the same time, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State stated that negotiations in the “5+2” format cannot be resumed because of Transnistria’s resistance, which invokes “any reason under the sun” not to attend the talks. The US have called for an immediate and unconditional resumption of the negotiations.

We would like to remind that during the period covered here local and international press featured a series of articles on a possible new Russian plan agreed secretly between Chisinau and Moscow behind EU and US back. The subject was first opened by Jamestown Foundation analyst, Vlad Socor, who published a leaked version of the presumed plan. The subject was later taken over by such publications as The Economist and the EUObserver.com portal. According to these, the plan would envision signature by President Voronin and the Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov of a joint statement whereby Moldova would recognise the legitimacy of the Transnistrian authorities; organisation of legislative elections on both banks for a new Moldovan Parliament, in which Transnistria will hold 20% of seats; allocation of a post of deputy minister in each Moldovan ministry to a Transnistrian representative, including a post of first deputy prime-minister; maintenance of the Russian military presence in Transnistria until Moldova and Russia decide the situation is stable enough.

The Economist calls the possible consequences of such a plan as “disastrous”, while the EUObsever.com portal draws parallels between the new plan and the Kozak Memorandum and argues the plan puts under serious threat the European aspirations of Moldova.

In an interview with Radio Free Europe, Deputy Chairman of Moldovan Parliament, Iurie Rosca, stated that President Voronin indeed presented the above mentioned elements to a limited circle of Moldovan decision makers on 11 April, but rather as a “possible scenario” than as a plan per se. According to Rosca, the scenario was discussed from the perspective of some possible proposals on behalf of Chisinau should Moscow advance such elements in a broader settlement plan. At the same time, Chisinau was to test the feasibility of such a scenario in light of responses internally and externally.

One can thus assume that the “leak” in the article of Vladimir Socor, who is know as being close to the Chisinau’s administration, was a planned one and one intended to “test” reactions. And given that reactions from the Western partners have been all negative, the “scenario” was invalidated and will not be put into practice. In such a case, one cannot help but wonder — is this the way in which the Moldovan leadership sees the application of the “upgrade in the scope and intensity of political cooperation” and “shared responsibility for conflict resolution” with the EU, as provided for in the EU-Moldova Action Plan?