Alegerile parlamentare din 2021 în Republica Moldova - alegeri.md
 Monitoring→Politics→Transnistrian Conflict

Transnistrian Conflict on May 2–31, 2009

Transnistrian leaders not nourishing illusions regarding resumption of negotiation process

Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov said in an interview with the Russian TV station TV Center on May 14 that he does not nourish illusions regarding the resumption of negotiations with the Chisinau authorities. Smirnov seized the occasion to speak about the impact of the April 7, 2009 events on the Chisinau-Tiraspol relations. He said that the developments concerned were predictable, as the Republic of Moldova would promote a nationalist policy on separating people under ethnic criteria. As well, Smirnov noted that he does not trust in Chisinau authorities who sign documents and ignore them lately, and promote oscillating policies in general, either focussed on EU, or aiming at Russia. In this context, Transnistrian foreign minister Vladimir Yastrebceak delivered a speech on occasion of the “day of diplomatic worker”, reiterating that the Transnistrian authorities will be ready to resume the “5+2” negotiation process just after lifting all barriers imposed to Transnistria. As well, Yastrebceak stressed that the foreign policy of Transnistria focuses on relations with Russia, Ukraine, EU and partners from CIS-2.

On occasion of the professional day of the Transnistrian security, lieutenant-general Vladimir Antiufeev has spoken about the future of the Tiraspol-Chisinau relations. The news agency INFOTAG quoted Antiufeev as saying that the key purpose of the Moldovan communists within organisation of the disturbances in Chisinau on April 7 was to prove that “nobody but the PCRM is capable to control the situation.” Antiufeev stressed that “Romania’s participation in the developments in Moldova was predictable, too.” By declaring the European integration policy, “Moldova is going to the ‘stomach’ of Romania. This is an objective process and no one should nourish illusions.” According to Antiufeev, the authorities in Transnistria “have built mechanisms against technologies of the so-called coloured revolutions”.

Developments in the Republic of Moldova will not influence Transnistria’s strategy

The Transnistrian authorities have announced that the post-electoral political developments in the Republic of Moldova cannot influence their strategy on implementing objectives related to results of the September 2006 referendum. Hence, the Tiraspol authorities have plans to keep fortifying Transnistria’s independence with the purpose to join the Russian Federation. In this framework, the “5+2” negotiations may restart only after all pressures capable to harm Transnistria’s interest will be stopped, this being a condition set in the Barvikha Declaration. So far, the Transnistrian authorities have plans to attend the Helsinki seminar which will take place in June under the OSCE auspices and discuss issues related to building reciprocal confidence in military and security areas. Transnistria has already made an expert group and expects Chisinau to do the same.

Vladimir Yastrebceac has told a news conference organized by the Institute of CIS countries chaired by Constantin Zatulin, head of Transnistrian diplomacy, that Chisinau’s statements regarding the dialogue with the Transnistrian side are meaningless as long as a new president of the Republic of Moldova is not elected. Secondly, the current status of Vladimir Voronin is unclear — head of the Parliament or head of state, and this produces confusion, obstructing the resumption of dialogue. Thirdly, it has become a tradition for Chisinau to invoke the attachment for continuing the “5+2” negotiations. However, this means nothing but bowing to western partners which it wants to assure that nothing has happened in the Republic of Moldova after the parliamentary elections, despite developments that should be taken into consideration during negotiations. Fourthly, the political instability in the Republic of Moldova may be quite lasting, and Moldovan functionaries will avoid assuming certain risks meantime, holding serious talks, while their eventual successors will like to cite the 2005 legal regulations, which stipulates a status of autonomy for Transnistrian region, but the latter does not accept it. Fifthly, taken altogether and separately these factors estrange Transnistria from the Republic of Moldova.

Harmonisation of Transnistria’s legislation to Russia’s laws — a source of conflict

On May 14, 2009 Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov sent a letter to the speaker of the Supreme Soviet, Yevgeni Shevchyuk, in connection with the “initiatives of the 17” concerning the amendment of Transnistria’s constitution, voted in the first reading on April 15, 2009. On the eve, Smirnov has instructed the Transnistrian justice minister to make a comparative and in-depth analysis of the constitutions of Transnistria and Russian Federation, in order to be able to combat the “initiative of the 17” by using the key pretext of harmonising the Transnistrian legislation with Russia’s laws. According to Smirnov’s message to Shevchyuk, after examining the text of constitutional amendments he concluded that the declared goal of harmonising Transnistria’s legislation with Russia’s regulations cannot be reached through amendments adopted in the first reading by the Supreme Soviet. On the contrary, the constitutional amendments concerned enlarge the discrepancies between Transnistria’s legislation and Russia’s laws. In this context, Smirnov stated:

On the basis of these arguments, Igor Smirnov has demanded speaker Yevgeni Shevchyuk to decline the draft constitutional amendments and deliver the proposals to the interdepartmental working group in charge with harmonising the legislation of Transnistria with Russian regulations, so that to continue the harmonisation activity.

As Smirnov’s call did not have any impact, the political competition between speaker Shevchyuk and administration of Igor Smirnov related to “the initiative of the 17” lawmakers to modify Transnistria’s constitution attracted new supporters of Smirnov. Twenty-seven legislators from the first legislature of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet convoked a meeting to take an attitude towards “the initiative of the 17” and criticised both the proper initiative and speaker Shevchyuk, accusing him that in 2003, when he was member of the “constitutional commission” for Transnistrian settlement, he was ready for unilateral ceding to the Republic of Moldova and further wanted to involve the EU and UN as moderators of the negotiation process, while now he corrupts lawmakers and electors via some funds from the Russian Federation. However, the gravest accusation brought against Shevchyuk is that he is using the slogan of harmonising the Transnistrian legislation with Russian laws for the purpose of usurping the power and weakening the position of Transnistrian deputy president Alexandr Koroliov, by cancelling his office via the constitutional reform. Participants in the meeting, including some functionaries from Smirnov’s administration adopted a statement which brings the following recommendations:

Initiative on circulation of Russian rouble on a par with Transnistrian rouble

Concomitantly with the harmonisation of the Transnistrian legislation with Russian regulations lawmakers in Tiraspol are considering the possibility to introduce the Russian rouble in the secessionist region. However, representatives of the Transnistrian republican bank contested the initiative on legalising the circulation of Russian rouble on a par with the Transnistrian rouble. According to bank experts, the introduction of the Russian rouble in Transnistria would have the following negative effects: the loss of control on supply of currency and issuance processes; the devaluation of domestic currency; the transfer of the domestic currency into Russian currency by economic agents, so that the Transnistrian rouble will be eliminated from local circuit; the loss of control on inflation; the rise in shadow economic activity; the loss of people’s trust in economic policies promoted by authorities. Finally, Transnistria could loss its “economic sovereignty” after an eventual introduction of the Russian rouble.

Chisinau blamed for Tiraspol’s economic problems

The Transnistrian propaganda is trying to persuade people from the Transnistrian region that Chisinau carries some responsibility for Transnistria’s economic problems, as it introduced new customs regulations for Transnistrian exporters in 2006. In consequence, the industrial output of Transnistria in January-April 2009 reached only 67.5 percent of the output in the similar period of 2008. The production of the Ribnita-based Metallurgical Plant has decreased by 70 percent, indicators of light industry recorded just 55 percent, while those of building material industry recorded only 19 percent of the same period of 2008.

Updating of demographic data

According to the branch of the news agency Novy Region, which cites official statistics released by the Tiraspol ministry of economy, the population decline in the Transnistrian region is on the rise. As of April 1, 2009, there were 526,500 people in Transnistria. According to formal statistics, the natural decline of population was 771 people in January-February 2009. As many as 1,248 new-borns vs. 2,019 deaths were recorded in the period concerned. Majority of deaths were related to cardiovascular and oncologic diseases. According to statistics, 68 percent of the population of the Transnistrian region lives in urban areas and 32 percent in rural areas. As many as 618 marriages and 500 divorces were recorded in Transnistria in January-March 2009.

Successors of imperial family from Tiraspol

By occurrence or not, there is a battle of symbols between Chisinau and Tiraspol. The new Parliament elected on April 5, which is dominated by 60 percent of communists who introduce themselves as ideological successors of Lenin accordingly to their programme, convened in its first sitting on May 5, 2009. The same day, invited by Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, Grand Duchess Maria Vladimirovna Romanov visited Tiraspol. According to the news agency INFOTAG, the grand duchess visited the memorial complex in Tighina where thousands of Russian military who fought in that area in the 18th century were buried. In fact, she was invited to attend a ceremony dedicated to the 600th anniversary of the city of Tighina celebrated on October 8, 2008. But she could not come then, deploying the secretary of the head of the Russian royal family, Alexandr Zakatov. The duchess believes that one of her key tasks is the peacekeeping mission and consolidation of friendship between nations who had been part of a state once.

April 16 – May 1, 2009 June 1–15, 2009