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Transnistrian Conflict on April 18 – May 1, 2005

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At the GUUAM Summit of Heads of State, which took place on 22 April 2005 in Chisinau, the Ukrainian President Victor Yushcenko did not present a Transnistrian settlement plan, as he had announced previously, but just seven general principles, under the generic title Towards Settlement through Democratisation, that are to be laid at the basis of the Transnistrian settlement:

According to Yushcenko, if the proposed principles are accepted, Ukraine will present a full fledged settlement plan shortly.

Both at the Summit and afterwards, Romania was the only state to take an official stand towards Ukraine’s proposals. The Romanian President Traian Basescu subjected to tough critique the proposals of his Ukrainian colleague, stating that there can be no international monitoring of elections in Transnistria, because this would mean recognition of the break away regime. Thus, it seems that despite the joint statement made by the Romanian and Ukrainian presidents just a few days before the GUUAM Summit that the two states are ready to cooperate in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, Yushcenko’s proposals came as a complete surprise to his Romanian counterpart.

The official Chisinau has not made any comments on Kiev’s proposals, although a number of local and foreign observers have noted the disappointment that the Moldovan side should have felt at proposals that did not refer to the status of the Transnistrian region within the unitary Moldovan state, did not mention the inefficiency of the five-sided negotiations mechanism and the need to change it, did not urge for the immediate withdrawal of Russian military and weapons from the region, and did not plead for joint Moldovan-Ukrainian customs check points. Asked by Radio Free Europe, Reintegration Minister Vasile Sova avoided to give a straightforward view on the Ukrainian proposals, but said that these were being examined with great attention in Chisinau. At the same time, Sova said that the proposals denote Ukraine’s intention to assume a greater role in the Transnistrian settlement process, which is a positive development. The reaction of the local public opinion has been an extremely critical one, the Ukrainian proposals being rejected fully as they would legitimize the break away authorities, preserve the status quo and ignore such important aspects of settlement as the demilitarization and decriminalization of the region. Thus, many civil society representatives called Ukraine’s proposals as a “Ukrainian Kozak Plan”.

On the other hand, the Transnistrian official news agency Olvia-press, published on 24 April a commentary in which most of Yushcenko’s proposals were welcomed, as was Ukraine’s will to assume a greater role in the settlement process. The Transnistrian side supports in particular Kiev’s proposals to organize elections to the Transnistrian supreme soviet and invite an international monitoring mission, which in Tiraspol is interpreted as an international recognition of the legitimacy of elections and of the said body. Transnistria also accepts Kiev’s proposals to deploy an international monitoring mission on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border and the inspection of enterprises from the military-industrial complex from the region — measures that the comment claims Tiraspol would have long demanded to show the international public opinion that it is not a “black hole” as it is called in Chisinau and elsewhere. Less acceptable for the Olvia-press commentator is Ukraine’s proposal to develop the civil society in the region, which to the Olvia-press commentator has an equivocal meaning, given the role that civil society — a network of non-governmental organizations funded by foreign states — has played in the organization of “colour” revolutions in the CIS.

The participants in the GUUAM Summit declared that the Summit had been a great success and adopted a joint statement in which they engaged, among other things, to collaborate in fighting the phenomenon of secessionism in the region. The first step made in this direction — Ukraine’s initiative with regard to the Transnistrian conflict, is not a very promising one.

After the political change in Ukraine, there was real hope in Chisinau that Ukraine would assume a more active and constructive role in the Transnistrian settlement process. A political will to settle the Transnistrian crisis in Kiev would mean in the first place the interruption of the illegal smuggling activities over the Transnistrian segment of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, which would leave the Transnistrian regime without sources of existence and would determine it to accept a compromise solution. The “orange” Ukraine has not justified yet its claims to be a regional leader, Yushcenko’s proposals being a set of disparate principles that would be difficult to incorporate into a coherent and functional Transnistrian settlement plan.

As the Ukrainian opportunity has not materialized itself yet, the Transnistrian settlement process enters a new phase of incertitude that will only be overcome through a greater involvement of the European Union in the settlement efforts, including through an intensified political dialogue on Transnistria with the mediator states and other interested actors, notably Romania.

April 4–17, 2005 May 2–22, 2005